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COUNCIL
Report on the Convention
on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters
(Signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968)
by Mr P. Jenard
Director in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade.
committee of experts set up in 1960 by decision of the Committee of Permanent
Representatives of the Member States, following a proposal by the Commission, prepared a
draft Convention, in pursuance of Article 220 of the EEC Treaty, on jurisdiction and the
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. The committee was composed of
governmental experts from the six Member States, representatives of the Commission, and
observers. Its rapporteur, Mr P. Jenard, Directeur d' Administration in the Belgian Ministry
for Foreign Affairs and External Trade, wrote the explanatory report, which was submitted
to the governments at the same time as the draft prepared by the committee of experts. The
following is the text of that report. It takes the form of a commentary on the Convention
which was signed in Brussels on 27 September 1968.No C 59/2 Official Journal of the European Communities
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CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
By Article 220 of the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, the Member States agreed to
enter into negotiations with each other, so far as
necessary, with a view to securing for the benefit of
their nationals the simplification of formalities
governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of
judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration
awards.
The fact that the Treaty of Rome requires the Member
States to resolve this problem shows that it is important.
In a note sent to the Member States on 22 October
1959 inviting them to commence negotiations, the
Commission of the European Economic Community
pointed out that
a true internal market between the six States will be
achieved only if adequate legal protection can be
secured. The economic life of the Community may
be subject to disturbances and difficulties unless it is
possible, where necessary by judicial means, to
ensure the recognition and enforcement of the
various rights arising from the existence of a
multiplicity of legal relationships. As jurisdiction in
both civil and commercial matters is derived from
the sovereignty of Member States, and since the
effect of judicial acts is confined to each national
territory, legal protection and, hence, legal certainty
in the common market are essentially dependent on
the adoption by the Member States of a satisfactory
solution to the problem of recognition and
enforcement of judgments.
On reCeIVIng this note the Committee of Permanent
Representatives decided on 18 February 1960 to set up
a committee of experts. The committee, consisting of
delegates from the six Member countries, observers
from the Benelux Committee on the unification of law
and from the Hague Conference on private
international law, and representatives from the EEC
Commission departments concerned, met for the first
time from 11 to 13 July 1960 and appointed as its
chairman Professor Billow then Ministerialdirigent and
later Staatssekretar in the Federal Ministry of Justice in
Bonn, and as its rapporteur Mr Jenard, directeur in the
Belgian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
At its 15th meeting, held in Brussels from 7 to 11
December 1964, the committee adopted a 'Preliminary
Draft Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters, and the enforcement of authentic instruments
(document 143711IV/64). This preliminary draft, with
an explanatory report (document 2449/IV/65), was
submitted to the Governments for comment.
The comments of the Governments, and those
submitted by the Union of the Industries of the
European Community, the Permanent Co~ference of
Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the EEC, the
Banking Federation of the EEC, the Consultative
Committee of the Barristers' and Lawyers ' Associations
of the six EEC countries (a committee of the
International Association of Lawyers), were studied by
the Committee at its meeting of 5 to 15 July 1966. The
draft Convention was finally adopted by the experts at
that meeting.
The names of the governmental experts who took part
in the work of the committee are set out in the annex to
this report.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND TO THE CONVENTION
It is helpful to consider, first, the rules in ea~h of the six
countries governing the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments.
A. THE LAW IN FORCE IN THE SIX STATES
In Belgium,  until the entry into force of the Judicial
Code (Code Judiciaire), the relevant provisions asNo C 59/4 Official Journal of the European Communities
regards enforcement are to be found in Article 10 of the
Law of 25 March 1876, which contains Title I of the
Introductory Book of the Code of Civil Procedure (1).
Where there is no reciprocal convention, a court seised
of an application for an order for enforcement 'has
jurisdiction over a foreign judgment as to both form
and substance, and can re-examine both the facts and
the law. In other words, it has power to review the
matter fully . (2) e)
) Article 10 of the Law of 1876 provides that: They (courts
of first instance) shall also have jurisdiction in relation to
judgments given by foreign courts in civil and commercial
matters. Where there exists a treaty concluded on a basis of
reciprocity between Belgium and the country in which the
judgment was given, they shall review only the following
five points:
1. whether the judgment contains anything contrary to
public policy or to the principles of Belgian public law;
2. whether, under the law of the country in which the
judgment was given, it has become  res judicata;
3. whether, under that law, the certified copy of the
judgment satisfies the conditions necessary to establish
its authenticity;
4. whether the rights of the defendant have been
observed;
5. whether the jurisdiction of the foreign court is based
solely on the nationality of the plaintiff.
Article 570 of the Judicial Code contained in the Law of
10 October 1967 (supplement to the Moniteur beige of
31 October 1967) reads as follows:
Courts of first instance shall adjudicate on applications for
orders for the enforcement of judgments given by foreign
courts in civil matters, regardless of the amount involved.
Except where the provisions of a treaty between Belgium
and the country in which judgment was given are to be
applied, the court shall examine, in addition to the
substance of the matter:
1. whether the judgment contains anything contrary to
public policy or to the principles of Belgian public
law;
2. whether the rights of the defendant have been
observed;
3. whether the jurisdiction of the foreign court is based
solely on the nationality of the plaintiff;
4. whether, under the law of the country in which the
judgment was given, it has become  res judicata;
5. whether, under that law, the certified copy of the
judgment satisfies the conditions necessary to establish
its authenticity.' These provisions will enter into force
on 31 October 1970 at the latest. Before that date an
arrete royal  (Royal Decree) will determine the date on
which the provisions of the Judicial Code enter into
force.
(l) GRAULICH, Principes de droit international prive, No 248
et seq.
) RIGAUX, L'efficacite des jugements etrangers en Belgique,
Journal des tribunaux, 10. 4. 1960, P 287.
As regards recognition, text-book authorities and
case-law draw a distinction between foreign judgments
relating to status and legal capacity and those relating
to other matters. The position at present is that foreign
judgments not relating to the status and legal capacity
of persons are not regarded by the courts as having the
force of  res judicata.
However, foreign judgments relating to a person
status or legal capacity may be taken as evidence of the
status acquired by that person (4). Such  foreign
judgment thus acts as a bar to any new proceedings for
divorce or separation filed before a Belgian court if the
five conditions listed in Article 10 of the Law of 1876
are fulfilled, as they 'constitute no more than the
application to foreign judgments of rules which the
legislature considers essential for any judgment to be
valid' .
In the  Federal Republic of Germany,  foreign judgments
are recognized and enforced on the basis of
reciprocity (5). The conditions for recognition of foreign
judgments are laid down in paragraph 328 of the Code
of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozegordnung):
I. A judgment given by a foreign court may not be
recognized:
1. where the courts of the State to which the
foreign court belongs have no jurisdiction
under German law;
2. where the unsuccessful defendant is German
and has not entered an appearance, if the
document instituting the proceedings was
not served on him in person either in the
State to which the court belongs, or by a
German authority under the system of
mutual assistance in judicial matters;
3. where, to the detriment of the German
party, the judgment has not complied with
the provisions of Article 13 (1) and (3)or 
Articles 17, 18, and 22 of the Introductory
Law to the Civil Code . (Einfuhrungsgesetz
zum Burgerlichen Gesetzbuch), or with the
provisions of Article 27 of that Law which
refer to Article 13 (1), nor where, in matters
falling within the scope of Article 12 (3) of
the Law of 4 July 1939 on disappearances
certifications of death, and establishment of
the date of decease (RGBI. I, p. 1186), there
has been a failure to comply with the
provisions of Article 13 (2) of the
Introductory Law to the Civil Code, to the
) Casso 16. 1. 1953  Pas. I. 335.
) Riezler, Internationales ZivilprozeBrecht, 1949, p. 509 
seq.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/5
detriment of the wife of a foreigner who has
been declared dead by judgment of the
court (1);
4. where recognition of the judgment would be
contrary to 'good morals' (gegen die guten
Sitten) or the objectives of a German law;
5. where there is no guarantee of reciprocity.
II. The provision in (5) above shall not prevent
recognition of a judgment given in a matter not
relating to property rights where no court in
Germany has jurisdiction under German law.'
The procedure for recognizing judgments delivered in
actions relating to matrimonial matters is governed by a
special Law (Familienrechtsanderungsgesetz) of 
August 1961 (BGBI. I, p. 1221, Article 7).
Enforcement is governed by Articles 722 and 723 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which read as follows:
Article  722
I. A foreign judgment may be enforced only where
this is authorized by virtue of an order for
enforcement.
II. An application for an order for enforcement shall be
heard either by the Amtsgericht or the Landgericht
having general jurisdiction in relation to the
defendant, or otherwise by the Amtsgericht or the
Landgericht before which the defendant may be
summoned under Article 23.
Article  723
I. An order for enforcement shall be granted without
re-examination of the substance of the judgment.
II. An order for enforcement shall be granted only if
the foreign judgment has become  res judicata  under
the law of the court in which it was given. No order
for enforcement shall be granted where recognition
of the judgment is excluded by Article 328.'
In France,  Article 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Code de procedure civile) provides that judgments
(1) These Articles of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code
provide for the application of German law in many cases:
condition of validity of marriage, form of marriage
divorce, legitimate and illegitimate paternity, adoption
certification of death.
given by foreign courts and instruments recorded by
foreign officials can be enforced only after being
declared enforceable by a French court (Articles 2123
and 2128 of the Civil Code).
The courts have held that four conditions must be
satisfied for an order for enforcement to be granted: the
foreign court must have had jurisdiction; the procedure
followed must have been in order; the law applied must
have been that which is applicable under the French
system of conflict of laws; and due regard must have
been paid to public policy (2).
The Cour de cassation recently held (Cass. civ. 1 
Section, 7 January 1964  Munzer case) that the
substance of the original action could not be reviewed
by the court hearing the application for an order for
enforcement. This judgment has since been followed.
In Italy,  on the other hand, the Code of Civil Procedure
(Codice di procedura civile) in principle allows foreign
judgments to be recognized and enforced.
Under Article 796 of the Code of Civil Procedure, any
foreign judgment may be declared enforceable in Italy
by the Court of Appeal (Corte d' appello) for the place
in which enforcement is to take place (Dichiarazione di
efficacia) .
Under Article 797 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
Court of Appeal examines whether the foreign
judgment was given by a judicial authority having
jurisdiction under the rules in force in Italy; whether in
the proceedings abroad the document instituting the
proceedings was properly served and whether sufficient
notice was given; whether the parties properly entered
an appearance in the proceedings or whether their
default was duly recognized; whether the judgment has
become  res judicata;  whether the judgment conflicts
with a judgment given by an Italian judicial authority;
whether proceedings between the same parties and
concerning the same claim are pending before an Italian
judicial authority; and whether the judgment contains
anything contrary to Italian public policy.
However, if the defendant failed to appear in the
foreign proceedings, he may request the Italian court to
review the substance of the case (Article 798). In such a
case, the Court may either order enforcement, or 'hear
the substance of the case and give judgment.
(2) Batiffol, Traite elementaire de droit international prive
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There is also in Italian law the 'delibazione incidentale
(Article 799 of the Code of Civil Procedure) which,
however, applies only to proceedings in which it 
sought to invoke a foreign judgment.
Luxembourg.  Under Article 546 of the Luxembourg
Code of Civil Procedure (Code de procedure civile),
judgments given by foreign courts and instruments
recorded by foreign officials can be enforced in the
Grand Duchy only after being declared enforceable by a
Luxembourg court (see Articles 2123 and 2128 of the
Civil Code).
Luxembourg law requires seven conditions to be
satisfied before an order for enforcement can be
granted: the judgment must be enforceable in the
country in which it was given; the foreign court must
have had jurisdiction; the law applied must have been
that applicable under the Luxembourg rules of conflict
of laws; the rules of procedure of the foreign law must
have been observed; the rights of the defendant must
have been observed; due regard must have been paid to
public policy; the law must not have been contravened
(Luxembourg, 5. 2. 64, Pasicrisie luxembourgeoise XIX
285).
Luxembourg law no longer permits any review of a
foreign judgment as to the merits.
In the  Netherlands,  the Code of Civil Procedure
(Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering) lays down
the principle that judgments of foreign courts are not
enforceable in the Kingdom. Matters settled by foreign
courts may be reconsidered by Netherlands courts (see
Article 431 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
The national laws of the Member States thus vary
considerably.
B. EXISTING CONVENTIONS
Apart from conventions dealing with particular matters
(see p. 10), various conventions on enforcement exist
between the Six; they are listed in Article 55 of the
Convention. However, relations between France and the
Federal Republic of Germany, France and the
Netherlands, France and Luxembourg, Germany and
Luxembourg, and Luxembourg and Italy are hampered
by the absence of such conventions (1).
There are also striking differences between the various
conventions. Some, like those between France and
Belgium, and between Belgium and the Netherlands
and the Benelux;, Treaty, are based on 'direct
jurisdiction; but all the others are based on 'indirect
jurisdiction. The Convention between France and Italy
is based on indirect jurisdiction, but nevertheless
contains some rules of direct jurisdiction. Some
conventions allow only those judgments which have
becom  res judicata  to be recognized and enforced
whilst others such as the Benelux Treaty and the
Conventions between Belgium and the Netherlands
Germany and Belgium, Italy and Belgium and Germany
and the Netherlands apply to judgments which are
capable of enforcement (2). Some cover judgments given
in civil matters by criminal courts, whilst others are
silent on this point or expressly exclude such judgments
from their scope (Conventions between Italy and the
Netherlands, Article 10, and between Germany and
Italy, Article 12).
There are various other differences between these
treaties and conventions which need not be discussed in
detail; they relate in particular to the determination of
competent courts and to the conditions governing
recognition and enforcement. It should moreover be
stressed that these conventions either do not lay down
the enforcement procedure or give only a summary
outline of it.
The present unsatisfactory state of affairs as regards the
recognition and enforcement of judgments could have
been improved by the conclusion of new bilateral
conventions between Member States not yet bound by
such conventions.
(1) It should be noted that at the time of writing this report
the Benelux Treaty has not yet entered into force and there
is no agreement existing between Luxembourg on the one
hand and Belgium and the Netherlands on the other.
(l) The Franco-Belgian convention, in spite of the provisions
of Article 11 (2) which impose the condition of  res judi-
cata nevertheless applies to enforceable judgments even if
there is still a right of appeal (see Niboyet, Droit inter-
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However, the Committee has decided in favour of the
conclusion of a multilateral convention between the
countries of the European Economic Community, in
accordance with the views expressed in the
Commission letter of 22 October 1959. The
Committee felt that the differences between the bilateral
conventions would hinder the 'free movement' of
judgments and lead to unequal treatment of the various
nationals of the Member States, such inequality being
contrary to the fundamental EEC prinj:iple of
non-discrimination, set out, in particular, in Article 7 of
the Treaty of Rome.
In addition, the European Economic Community
provided the conditions necessary for a modern, liberal
law on the recognition and enforcement of judgments
which would satisfy both legal and commercial
Interests.
C. THE NATURE OF THE CONVENTION
Some of the bilateral conventions concluded between
the Member States, such as the Convention between
France and Belgium of 8 July 1899, the Convention
between Belgium and the Netherlands of 28 March
1925, and the Benelux Treaty of 24 November 1961
are based on rules of direct jurisdiction, whilst in the
others the rules of jurisdiction are indirect. Under
conventions of the first type known also as 'double
treaties , the rules of jurisdiction laid down are
applicable in the State of origin, i.e. the State in which
the proceedings originally took place; they therefore
apply independently of any proceedings for recognition
and enforcement, and permit a defendant who is
summoned before a court which under the convention
in question would not have jurisdiction to refuse to
accept its jurisdiction.
Rules of jurisdiction in a convention are said to be
indirect' when they do not affect the courts of the State
in which the judgment was originally given, and are to
be considered only in relation to recognition and
enforcement. They apply only in determining cases in
which the court of the State in which recognition or
enforcement of a judgment is sought (the State
addressed) is obliged to recognize the jurisdiction of the
court of the State of origin. They can therefore be taken as conditions governing the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments and more
specifically, governing supervision of the jurisdiction 
foreign courts.
The Committee spent a long time considering which of
these types of convention the EEC should have. It
eventually decided in favour of a new system based on
direct jurisdiction but differing in several respects from
existing bilateral conventions of that type.
Although the Committee of experts did not
underestimate the value and importance of ' single
conventions, (i. e. conventions based on rules of indirect
jurisdiction) it felt that within the EEC a convention
based on rules of direct jurisdiction as a result of the
adoption of common rules of jurisdiction would allow
increased harmonization of laws, provide greater legal
certainty, avoid discrimination and facilitate the 'free
movement' of judgments , which is after all the ultimate
objective.
Conventions based on direct jurisdiction lay down
common rules of jursidiction, thus bringing about the
harmonization of laws, whereas under those based on
indirect jurisdiction, national provisions apply, without
restriction, in determining international jurisdiction in
each State.
Legal certainty is most effectively secured by
conventions based on direct jurisdiction since, under
them, judgments are given by courts deriving their
jurisdiction from the conventions themselves; however
in the case of conventions based on indirect jurisdiction
certain judgments cannot be recognized and enforced
abroad unless national rules of jurisdiction coincide
with the rules of the convention (1
Moreover, since it establishes, on the basis of mutual
agreement, an autonomous system of international
jurisdiction in relations between the Member States, the
Convention makes it easier to abandon certain rules of
jurisdiction which are generally regarded as exorbitant.
Finally, by setting out rules of jurisdiction which may be
relied upon as soon as proceedings are begun in the
State of origin, the Convention regulates the problem of
lis pendens  and also helps to minimize the conditions
governing recognition and enforcement.
) WESER, Les conflits de juridictions dans Ie cadre du
Marche Commun, Revue Critique de droit international
prive 1960, pp. 161-172.No C 59/8 Official Journal of the European Communities
As already stated, the Convention is based on direct
jurisdiction, but differs fundamentally from treaties and
conventions of the same type previously concluded. This
is not the place to undertake a detailed study of the
differences, or to justify them; it will suffice merely to
list them:
1. the criterion of domicile replaces that of nationality;
2. the principle of equality of treatment is extended to
any person domiciled in the Community, whatever
his nationality;
3. rules of exclusive jurisdiction are precisely defined;
CHAPTER III
4. the right of the defendant to defend himself in the
original proceedings is safeguarded;
5. the number of grounds for refusal of recognition
and enforcement is reduced.
In addition, the Convention is original in that:
for enforcement obtaining 1. the procedure
standardized;
2. rules of procedure are laid down for cases in which
recognition is at issue;
3. provision is made for cases of conflict with other
conventions.
SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
The scope of the Convention is determined by the
preamble and Article 1.
It governs international legal relationships, applies
automatically, and covers all civil and commercial
matters, apart from certain exceptions which are
exhaustively listed.
I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
As is stressed in the fourth paragraph of the preamble,
the Convention determines the international jurisdiction
of the courts of the Contracting States.
It alters the rules of jurisdiction in force in each
Contracting State only where an international element is
involved. It does not define this concept, since the
international element in a legal relationship may depend
on the particular facts of the proceedings of which the
court is seised. Proceedings instituted in the courts of a
Contracting State which involves only persons
domiciled in that State will not normally be affected by
the Convention; Article 2 simply refers matters back to
the rules of jurisdiction in force in that State. It is
possible, however, that an international element may be
involved in proceedings of this type. This would be the
case, for example, where the defendant was a foreign
national, a situation in which the principle of equality
of treatment laid down in the second paragraph of
Article 2 would apply, or where the proceedings related
to a matter over which the courts of another State had
exclusive jurisdiction (Article 16), or where identical or
related proceedings had been brought in the courts of
another State (Article 21 to 23).
It is clear that at the recognition and enforcement stage
the Convention governs only international legal
relationships since  ex hypothesi  it concerns the
recognition and enforcement in one Contracting State of
judgments given in another Contracting State (1
II. THE BINDING NATURE OF THE CONVENTION
It was decided by the committee of experts that the
Convention should apply automatically. This principle
is formally laid down in Articles 19 and 20 which deal
with the matter of examination by the courts of the
Contracting States of their international jurisdiction.
The courts must apply the rules of the Convention
whether or not they are pleaded by the parties. It
follows from this, for example, that if a person
domiciled in Belgium is sued in a French court on the
basis of Article 14 of the French Civil Code, and
contests the jurisdiction of that court but without
pleading the provisions of the Convention, the court
(1) A. BOLOW, Vereinheitlichtes internationales ZivilprozeB-
recht in der Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 
Rabels Zeitschrift fur auslandisches und internationales
Privatrecht, 1965 , p. 473  et seq.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/9
must nevertheless apply Article 3 and declare that it has
no jurisdiction (1).
III. CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MA TIERS
The Committee did not specify what is meant by 'civil
and commercial matters , nor did it point to a solution
of the problem of classification by determining the law
according to which that expression should be
interpreted.
In this respect it followed the practice of existing
conventions (2).
However, it follows from 'the text of the Convention
that civil and commercial matters are to be classified as
such according to their nature, and irrespective of the
character of the court or tribunal which is seised of the
proceedings or which has given judgment. This emerges
from Article 1, which provides that the Convention
shall apply in civil and commercial matters 'whatever
the nature of the court or tribunal'. The Convention
also applies irrespective of whether the proceedings are
contentious or non-contentious. It likewise applies to
labour law in so far as this is regarded as a civil or
commercial matter (see also under contracts of
employment, page 24).
The Convention covers civil proceedings brought before
criminal courts, both as regards decisions relating to
jurisdiction, and also as regards the recognition and
enforcement of judgments given by criminal courts in
such proceedings. It thereby takes into account certain
laws in force in the majority of the Contracting
States (3), tends to rule out any differences of
interpretation such as have arisen in applying the
Convention between Belgium and the Netherlands (4
(1) Tribunal civil de Lille, 9. 11. 1953, Revue critique de droit
international prive, 1954, p. 832.
(2) This problem is not dealt with in any treaty on
enforcement. See also the report by Professor Fragistas on
the Preliminary Draft Convention adopted by the Special
Commission of the Hague Conference on private
international law, preliminary document No 4 for the tenth
session, p. 11.
(3) In  Belgium,  see Article 4 of the Law of 17 April 1878
containing the Introductory Title of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
In the Federal Republic of Germany,  see Article 403  et seq.
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In  France see Article 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
In  Luxembourg,  any person who claims to have suffered
loss or injury as a result of a crime or other wrongful act
may, under Article 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
be joined as a civil party.
In the  Netherlands see Articles 332 to 337 of the Code 
Criminal Procedure, and Articles 44 and 56 of the Law 
Judicial Procedure, which gives jurisdiction to the justices
of the peace or to the courts up to Fl 200 and 500
respectively.
) In interpreting the 1925 Convention between Belgium and
the Netherlands, the Netherlands Court of Cassation held
in its judgment of 16. 3. 1931 (N.J. 1931 , p. 689) that
Articles 11 and 12 did not affect orders by criminal courts
to pay compensation for injury or loss suffered by a party.
and, finally, meets current requirements arising from the
increased number of road accidents.
The relevant provisions of the treaty and conventions
already concluded between the Member States vary
widely, as has already been pointed out in Chapter
I (A).
The formula adopted by the Committee reflects the
current trend in favour of inserting in conventions
clauses specifying that they apply to judgments given in
civil or commercial matters by criminal courts. This can
in particular be seen in the Benelux Treaty of 24
November 1961 and in the work of the Hague
Conference on private international law.
It should be noted that the provisions of Article 5 (4) of
the Convention in no way alter the penal jurisdiction of
criminal courts and tribunals as laid down in the
various codes of criminal procedure.
As regards both jurisdiction and recognition and
enforcement the Convention affects only civil
proceedings of which those courts are seised, and
judgments given in such proceedings.
However, in order to counter the objection that a party
against whom civil proceedings have been brought
might be obstructed in conducting his defence 
criminal sanctions could be imposed on him in the same
proceedings, the Committee decided on a solution
identical to that adopted in the Benelux Treaty. Article
II of the Protocol provides that such persons may be
defended or represented in criminal courts. Thus they
will not be obliged to appear in person to defend their
civil interests.
The Convention also applies to civil or commercial
matters brought before administrative tribunals.
The formula adopted by the Committee is identical to
that envisaged by the Commission which was given the
task at the fourth session of the Hague Conference on
private international law of examining the Convention
of 14 November 1896 in order to draw up common
rules on a number of aspects of private international
law relating to civil procedure. It reported as follows:
The expression "civil or commercial matters
very wide and does not include only those matters
which fall within the jurisdiction of civil tribunals
and commercial tribunals in countries where
administrative tribunals also exist. Otherwise there
would be a wholly unjustifiable inequality between
the Contracting States: service abroad of judicialNo C 59110 Official Journal of the European Communities
instruments could take place on a wider scale for
countries which do not have administrative
tribunals than for countries which have them. In
brief, the Convention is applicable from the moment
when private interests become involved . . .' (1
Thus, for example, decisions of the French Conseil
Etat given on such matters may be recognized and
enforced (2).
IV. MA TIERS EXCLUDED FROM THE SCOPE OF THE
CONVENTION
The ideal solution would certainly have been to apply
the Convention to all civil and commercial matters.
However, the Committee did not feel able to adopt this
approach, and limited the scope of the Convention to
matters relating to property rights for reasons similar to
those which prevailed when the Hague Convention on
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in
civil and commercial matters was drafted, the main
reason being the difficulties resulting from the absence
of any overall solution to the problem of conflict of
laws.
The disparity between rules of conflict of laws is
particularly apparent in respect of matters not relating
to property rights, since in general the intention of the
parties cannot regulate matters independently of
considerations of public policy.
The Committee, like the Hague Conference on private
international law, preferred a formula which excluded
certain matters to one which would have involved
giving a positive definition of the scope of the
Convention. The solution adopted implies that all
litigation and all judgments relating to contractual or
non-contractual obligations which do not involve the
status or legal capacity of natural persons, wills or
succession rights in property arising out of 
matrimonial relationship, bankruptcy or social security
must fall within the scope of the Convention, and that
in this respect the Convention should be interpreted as
widely as possible.
However, matters falling outside the scope of the
Convention do so only if they constitute the principal
subject-matter of the proceedings. They are thus not
excluded when they come before the court as a
(1) See The Hague Conference on private international law 
documents of the fourth session (May to June 1904),
84.
(2) WESER, Traite franco-beige du 8. 7. 1899, No 235.
subsidiary matter either in the main proceedings or in
preliminary proceedings (3).
A. Status, legal capacity, rights in property arising out
of a matrimonial relationship, wills, succession
Apart from the desirability of bringing the Convention
into force as soon as possible, the Committee was
influenced by the following considerations. Even
assuming that the Committee managed to unify the
rules of jurisdiction in this field, and whatever the
nature of the rules selected, there was such disparity on
these matters between the various systems of law, in
particular regarding the rules of conflict of laws, that it
would have been difficult not to re-examine the rules of
jurisdiction at the enforcement stage. This in turn would
have meant changing the nature of the Convention and
making it much less effective. In addition, if the
Committee had agreed to withdraw from the court 
enforcement all powers of examination, even in matters
not relating to property rights, that court would
surely have been encouraged to abuse the notion of
public policy, using it to refuse recognition to foreign
judgments referred to it. The members of the
Committee chose the lesser of the two evils, retaining
the unity and effectiveness of their draft while
restricting its scope. The most serious difficulty with
regard to status and legal capacity is obviously that 
divorce, a problem which is complicated by the extreme
divergences between the various systems of law: Italian
law prohibits divorce, while Belgian law not only
provides for divorce by consent (Articles 223 , 275 
seq.  of the Civil Code), which is unknown under the
other legal systems apart from that of Luxembourg, but
also, by the Law of 27 June 1960 on the admissibility of
divorce when at least one of the spouses is a foreign
national, incorporates provisions governing divorces by
foreign nationals who ordinarily reside in Belgium.
The wording used
, '
status or legal capacity of natural
persons , differs slightly from that adopted in the Hague
Convention, which excludes from its scope judgments
concerning 'the status or capacity of persons or
questions of family law, including personal or financial
rights and obligations between parents and children or
between spouses' (Article 1 (1)). The reason for this is
twofold. Firstly, family law in the six Member States of
the Community is not a concept distinct from questions
of status or capacity; secondly, the EEC Convention
unlike the Hague Convention, applies to maintenance
(Article 5 (2)) even where the obligation stems from the
status of the persons and irrespective of whether rights
(3) BELLET
, '
elaboration d'une convention sur 
reconnaissance des jugements dans Ie cadre du Marche
commun , Clunet, 1965.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/11
and duties between spouses or between parents and
children are involved.
Moreover in order to avoid differences of
interpretation, Article 1 specificies that the Convention
does not apply to the status or legal capacity of natural
persons, thereby constituting a further distinction
between this Convention and the Hague Convention
which specifies that it does not apply to judgments
dealing principally with 'the existence or constitution of
legal persons or the powers of their organs' (Article 1
(2) third indent).
With regard to matters relating to succession, the
Committee concurred in the opinion of the
International Union of Latin Notaries.
This body, when consulted by the Committee
considered that it was necessary, and would become
increasingly so as the EEC developed in the future, to
facilitate the recognition and enforcement of judgments
given in matters relating to succession, and that it was
therefore desirable for the six Member States to
conclude a convention on the subject. However, the
Union considered that it was essential first to unify the
rules of conflict of laws.
As is pointed out in the Memorandum of the Permanent
Bureau of the Hague Conference on private
international law (1), from which this commentary has
been taken, there are fairly marked differences between
the various States on matters of succession and of rights
in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship.
1. As regards succession, some systems of law make
provision for a portion of the estate to devolve
compulsorily upon the heirs, whereas others do not.
The share allocated to the surviving spouse (a
question which gives rise to the greatest number of
proceedings in matters of succession because of the
clash of interests involved) differs enormously from
country to country. Some countries place the spouse
on the same footing as a surviving child, or grant
him or her a certain reserved portion (Italy), while
others grant the spouse only a limited life interest
(for example, Belgium).
The disparities as regards rules of conflict of laws
are equally marked. Some States (Germany, Italy
and the Netherlands) apply to succession the
national law of the  de CUjllS;  others (Belgium and
France) refer succession to the law of the domicile
(1) The Hague Conference on private international law,
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in
matters relating to property rights. Memorandum, with
Annexes, by the Permanent Bureau. Preliminary document
No 1 of January 1962 for the Special Committee, p. 10.
as regards movable property and, as regards
immovable property, to the law of the place where
the property is situated; or (as in Luxembourg) refer
to the law of the place where the property is
situated in the case of immovable property, but
subject movable property to national law.
2. As regards rights in property arising out of 
matrimonial relationship, the divergences between the
legal - systems are even greater, ranging from joint
ownership of all property (Netherlands) through joint
ownership of movable property and all property
acquired during wedlock (France, Belgium and
Luxembourg) or joint ownership of the increase in
capital value of assets (Federal Republic of Germany) to
the complete separation of property (Italy).
There are also very marked divergences between the
rules of conflict of laws, and this provokes positive
conflicts between the systems. In some States the rules
governing matrimonial property, whether laid down by
law or agreed between the parties, are subject to the
national law of the husband (Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands); in the other States (Belgium, France, and
Luxembourg) matrimonial property is subject to the
rules impliedly chosen by the spouses at the time of
their marriage.
Unlike the preliminary draft the Convention does not
expressly exclude gifts from its scope. In this respect 
follows the Hague Convention, though gifts will of
course be excluded in so far as they relate to succession.
However, the Committee was of the opinion that there
might possibly be grounds for resuming discussion of
these problems after the Judgments Convention had
entered into force, depending on the results of the work
currently being done by the Hague Conference and by
the International Commission on Civil Status.
It should be stressed that these matters will still be
governed, temporarily at least, by existing bilateral
conventions, in so far as these conventions apply (see
Article 56).
B. Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy is also excluded from the scope of this
Convention.
A separate Convention is currently being drafted, since
the peculiarities of this branch of law require special
rules.
Article 1 (2) excludes bankruptcy, proceedings relating
to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal
persons judicial arrangements compositions and
analogous proceedings, i.e. those proceedings whichNo C 59/12 Official Journal of the European Communities
depending on the system  of  law involved, are based on
the suspension  of  payments, the insolvency  of  the
debtor or his inability  to  raise credit, and which involve
the judicial authorities for the purpose either 
compulsory and collective liquidation  of  the assets or
simply  of  supervision.
Thus the Convention will cover proceedings arISIng
from schemes  of  arrangement out  of  court, since the
latter depend on the intention  of  the parties and are  of 
purely contractual nature. The insolvency  of 
non-trader (deconfiture civile) under French law, which
does not involve organized and collective proceedings
cannot be regarded as falling within the category 
analogous proceedings' within the meaning  of  Article 1
(2).
Proceedings relating to a bankruptcy are not necessarily
excluded from the Convention. Only proceedings
arising directly from the bankruptcy (1) and hence
falling within the scope  of  the Bankruptcy Convention
of  the European Economic Community are excluded
from the scope  of  the Convention (2).
Pending the conclusion  of  the separate C~nvention
covering bankruptcy, proceedings arising directly from
bankruptcy will be governed by the legal rules currently
in force, or by the conventions which already exist
between certain Contracting States, as provided in
Article 56 (3
C. Social Security
The Committee decided, like the Hague Conference (4
to  exclude social security from the scope  of  the
Convention. The reasons were as follows.
In some countries, such as the Federal Republic of
Germany, social security is a matter  of  public law, and
) Benelux Treaty, Article 22 (4), and the report annexed
thereto. The Convention between France and Belgium is
interpreted in the same way. See WESER, Convention
franco-belge 1899 in the Jurisclasseur de droit
international, Vol. 591, Nos 146 to 148.
e) A complete list  of  the proceedings involved will be given in
the Bankruptcy Convention  of  the European Economic
Community.
) These are the Conventions between Belgium and France
between France and Italy, and between Belgium and the
Netherlands unless the latter convention has been
abrogated by the Benelux Treaty on its entry into force.
) The Hague Conference on private international law
extraordinary session. Final Act, see Article 1  of  the
Convention.
in others it falls in the borderline area between private
law and public law.
In some States, litigation on social security matters falls
within the jurisdiction  of  the ordinary courts, but in
others it falls within the jurisdiction  of  administrative
tribunals; sometimes it lies within the jurisdiction 
both (5
The Committee was moreover anxious to allow current
work within the EEC pursuant to Articles 51, 117 and
118  of  the Treaty  of  Rome  to  develop independently,
and  to  prevent any overlapping on matters  of  social
security between the Convention and agreements
already concluded, whether bilaterally or under the
auspices  of  other international organizations such as the
International Labour Organization or the Council 
Europe.
Social security has not in fact hitherto given rise 
conflicts  of  jurisdiction, since judicial jurisdiction has
been taken as coinciding with legislative jurisdiction
which is determined by Community regulations adopted
pursuant to Article 51  of  the Treaty  of  Rome; however
the recovery  of  contributions due to social security
bodies still raises problems  of  enforcement. This matter
should therefore be the subject  of  a special agreement
between the Six.
What is meant by social security?
Since this is a field which is in a state  of  constant
development, it did not seem desirable to define it
expressly in the Convention, nor even  to  indicate in an
annex what this concept covers, especially as Article
117  of  the Treaty  of  Rome states that one  of  the
Community s objectives is the harmonization  of  social
security systems.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that in the six
countries benefits are paid in the circumstances listed in
Convention  No 102 of  the International Labour
Organization on minimum standards  of  social security,
namely: medical care, sickness benefits, maternity
allowances, invalidity benefits, old age and survivors
pensions benefits for accidents at work and
occupational diseases family allowances and
unemployment benefits (6). It may also be useful  to  refer
) f:tude de la physionomie actuelle de la securite sociale dans
les pays de la CEE. Serie politique sociale 3  1962,
Services des publications des Communautes europeennes.
8058/l/IX/I96215.
) Tableaux comparatifs des regimes de securite sociale
applicables dans les f:tats membres des Communautes
europeennes. Third edition, Services des publications des
Communautes europeennes 8122/l/VII/I964/5.Official Journal of the European Communities
D. Arbitration
No C 59/13
to the definition given in Articles 1 (c) and 2 of Council
Regulation No 3 on social security for migrant workers
which, moreover, corresponds to that laid down in
Convention No 102 of the ILO.
However, the litigation on social security which is
excluded from the scope of the Convention is confined
to disputes arising from relationships between the
administrative authorities concerned and employers or
employees. On the other hand, the Convention 
applicable when the authority concerned relies on a
right of direct recourse against a third party responsible
for injury or damage, or is subrogated as against a third
party to the rights of an injured party insured by it
since, in doing so, it is acting in accordance with the
ordinary legal rules (1
There are already many international agreements on
arbitration. Arbitration is, of course, referred to in
Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, the
Council of Europe has prepared a European Convention
providing a uniform law on arbitration, and this will
probably be accompanied by a Protocol which will
facilitate the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards to an even greater extent than the New York
Convention. This is why it seemed preferable to exclude
arbitration. The Brussels Convention does not apply to
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards (see
the definition in Article 25); it does not apply for the
purpose of determining the jurisdiction of courts and
tribunals in respect of litigation relating to arbitration
for example, proceedings to set aside an arbitral
award; and, finally, it does not apply to the recognition
of judgments given in such proceedings.
CHAPTER IV
JURISDICTION
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Preliminary remarks
Underlying the Convention is the idea that the Member
States of the European Economic Community wanted to
set up a common market with characteristics similar to
those of a vast internal market. Everything possible
must therefore be done not only to eliminate any
obstacles to the functioning of this market, but also to
promote its development. From this point of view, the
territory of the Contracting States may be regarded as
forming a single entity: it follows, for the purpose of
laying down rules on jurisdiction, that a very clear
distinction can be drawn between litigants who are
domiciled within the Community and those who are
not.
Starting from this basic concept, Title II of the
Convention makes a fundamental distinction
particular in Section 1, between defendants who are
domiciled in a Contracting State and those who are
domiciled elsewhere.
1. If a person is domiciled in a Contracting State, he
must in general be sued in the courts of that State in
(1) See Michel Voirin, note under Casso 16. 2. 1965, Recueil
Dalloz 1965, p. 723.
accordance with the rules of jurisdiction in force in
that State (Article 2).
2. If a person is domiciled in a Contracting State, he
may be sued in the courts of another Contracting
State only if the courts of that State are competent
by virtue of the Convention (Article 3).
3. If a person is not domiciled in a Contracting State
that is, if he is domiciled outside the Community,
the rules of jurisdiction in force in each Contracting
State, including those regarded as exorbitant, are
applicable (Article 4).
The instances in which a person domiciled in a
Contracting State may be sued in the courts of another
Contracting State  or must be so sued, in cases of
exclusive jurisdiction or prorogation of jurisdiction 
are set out in Sections 2 to 6. Section 7, entitled
Examination as to jurisdiction. . . and admissibility , is
mainly concerned with safeguarding the rights of the
defendant.
Section 8 concerns  /is pendens  and related actions. The
very precise rules of this Section are intended to prevent
as far as possible conflicting judgments being given in
relation to the same dispute in different States.No C 59/14 Official Journal of the European Communities
Section 9 relates to provisional and protective measures
and provides that application for these may be made to
any competent court of a Contracting State, even if
under the Convention, that court does not have
jurisdiction over the substance of the matter.
2. Rationale of the basic principles of Title II
The far-reaching nature of the Convention may at first
seem surprising. The rules of jurisdiction which it lays
down differ fundamentally from those of bilateral
conventions which are based on direct jurisdiction (the
Conventions between France and Belgium, and between
Belgium and the Netherlands, the Benelux Treaty, the
Convention between France and Switzerland) and apply
not only to nationals of the Contracting States but also
to any person, whatever his nationality, who 
domiciled in one of those States.
The radical nature of the Convention may not only
evoke surprise but also give rise to the objection that the
Committee has gone beyond its terms of reference, since
Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome provides that States
should enter into negotiations with a view to securing
for the benefit of their nationals' the simplification of
formalities governing the recognition and enforcement
of judgments. The obvious answer to this is that the
extension of the scope of the Convention certainly does
not represent a departure from the Treaty of Rome
provided the Convention ensures, for the benefit of
nationals, the simplification of formalities governing the
recognition and enforcement of judgments. Too strict
an interpretation of the Treaty of Rome would
moreover, have led to the Convention providing for the
recognition and enforcement only of those judgments
given in favour of nationals of the Contracting States.
Such a limitation would have considerably reduced the
scope of the Convention, which would in this regard
have been less effective than existing bilateral
conventions.
There are several reasons for widening the scope of the
Convention by extending in particular the rules of
jurisdiction under Title II to all persons, whatever their
nationality, who are domiciled in a Contracting State.
First, it would be a retrograde step if common rules of
jurisdiction were to be dependent on the nationality.
the parties; the connecting factor in international
procedure is usually the domicile or residence of the
parties (see, for example, Article 3 (1) and (2) of the
Hague Convention of 15 April 1958 concerning the
recognition and enforcement of decisions relating to
maintenance obligations towards children; the Hague
Convention of 15 April 1958 on the jurisdiction of the
contractual forum in matters relating to the
international sale of goods; Article 11 of the Benelux
Treaty; and Article 10 (1) of the Hague Convention on
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in
civil and commercial matters).
Next, the adoption of common rules based on
nationality would have caused numerous difficulties in
applying the Convention. This method would have
necessitated the introduction of different rules of
jurisdiction depending on whether the litigation
involved nationals of Contracting States, a national of a
Contracting State and a foreign national, or two foreign
nationals.
In some situations the rules of jurisdiction of the
Convention would have had to be applied; in others
national rules of jurisdiction. Under this system the
court would, at the commencement of proceedings
automatically have had to carry out an examination 
the nationality of the parties, and it is not difficult to
imagine the practical problems involved in, for example,
establishing the nationality of a defendant who has
failed to enter an appearance.
If the Convention had adopted the nationality of the
parties as a connecting factor, it might well have been
necessary to introduce a special provision to deal with
the relatively frequent cases of dual nationality.
The Convention would thus have had to solve many
problems which do not strictly speaking fall within its
scope. Using nationality as a criterion would inevitably
have led to a considerable increase in the effect of those
rules of jurisdiction which may be termed exorbitant.
Thus, for example, a judgment given in France or
Luxembourg on the basis of Article 14 of the Civil Code
in an action between a national of France or
Luxembourg and a national of a non-Member State of
the Community would have had to be recognized and
enforced in Germany even if the foreign national was
domiciled in Germany and a generally recognized
jurisdiction, that of the defendant s domicile, thus
existed.
By ruling out the criterion of nationality, the Committee
is anxious not only to simplify the application of the
Convention by giving it a unity which allows a uniform
interpretation, but also, in fairness, to allow foreign
nationals domiciled in the Community, who are
established there and who thereby contribute to itsOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/15
economic activity and prosperity, to benefit from the
provisions of the Convention.
Moreover, the purpose of the Convention is also, by
establishing common rules of jurisdiction, to achieve, in
relations between the Six and in the field which it was
required to cover, a genuine legal systematization which
will ensure the greatest possible degree of legal
certainty. To this end, the rules of jurisdiction codified
in Title II determine which State s courts are most
appropriate to assume jurisdiction, taking into account
all relevant matters; the approach here adopted means
that the nationality of the parties is no longer of
importance.
3. Determination of domicile
As already shown, the rules of jurisdiction are based on
the defendant's domicile. Determining that domicile is
therefore a matter of the greatest importance.
The Committee was faced with numerous questions
which proved difficult to resolve. Should the
Convention include a common definition of domicile?
Should domicile possibly be replaced by the concept of
habitual residence? Should both domicile and habitual
residence be used? Should the term domicile be
qualified?
1. Should the Convention include a common definition
of domicile?
The first point to note is that the concept of
domicile is not defined in the Conventions between
France and Belgium, Belgium and the Netherlands
Germany and Belgium, and Italy and Belgium, nor
in the Benelux Treaty.
It is, however, defined in the Conventions between
France and Italy (Article 28), between Italy and the
Netherlands (Article 11), and between Germany and
Italy (Article 13); but these Conventions are all
based on indirect jurisdiction.
At first, the Committee thought of defining domicile
in the Convention itself, but it finally rejected this
course of action. Such a definition would have fallen
outside the scope of the Convention, and properly
belongs in a uniform law (1). To define the concept
(1) The concept of domicile has been specified by the
European Committee for Legal Cooperation, set up by the
Council of Europe, as one of the basic legal concepts which
should be defined.
of domicile in international conventions might even
be dangerous, as this could lead to a multiplicity of
definitions and so to inconsistency.
Moreover, such definitions run the risk of being
superseded by developments in national law.
2. Should domicile be replaced by habitual residence?
This course was similarly rejected. It was pointed
out that the term 'habitual' was open to conflicting
interpretations, since the laws of some of the
Member States provide that an entry in the
population registers is conclusive proof of habitual
residence.
The adoption of this course would, moreover
represent a divergence from that followed under the
laws of the Contracting States, the majority of
which use domicile as a basis of jurisdiction (2).
(2)  Belgium
Law of 25 March 1876 containing Title I of the
Introductory Book of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Article 39: Except in the case of amendments and
exceptions provided for under the law, the court of the
defendant s domicile shall be the only court having juris-
diction.
Judicial Code:
Article 624: Except in cases where the law expressly
determines the court having jurisdiction a plaintiff may,
institute proceedings:
1. in the court of the domicile of the defendant or of one
of the defendants.
Federal Republic of Germany
Code of Civil Procedure, Article 13: A person shall in
general be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of his
domicile.
France
Code of Civil Procedure, Article 59 (1): In actions 
personam the defendant shall be sued in the court of his
domicile or, where he has no domicile or, in the court of
his place of residence.
Italy
Code of Civil Procedure, Article 18: Except where the law
otherwise provides, the competent court shall be the court
for the place where the defendant has his habitual
residence or his domicile or, where these are not known
the court for the place where the defendant is resident.
Luxembourg
Article 59 of the Code of Civil Procedure corresponds to
Article 59 of the French Code of Civil Procedure.
Netherlands
Code of Civil Procedure, Article 126:
1. In actions  in personam  or actions relating to movable
property, the defendant shall be sued in the court of his
domicile.No C 59/16 Official Journal of the European Communities
Adopting habitual residence as the sole criterion
would have raised new problems as regards
jurisdiction over persons whose domicile depends or
may depend on that of another person or on the
location of an authority (e.g. minors or married
women) .
Finally, in a treaty based on direct jurisdiction, it is
particularly important that jurisdiction should have
secure legal basis for the court seised of the
matter. The concept of domicile, while not without
drawbacks, does however introduce the idea of a
more fixed and stable place of establishment on the
part of the defendant than does the concept of
habitual residence.
3. Should both domicile and habitual residence be
adopted?
In a treaty based on direct jurisdiction, the inclusion
of both criteria would result in the major
disadvantage that the number of competent courts
would be increased. If the domicile and the place of
habitual residence happened to be in different
States, national rules of jurisdiction of both the
States concerned would be applicable by virtue of
Article 2 of the Convention, thus defeating the
object of the Convention. Moreover, the inclusion
of both criteria could increase the number of cases
of  lis pendens  and related actions. For these reasons
the Committee preferred finally to adopt only the
concept of domicile.
4. Should the concept of domicile be qualified?
In view of the varied interpretations of the concept
of domicile, the Committee considered that the
implementation of the Convention would be
facilitated by the inclusion of a provision specifying
the law to be applied in determining domicile. The
absence of such a provision might give rise to claims
and disclaimers of jurisdiction; the purpose of
Article 52 is to avoid this.
Article 52 deals with three different situations:
(i) where the court of a Contracting State must
determine whether a person is domiciled in that
State;
(ii) where the court must determine whether a
person is domiciled in another Contracting
State; and finally,
(iii) where the court must determine whether a
person s domicile depends on that of another
person or on the seat of an authority.
Article 52 does not deal with the case of a person
domiciled outside the Community. In this case the
court seised of the matter must apply its rules of
private international law.
Nor does Article 52 attempt to resolve the conflicts
which might arise if a court seised of a matter ruled
that a defendant were to be considered as having his
domicile in two other Contracting States, or in one
Contracting State and a third country. According to
the basic principles of Title II the court, having
found that a person is domiciled in some other
Contracting State, must, in order to determine its
own jurisdictiont apply the rules set out in Article 3
and in Sections 2 to 6 of the Convention.
In most disputed cases it will be necessary to
determine where the defendant is domiciled.
However, when applying certain provisions of the
Convention, in particular Article 5 (2) and the first
paragraph of Article 8, the rules set out will be used
to determine the plaintiff's domicile. For this reason
Article 52 does not. specify either the defendant or
the plaintiff since, in the opinion of the Committee
the same provisions for determining domicile must
apply to both parties.
Under the first paragraph of Article 52, only the
internal law of the court seised of the matter can
determine whether a domicile exists in that State. It
follows that, if there is a conflict between the  lex
fori  and the law of another Contracting State when
determining the domicile of a party, the  lex fori
prevails. For example, if a defendant sued in a
French court is domiciled both in France, because he
has his principal place of business there, and in
Belgium, because his name is entered there in the
official population registers, where the laws conflict
the French court must apply only French law. If it is
established under that law that the defendant is in
fact domiciled in France, the court need take 
other law into consideration. This is justified on
various grounds. First, to take the example given, a
defendant, by establishing his domicile in a given
country, subjects himself to the law of that country.
Next, only if the  lex fori  prevails can the court
examine whether it has jurisdiction; as the
Convention requires it to do, in cases where the
defendant fails to enter an appearance (Article 20).
Where the courts of different Contracting States are
properly seised of a matter  for example, the
Belgian court because it is the court for the place
where the defendant's name is entered in the
population registers, and the French court because itOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/17
is the court for the place where he has his principal
place of business  the conflict may be resolved by
applying the rules governing  /is pendens  or related
actions.
The second paragraph covers the case of a
defendant who is not domiciled in the State whose
courts are seised of the matter. The court must then
determine whether he is domiciled in another
Contracting State, and to do this the internal law of
that other State must be applied.
This rule will be applied in particular where a
defendant is sued in the courts of a Contracting
State in which he is not domiciled. If the jurisdiction
of the court is contested, then, following the basic
principles of Title II, whether or not the court has
jurisdiction will vary according to whether the
defendant is domiciled in another Contracting State
or outside the Community. Thus, for example, a
person domiciled outside the Community may
properly be sued in Belgium in the court for the
place where the contract was concluded (1) while a
person domiciled in another Contracting State and
sued in the same court may refuse to accept its
jurisdiction, since Article 5 (1) of the Convention
provides that only the courts for the place of
performance of the obligation in question have
jurisdiction. Thus if a defendant wishes to contest
the jurisdiction of the Belgian court, he must
establish that he is domiciled in a Contracting State.
Under the second paragraph of Article 52 the
Belgian court must, in order to determine whether
the defendant is domiciled in another Contracting
State, apply the internal law of that State.
The Committee considered it both more equitable
and more logical to apply the law of the State of the
purported domicile rather than the  lex fori.
If a court, seised of a matter in which the defendant
was domiciled in another Contracting State, applied
its own law to determine the defendant s domicile
the defendant might under that law not be regarded
as being domiciled in the other Contracting State
even though under the law of that other State he
was in fact domiciled there. This solution becomes
all the more untenable when one realises that a
) See Article 634 of the Judicial Code and Article 4 of the
Convention.
person establishing his domicile in a Contracting
State can obviously not be expected to consider
whether this domicile is regarded as such under a
foreign law (2).
On the other hand, where the law of the State of the
purported domicile has two definitions of
domicile (3), that of the Civil Code and that of the
Code of Civil Procedure, the latter should obviously
be used since the problem is one of jurisdiction.
The third principle laid down by Article 52 concerns
persons such as minors or married women whose
domicile depends on that of another person or on
the seat of an authority.
Under this provision national law is applied twice.
For example, the national law of a minor first
determines whether his domicile is dependent on
that of another person. If it is, the national law of
the minor similarly determines where that domicile
is situated (e.g. where his guardian is domiciled). If
however, the domicile of the dependent person is
under his national law not dependent on that 
another person or on the seat of an authority, the
first or second paragraph of Article 52 may be
applied to determine the domicile of the dependent
person. These two paragraphs also apply for the
purpose of determining the domicile from which
that of the dependent person derives.
The members of the Committee were alive to the
difficulties which may arise in the event of dual
nationality, and more especially in determining the
domicile of a married woman. For example, where a
German woman marries a Frenchman an acquires
French nationality while retaining her German
(2) NIBOYET, Traite de droit international prive frans;ais
V 01. VI, No 1723: 'It is submitted that domicile is not
systematically determined according to the  lex fori but
according to the law of the country where the domicile is
alleged to be. French law alone can therefore determine
whether a person is domiciled in France; but whether a
person is domiciled in any particular foreign country is a
matter, not for French law, but for the law of the country
concerned. '
) Such might for example be the case in Belgium, where
Article 102 of the Civil Code provides that the domicile of
a Belgian in so far as the exercise of his civil rights is
concerned is where he has his principal establishment
while Article 36 of the Judicial Code provides that, for the
purpose of that Code, a person is deemed to be domiciled
in the place where his name is entered in the official
population registers.No C 59/18 Official Journal of the European Communities
nationality, her domicile under French law (1) is that
of her husband, whereas under Getman law she can
have a separate domicile, since German law no
longer provides that a married woman has the
domicile of her husband (2). In cases of this kind
the Committee considered that the usual rules
relating to dual nationality should be applied. Thus
even if she has a separate domicile in Germany, that
person may be sued in France in the court for the
husband' s domicile, since the French court must
apply French law. If, however, she is sued 
Germany in the court for the place of her own
domicile, the German court will apply German law
and declare that it has jurisdiction.
Finally, it should be made clear that the concept of
domicile within the meaning of the Convention does
not extend to the legal fiction of an address fur
service of process.
B. COMMENTARY ON THE SECTIONS OF TITLE II
Section 1
General provisions
Section 1 sets out the main principles on which the rules
of jurisdicition laid down by the Convention are founded: 
1. the rule that a defendant domiciled in a Contracting
State is in general to be sued in the courts of that
State (Article 2);
2. the rule that a person domiciled in a Contracting
State may in certain circumstances be sued in the
courts of another Contracting State (Article 3);
3. the rule that a person domiciled outside the
Community is subject to all applicable national
rules of jurisdiction (Article 4).
This Section also embodies the widely applied principle
of equality of treatment (3), which is already enshrined
in Article 1 of the Convention between France and
(1) French Civil Code, Article 108: 'A married woman has no
domicile other than that of her husband.'
(2) BGB, Article 10, repealed by the Gleichberechtigungsgesetz
. (Law on equal rights of men and women in the field of civil
law) of..,t8 June 1957.
(3) WESER, Revue critique de droit international prive, 1960
pp. 29-35.
Belgium of 8 July 1899, Article 1 of the Convention
between Belgium and the Netherlands of 28 March
1925 and Article 1 of the Benelux Treaty of 24
November 1961. Whilst this principle thus forms an
integral part of treaties based on direct jurisdiction, in
this Convention it also ensures implementation of the
mandatory rules of the Treaty of Rome. Article 7 of
that Treaty lays down the principle of
non-discrimination between nationals of Member States
of the Community.
Specific provisions applying the general principle set out
in Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome to the right of
establishment are laid down in Article 52  et seq.  of that
Treaty.
During the preparation of the General Programme on
establishment, the Economic and Social Committee of
the European Communities drew particular attention to
this aspect of the problem by requesting that equality of
treatment as regards legal protection be achieved in full
as quickly as possible.
Article 
The maxim  actor sequitur forum rei' which expresses
the fact that law leans in favour of the defendant, is
even more relevant in the international sphere than it is
in national law (4). It is more difficult, generally
speaking, to defend oneself in the courts of a foreign
country than in those of another town in the country
where one is domiciled.
A defendant domiciled in a Contracting State need not
necessarily be sued in the court for the place where he is
domiciled or has his seat. He may be sued in any court
of the State where he is domiciled which has jurisdiction
under the law of that State.
As a result, if a defendant is sued in one of the courts of
the State in which he is domiciled, the internal rules of
jurisdiction of that State are fully applicable. Here the
Convention requires the application of the national law
of the court seised of the matter; the Convention
determines whether the courts of the State in question
have jurisdiction, and the law of that State in turn
determines whether a particular court in that State has
jurisdiction. This solution seems equitable since it is
usual for a defendant domiciled in a State to be subject
to the internal law of that State without it being
) See report by Professor FRAGIST AS  Hague Conference
on private international law  preliminary doc. No 4
May 1964, for the tenth session.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/19
necessary for the Convention to provide special rules for
his protection. It is, moreover, an extremely practical
solution because it means that in most cases the court
will not have to take the Convention any further into
consideration.
Defendants are usually sued in the courts of the State in
which they are domiciled. This is true of proceedings in
which there is no international element. It is also true of
proceedings with an international element in which, by
application of the traditionally accepted maxim  actor
sequitur forum rei' the defendant is sued in the courts
of the State of his domicile. The Convention does not
therefore involve a general reversal of national rules of
jurisdiction nor of the practice of judges and lawyers. In
fact, judges "nd lawyers will need to take account of the
changes effected by the Convention only in cases where
a defendant is sued in a court of a State where he is not
domiciled, or in one of the few cases in which the
Convention has laid down common rules of exclusive
jurisdiction.
The second paragraph of Article 2 embodies the
principle of equality of treatment where a foreigner is
domiciled in the State of the forum. Such foreigner
whether he is defendant or plaintiff, is governed in that
State by the same rules of jurisdiction as its nationals, or
more precisely, as its nationals who are domiciled in
that State, where, as in Italy, the law of that State
determines the jurisdiction of its courts according to
whether the national concerned is domiciled in its
territory.
As a result, Article 52 of the Belgian Law of 25 March
1876 will no longer be applicable as such to foreigners
domiciled in Belgium (1
The positive aspect of equality of treatment is set out in
the second paragraph of Article 4.
Article 
Article 3 deals with those cases in which a defendant
domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in another
Contracting State. This Article lays down the principle
that a defendant may be sued otherwise than in the
courts of the State where he is domiciled only in the
cases expressly provided for in the Convention. The rule
sets aside the rules of exorbitant jurisdiction in force in
(1) This Article provides, in particular, that foreigners who are
domiciled or resident in Belgium may be sued before a
court of the Kingdom either by a Belgian or by a foreigner.
each of the Contracting States. However, these rules of
jurisdiction are not totally excluded; they are excluded
only in respect of persons who are domiciled in another
Contracting State. Thus they remain in force with
respect to persons who are not domiciled within the
Community.
The second paragraph of Article 3 prohibits the
application of the most important and best known of
the rules of exorbitant jurisdiction. While this
paragraph is not absolutely essential it will nevertheless
facilitate the application of certain provisions of the
Convention (see, in particular, Article 59).
The following are the rules of exorbitant jurisdiction in
question in each of the States concerned.
In Belgium
Articles 52, 52bis and 53 of the Law of 25 March 1876
which govern territorial jurisdiction in actions brought
by Belgians (2) or by foreigners against foreigners before
Belgian courts, and Article 15 of the Civil Code which
corresponds to Article 15 of the French Civil Code.
In Germany
The nationality of the parties does not in general affect
the rules of jurisdiction. Article 23 of the Code of Civil
Procedure lays down that, where no other German
court has jurisdiction, actions relating to property
instituted against a person who is not domiciled in the
national territory come under the jurisdiction of the
court for the place where the property or subject of the
dispute is situated.
German courts have in a number of cases given a very
liberal interpretation to this provision, thereby leading
some authors to state that Article 23 ' can be likened to
Article 14 of the French Civil Code' (3
In France
1. Article 14 of the Civil Code provides that any
French plaintiff may sue a foreigner or another
Frenchman in the French courts, even if there is no
(2) Repertoire pratique du droit beige, under 'competence
No 17518  et seq.  (see Judicial Code, Articles 635, 637
and 638).
) WESER, Revue critique de droit international prive, 1959
p. 
636; ROSENBERG Lehrbuch des deutschen
ZivilprozeBrechts, ninth edition, paragraph 35 I 3.No C 59/20
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In Luxembourg connection between the cause of action and those
courts.
2. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that a
Frenchman may always be sued in the French courts
by a Frenchman or by a foreigner, and can even
insist on this.
Despite the fact that Articles 14 and 15 in terms refer
only to contractual obligations, case law has extended
their scope beyond contractual obligations to all actions
whether or not relating to property rights. There are
thus only two limitations to the general application of
Articles 14 and 15: French courts are never competent
to hear either actions  in rem  concerning immovable
property situated abroad or actions concernIng
proceedings for enforcement which is to take place
abroad (1
In Italy
1. Article 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that an agreement to substitute for the jurisdiction
of Italian courts the jurisdiction of a foreign court
or arbitral tribunal will be valid only in the case of
litigation between foreigners, or between a foreigner
and an Italian citizen who is neither resident nor
domiciled in Italy, and only if the agreement 
evidenced in writing.
2. (a) Under Article 4 (1) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a foreigner may be sued in an Italian
court if he is resident or domiciled in Italy, or if
he has an address for service there or has a
representative who is authorized to bring legal
proceedings in his name, or if he has accepted
Italian jurisdiction unless the proceedings
concern immovable property situated abroad.
(b) Under Article 4 (2) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, a foreigner may be sued in the courts
of the Italian Republic if the proceedings
concern property situated in Italy, or succession
to the estate of an Italian national, or an
application for probate made in Italy, or
obligations which arose in Italy or which must
be performed there.
3. The interpretation given to Article 4 by Italian case
law means that an Italian defendant may always be
sued in the Italian courts (2
) BA TIFFOL op. cit. No 684  et seq.
(2) MORELLI, Diritto processuale civile internazionale, pp.
108-112.
Articles 14 and 15 of the Civil Code correspond to
Articles 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code.
Luxembourg case law applies the same principles of
interpretation as French case law.
In the Netherlands
Article 126 (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that, in personal matters or matters concerning movable
property, a defendant who has no known domicile or
residence in the Kingdom shall be sued in the court for
the domicile of the plaintiff. This provision applies
whether or not the plaintiff is a Netherlands
national (3
Article 127 provides that a foreigner, even if he does not
reside in the Netherlands, may be sued in a Netherlands
court for the performance of obligations contracted
towards a Netherlander either in the Netherlands or
abroad.
Article 
Article 4 applies to all proceedings in which the
defendant is not domiciled in a Contracting State, and
provides that the rules of internal law remain in force.
This is justified on two grounds:
First, in order to ensure the free movement of
judgments, this Article prevents refusal of recognition or
enforcement of a judgment given on the basis of rules of
internal law relating to jurisdiction. In the absence of
such a provision, a judgment debtor would be able to
prevent execution being levied on his property simply
by transferring it to a Community country other than
that in which judgment was given.
Secondly, this Article may perform a function in the
case of  lis pendens.  Thus, for example, if a French court
is seised of an action between a Frenchman and a
defendant domiciled in America, and a German court is
) WESER, Revue critique de droit international prive, 1959
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seised of the same matter on the basis of Article 23 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, one of the two courts must
in the interests of the proper administration of justice
decline jurisdiction in favour of the other. This issue
cannot be settled unless the jurisdiction of these courts
derives from the Convention.
In the absence of an article such as Article 4, there
would be no rule in the Convention expressly
recognizing the jurisdiction of the French and German
courts in a case of this kind.
The only exception to the application of the rules of
jurisdiction of internal law is the field of exclusive
jurisdiction (ArtiCle 16) (1). The rules which grant
exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of a State are
applicable whatever the domicile of the defendant.
However, the question arises why the Committee did
not extend the scope of the provision limiting the
application of rules of exorbitant jurisdiction to include
in particular nationals of Member States regardless of
their place of domicile.
In other words, and to take another example based on
Article 14 of the French Civil Code, why will it still be
possible for a French plaintiff to sue in the French
courts a foreigner, or even a national of a Member State
of the Community, who is domiciled outside the
Community?
The Committee thought that it would have been
unreasonable to prevent the rules of exorbitant
jurisdiction from applying to persons including
Community nationals domiciled outside the
Community. Thus, for example, a Belgian national
domiciled outside the Community might own assets in
the Netherlands. The Netherlands courts have 
jurisdiction in the matter since the Convention does not
recognize jurisdiction based on the presence of assets
within a State. If Article 14 of the French Civil Code
could not be applied, a French plaintiff would have to
sue the Belgian defendant in a court outside the
Community, and the judgment could not be enforced in
the Netherlands if there were no enforcement treaty
between the Netherlands and the non-member State in
which judgment was given.
This, moreover, was the solution adopted in the
Conventions between France and Belgium, and between
(1) The third paragraph of Article 8, which concerns
jurisdiction in respect of insurers who are not domiciled in
the Community but have a branch or agency there, may
also be regarded as an exception.
Belgium and the Netherlands, and in the Benelux
Treaty, which, however, take nationality as their
criterion (2).
The second paragraph of Article 4 of the Convention
constitutes a positive statement of the principle of
equality of treatment already laid down in the second
paragraph of Article 2. An express provision was
considered necessary in order to avoid any
uncertainty (3). Under this provision, any person
domiciled in a Contracting State has the right, as
plaintiff, to avail himself in that State of the same rules
of jurisdiction as a national of that State.
This principle had already been expressly laid down in
the Convention between France and Belgium of 8 July
1899 (Article 1 (2)).
This positive aspect of the principle of equality of
treatment was regarded as complementing the right of
establishment (Article 52  et seq.  of the Treaty of Rome),
the existence of which implies, as was stated in the
General Programme for the abolition of restrictions on
freedom of establishment of 18 December 1961 (4), that
any natural or legal person established in a Member
State should enjoy the same legal protection as a
national of that State.
The provIsIOn is also justified on economic grounds.
Since rules of exorbitant jurisdiction can still be invoked
against foreigners domiciled outside the European
Economic Community, persons who are domiciled in
the Member State concerned and who thus contribute
to the economic life of the Community should be able
to invoke such rules in the same way as the nationals of
that State.
It may be thought surprISIng that the Convention
extends the 'privileges of jurisdiction' in this way, since
equality of treatment is granted in each of the States to
all persons, whatever their nationality, who are
domiciled in that State.
(2) The Convention between France and Belgium is interpreted
to mean that a Frenchman may not rely on Article 14 of
the Civil Code to sue in France a Belgian domiciled in Bel-
gium, but may do so to sue a Belgian domiciled abroad.
BA TIFFOL, Traite elementaire de droit international prive
No 714.
(3) According to French case law on the Treaty of 9 February
1842 between France and Denmark, a Danish national
may not rely on Article 14 of the French Civil Code.
Official Journal of the European Communities
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It should first be noted that such treatment is already
granted to foreigners in Belgium, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, where the rules
of exorbitant jurisdiction may be invoked by foreigners
as well as by nationals. The second paragraph of Article
4 therefore merely brings into line with these laws the
French and Luxembourg concepts, according to which
Article 14 of the Civil Code constitutes a privilege of
nationality.
Secondly, the solution adopted in the Convention
follows quite naturally from the fact that, for the
reasons already given, the Convention uses domicile as
the criterion for determining jurisdiction. In this context
it must not be forgotten that it will no longer 
possible to invoke the privileges of jurisdiction against
persons domiciled in the Community, although it will
be possible to invoke them against nationals of the
Community countries who have established their
domicile outside the territory of the Six.
Section 2
Special jurisdiction
Articles  and 
Articles 5 and 6 list the situations in which a defendant
may be sued in a Contracting State other than that of
his domicile. The forums provided for in these Articles
supplement those which apply under Article 2. In the
case of proceedings for which a court is specifically
recognized as having jurisdiction under these Articles
the plaintiff may, at his option, bring the proceedings
either in that court or in the competent courts of the
State in which the defendant is domiciled.
One problem which arose here was whether it should
always be possible to sue the defendant in one of the
courts provided for in these Articles, or whether this
should be allowed only if the jurisdiction of that court
was also recognized by the internal law of the State
concerned.
In other words, in the first case, jurisdiction would
derive directly from the Convention and in the second
there would need to be dual jurisdiction: that of the
Convention and that of the internal law on local
jurisdiction. Thus, for example, where Netherlands law
on jurisdiction does not recognize the court for the
place of performance of the obligation, can the plaintiff
nevertheless sue the defendant before that court in the
Netherlands? In addition, would there be any obligation
on the Netherlands to adapt its national laws in order
to give that court jurisdiction?
By adopting 'special' rules of jurisdiction, that is by
directly designating the competent court without
referring to the rules of jurisdiction in force 'in the State
where such a court might be situated, the Committee
decided that a plaintiff should always be able to sue a
defendant in one of the forums provided for without
having to take the internal law of the State concerned
into consideration. Further, in laying down these rules
the Committee intended to facilitate implementation of
the Convention. By ratifying the Convention, the
Contracting States will avoid having to take any other
measures to adapt their internal legislation to the
criteria laid down in Articles 5 and 6. The Convention
itself determines which court has jurisdiction.
Adoption of the ' special' rules of jurisdiction is also
justified by the fact that there must be a close
connecting factor between the dispute and the court
with jurisdiction to resolve it. Thus, to take the example
of the  forum delicti commissi a person domiciled in a
Contracting State other than the Netherlands who has
caused an accident in The Hague may, under the
Convention, be sued in a court in The Hague. This
accident cannot give other Netherlands courts
jurisdiction over the defendant. On this point there is
thus a distinct difference between Article 2 and Articles
5 and 6, due to the fact that in Article 2 domicile is the
connecting factor.
Forum contractus (Article 5 (1)) including contracts
of employment
There are great differences between the laws of the Six
in their attitude to the jurisdiction of the  forum
contractus;  in some countries this jurisdiction is not
recognized (the Netherlands, Luxembourg), while in
others it exists in varying degrees. Belgian law
recognizes the jurisdiction of the courts for the place
where the obligation arose, and also that of the courts
for the place where the obligation has been or is to be
performed (1); Italian law recognizes only the
jurisdiction of the courts for the place where the
obligation arose and where it has been performed (2);
German law in general recognizes only the jurisdiction
of the courts for the place where the obligation has been
) Articles 41 and 52 of the Law of 25 March 1876, Article
624 of the Judicial Code.
(l) Articles 4 and 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/23
performed (1); and, finally. French law recognizes the
jurisdiction of the  forum contractus  only to a limited
extent and subject to certain conditions  e).
Some of the conventions concluded between the Six
reject this forum, while others accept it in varying
degrees. Article 2 (1) of the Convention between  France
and Belgium  provides that, where a defendant is neither
domiciled nor resident in France or Belgium, a Belgian
or French plaintiff may institute proceedings in the
courts for the place where the obligation arose or where
it has been or is to be performed  e).
Article 4 of the Convention between  Belgium and the
Netherlands  provides that in civil or commercial
matters a plaintiff may bring a personal action
concerning movable property in the courts for the place
where the obligation arose or where it has been or is to
be performed.
In Article 3 (5) of the Convention between  Belgium and
Germany,  jurisdiction is recognized where, in matters
relating to a contract, proceedings are instituted in a
court of the State where the obligation has been or is to
be performed.
Article 14 of the Convention between  France and Italy
provides that if the action concerns a contract which is
considered as a commercial matter by the law of the
country in which the action is brought, a French or
Italian plaintiff may seise the courts of either of the two
countries in which the contract was concluded or is to
be performed.
The Convention between  Belgium and Italy  (Article 2
(5)) recognizes jurisdiction where, in matters relating
to a contract, an action is brought before the courts of
the State where the obligation arose, or where it has
been or should have been performed.
There are no provIsIOns on this subject in the
Conventions between  Italy and the Netherlands,
Germany and Italy,  and  Germany and the Netherlands.
Finally, the Benelux Treaty adopts Article 4 of the
Convention between Belgium and the Netherlands, but
includes a Protocol which in Article 1 lays down that
) Articl~ 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(2) Articles 59 (3) and 420 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
e) On the serious controversy to which this Article has given
rise, see WESER, Traite franco-belge du 8 juillet 1899.
E:tude critique, p. 63  et seq. also Jurisclasseur de droit
international, vol. 591, Nos 42 and 45.
Article 4 shall not apply where Luxembourg 
concerned if the defendant is domiciled or resident in
the country of which he is a national (4
Article 5 (1) provides a compromIse between the
various national laws.
The jurisdiction of the forum is, as in German law
limited to matters relating to contract. It could have
been restricted to commercial matters, but account must
be taken of the fact that European integration will mean
an increase in the number of contractual relationships
entered into. To have confined it to commercial matters
would moreover have raised the problem of
classification.
Only the jurisdiction of the  forum solutionis  has been
retained, that is to say the jurisdiction of the courts for
the place of performance of the obligation on which the
claim is based. The reasons for this are as follows.
The Committee considered that it would be unwise to
give jurisdiction to a number of courts, and thus
possibly create conflicts of jurisdiction. A plaintiff
already has a choice, in matters relating to a contract
between the competent courts of the State where the
defendant is domiciled, or, where there is more than one
defendant, the courts for the place where anyone of
them is domiciled, or finally, the courts for the place of
performance of the obligation in question.
If the Committee had adopted as wide-ranging a
provision as that of the Benelux Treaty, which
recognizes also the jurisdiction of the courts for the
place where the obligation arose, this would have
involved very considerable changes for those States
whose laws do not recognize that forum, or do so only
with certain restrictions.
There was also concern that acceptance of the
jurisdiction of the courts for the place where the
obligation arose might sanction, by indirect means, the
jurisdiction of the forum of the plaintiff. To have
accepted this forum would have created tremendous
problems of classification, in particular in the case of
contracts concluded by parties who are absent.
The court for the place of performance of the obligation
will be useful in proceedings for the recovery of fees: the
creditor will have a choice between the courts of the
State where the defendant is domiciled and the courts of
another State within whose jurisdiction the services
) For the reasons for this limitation, see the report on the
negotiations.No C 59/24 Official Journal of the European Communities
were provided, particularly where, according to the
appropriate law, the obligation to pay must be
performed where the services were provided. This
forum can also be used where expert evidence or
inquiries are required. The special position of
Luxembourg justified, as in the Benelux Treaty,
the inclusion of a special provision in the Protocol
(Article I).
Contracts of employment
In matters relating to contracts of employment in the
broadest sense of the term, the preliminary draft of the
Convention contained a provision attributing exclusive
jurisdiction to the courts of the Contracting State either
in which the undertaking concerned was situated, or in
which the work was to have been or had been
performed. After prolonged consideration the
Committee decided not to insert in the Convention any
special provisions on jurisdiction in this field. Its
reasoning was as follows.
First, work is at present in progress within the
Commission of the EEC to harmonize the provisions of
labour law in the Member States. It is desirable that
disputes over contracts of employment should as far as
possible be brought before the courts of the State whose
law governs the contract. The Committee therefore did
not think that rules of jurisdiction should be laid down
which might not coincide with those which may later be
adopted for determining the applicable law.
In order to lay down such rules of jurisdiction, the
Committee would have had to take into account not
only the different ways in which work can be carried
out abroad, but also the various categories of worker:
wage-earning or salaried workers recruited abroad to
work permanently for an undertaking, or those
temporarily transferred abroad by an undertaking to
work for it there; commercial agents, management, etc.
Any attempt by the Committee to draw such
distinctions might have provided a further hindrance to
the Commission s work.
Next, in most Member States of the Community the
principle of freedom of contract still plays an important
part; a rule of exclusive jurisdiction such as that
previously provided for in Article 16 would have
nullified any agreements conferring jurisdiction.
The general rules of the Convention will therefore apply
to contracts of employment. Thus, in litigation between
employers and employees, the following courts have
jurisdiction: the courts of the State where the defendant
is domiciled (Article 2); the courts for the place of
performance of the obligation, if that place is in a State
other than that of the domicile of the defendant (Article
(1)); and any court on which the parties have
expressly or impliedly agreed (Articles 17 and 18). In
the case of proceedings based on a tort committed at
work (Article 2 Nos  and  of the
Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz), Article 5 (3), which provides for
the jurisdiction of the courts for the place where the
harmful event occurred, could also apply. It seems that
these rules will, for the time being, prove of greater
value to the persons concerned than a provision similar
to that of the former Article 16 (2), which could not be
derogated from because it prohibited any agreement
conferring jurisdiction.
The rules on the recognition and enforcement of
judgments will probably ensure additional protection
for employees. If the law of the State addressed had to
be applied to a contract of employment, the courts of
that State, upon being seised of an application for
recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment
would, on the basis of Article 27 (1), which permits
refusal of recognition (or enforcement) on grounds of
public policy in the State addressed, be able to refuse
the application if the court of the State of origin had
failed to apply, or had misapplied, an essential
provision of the law of the State addressed.
Once the work of the Commission in this field has been
completed, it will always be possible to amend the
provisions of the Convention, either by means of an
additional Protocol, or by the drafting of a convention
governing the whole range of problems relating to
contracts of employment, which would, under Article
, prevail over the Convention.
Maintenance obligations (Article 5 (2))
Matters relating to maintenance are governed by the
Convention.
The Convention is in a sense an extension of the Hague
Convention of 15 April 1958 concerning the
recognition and enforcement of decisions relating to
maintenance obligations in respect of children (1), since
(1) In force on 1. 9. 1966 between Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy and the Netherlands.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/25
it ensures the recognition and enforcement of judgments
granting maintenance to creditors other than children
and also of the New York Convention of 20 June 1956
on the recovery abroad of maintenance (1).
The Committee decided that jurisdiction should be
conferred on the forum of the creditior, for the same
reasons as the draftsmen of the Hague Convention (2).
For one thing, a convention which did not recognize the
forum of the maintenance creditor would be of only
limited value, since the creditor would be obliged to
bring the claim before the court having jurisdiction over
the defendant.
If the Convention did not confer jurisdiction on the
forum of the maintenance creditor, it would apply only
in those situations where the defendant against whom
an order had been made subsequently changed
residence, or where the defendant possessed property in
a country other than that in which the order was made.
Moreover the court for the place of domicile of the
maintenance creditor is in the best position to know
whether the creditor is in need and to determine the
extent of such need.
However, in order to align the Convention with the
Hague Convention Article 5 (2) also confers
jurisdiction on the courts for the place of habitual
residence of the maintenance creditor. This alternative is
justified in relation to maintenance obligations since it
enables in particular a wife deserted by her husband to
sue him for payment of maintenance in the courts for
the place where she herself is habitually resident, rather
than the place of her legal domicile.
The Convention also supplements the New York
Convention of 20 June 1956 on the recovery abroad-
maintenance. The latter is limited to providing that a
forwarding authority will transmit to an intermediate
body any judgment already given in favour of a
maintenance creditor, and that body will then have to
begin proceedings for enforcement or registration of the
judgment, or institute new proceedings altogether.
This Convention, by simplifying the formalities
governing enforcement will thus facilitate
implementation of the New York Convention.
) In force on 1. 9. 1966 between Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy and the Netherlands.
(2) Hague Conference on private international law, documents
for the eighth session, p. 315.
As regards maintenance payments, the Committee did
not overlook the problems which might be raised by
preliminary issues (for example, the question of
affiliation). However, it considered that these were not
properly problems of jurisdiction, and that any
difficulties should be considered in the chapter on
recognition and enforcement of judgments.
It was suggested that, in order to avoid conflicting
judgments, it might be desirable to provide that the
court which had fixed the amount of a maintenance
payment should be the only court to have jurisdiction to
vary it. The Committee did not think it necessary to
adopt such a solution. This would have obliged parties
neither of whom had any further connection with the
original court, to bring proceedings before courts which
could be very far away. Moreover, any judgment by a
second court, in order to vary that of the first court
would have to be based on changed facts, and in those
circumstances it could not be maintained that the
judgments were in conflict (3
Forum delicti commissi (Article  5 (3)  and  (4))
This jurisdiction is recognized by the national laws of
the Member States with the exception of Luxembourg
and the Netherlands, where it exists only in respect of
collisions of ships and of road accidents.
The following are applicable in Belgium, Articles 41
and 52 (3) of the Law of 1876 (4); in Germany, Article
32 of the Code of Civil Procedure; in France, Article 59
(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 21 of
the Decree of 22 December 1958; and in Italy, Article
20 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This jurisdiction is incorporated in the bilateral
conventions by the following provisions: Article 4 of the
Convention between Belgium and the Netherlands and
Article 4 of the Benelux Treaty, which cover all
obligations concerning movable property, whether
statutory, contractual or non-contractual (5); Article 2
(b) of the Convention between Belgium and Italy;
Article 3 (1) (6) of the Convention between Germany
e) For a similar view, see the Hague Conference on private
international law, documents for the ninth session. Report
on the draft Convention concerning the recognition and
enforcement of decisions relating to maintenance
obligations in respect of children, p. 321.
) Article 626 of the Judicial Code.
) Report on the negotiations, p. 17.No C 59/26 Official Journal of the European Communities
nd Belgium; Article 15 of the Convention between
France and Italy; Article 2 (4) of the Convention
between Germany and Italy; and Article 4 (1) (e) of the
Convention between Germany and the Netherlands..
The fact that this jurisdiction is recognized under most
of the legal systems, and incorporated in the majority of
the bilateral conventions, was a ground for including it
in the Convention, especially in view of the high
number of road accidents.
Article 5 (3) uses the expression 'the place where the
harmful event occurred' . The Committee did not think
it should specify whether that place is the place where
the event which resulted in damage or injury occurred
or whether it is the place where the damage or injury
was sustained. The Committee preferred to keep to a
formula which has already been adopted by number of
legal systems (Germany, France).
Article 5 (4) provides that a civil claim may be brought
before a court seised of criminal proceedings; this is in
order to take into account the rules of jurisdiction laid
down by the various codes of criminal procedure. A
civil claim can thus always be brought, whatever the
domicile of the defendant, in the criminal court having
jurisdiction to entertain the criminal proceedings even if
the place where the court sits (place of arrest, for
example) is not the same as that where the harmful
event occurred.
jurisdiction based on a dispute arising out of the
operations of a branch agency or other
establishment (Article  5 (5))
This jurisdiction exists in the bilateral conventions
already concluded between the Contracting States: the
Conventions between Italy and Belgium (Article 2 (3)),
between Belgium and Germany (Article 2 (1) (4)),
between France and Belgium (Article 3 (2)), between
France and Italy (Article 13), between Italy and the
Netherlands (Article 2 (3)), and between Belgium and
the Netherlands (Article 5 (3)); the Benelux Treaty
(Article 5 (4)); and the Conventions between Germany
and the Netherlands (Article 4 (1) (d)), and between
Germany and Italy (Article 2 (3)).
This provision concerns only defendants domiciled in a
Contracting State (Article 5), that is, companies or firms
having their seat in one Contracting State and having a
branch, agency or other establishment in another
Contracting State. Companies or firms which have their
seat outside the Community but have a branch, etc. in a
Contracting State are governed by Article 4, even as
regards disputes relating to the activities of their
branches, but without prejudice to the provisions of
Article 8 relating to insurance.
More than one defendant (Article  6 (1))
Where there is more than one defendant, the courts for
the place where anyone of the defendants is domiciled
are recognized as having jurisdiction. This jurisdiction
is provided for in the internal law of Belgium (1
France (2), Italy (3), Luxembourg (4) and the Nether-
lands (5
It is not in general provided for in German law. Where
an action must be brought in Germany against a
number of defendants and there is no jurisdiction to
which they are all subject, the court having jurisdiction
may, subject to certain conditions, be designated by the
superior court which is next above it (Article 36 (3) of
the German Code of Civil Procedure).
This jurisdiction is also provided for in the Conventions
between Italy and the Netherlands (Article 2 (1)),
between Italy and Belgium (Article 2 (1)), between
France and Italy (Article 11 (2)), and between Germany
and Italy (Article 2 (1)). However, under the latter
Convention, jurisdiction depends on the existence of a
procedural requirement that the various defendants be
joined.
It follows from the text of the Convention that, where
there are several defendants domiciled in different
Contracting States, the plaintiff can at his option sue
them all in the courts for the place where anyone of
them is domiciled.
In order for this rule to be applicable there must be a
connection between the claims made against each of the
defendants, as for example in the case of joint
debtors (h). It follows that action cannot be brought
solely with the object of ousting the jurisdiction of the
courts of the State in which the defendant is
domiciled (1).
) Articles 39 and 52 (10) of the Law of 25 March 1876, and
Article 624 of the Judicial Code.
(2) Article 59 (4) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(3) Article 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
) Article 59 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
) Article 126 (7) of the Code of Civil Proct"dure.
) MOREL, Traite elementaire de procedure civile, No 264.
C)  Casso fran~aise 1924, D.P. 1925, Vol. 13.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/27
Jurisdiction derived from the domicile of one of the
defendants was adopted by the Committee because it
makes it possible to obviate the handing down in the
Contracting States of judgments which are
irreconcilable with one another.
Actions on a warranty or guarantee, third party
proceedings, counterclaims.
(a) Actions on a warranty or guarantee (Article 6 (2))
An action on a warranty or guarantee brought against a
third party by the defendant in an action for the
purpose of being indemnified against the consequences
of that action, is available in Belgian (1), French (2),
Italian (3), Luxembourg (4) and Netherlands (5) law.
The proceeding which corresponds to an action on a
warranty or guarantee in Germany is governed by
Articles 72, 73 and 74 and Article 68 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
A party who in any proceedings considers that, if he is
unsuccessful, he has a right of recourse on a warranty
or guarantee against a third party, may join that third
party in the proceedings (Article 72) (Streitverkundung
litis denunciatio 
The notice joining the third party must be served on
that party and a copy must be sent to the other party
(Article 73). No judgment can be given as regards the
third party, but the judgment given in the original
proceedings is binding in the sense that the substance of
the judgment cannot be contested in the subsequent
action which the defendant may bring against the third
party (Article 68). Under the German Code of Civil
Procedure the defendant can exercise his right of
recourse against the third party only in separate
proceedings.
Actions on a warranty or guarantee are governed by the
bilateral Conventions between Belgium and Germany
(Article 3 (10)), between France and Belgium (Article 4
(2)), between Belgium and the Netherlands (Article 6
(2)), between Italy and the Netherlands (Article 2 (4)),
between Belgium and Italy (Article 2 (10)), and between
Germany and the Netherlands (Article 4 (1) (c)), and
also by the Benelux Treaty (Article 6 (3)).
) Articles 50 and 52 of the Law of 25 March 1876, Article
181 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(l) Articles 59 (10) and 181 to 185 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
(3) Articles 32 and 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
) Articles 59 (8) and 181 to 185 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
) Article 126 (14) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This jurisdiction is, in the opinion of the Committee, of
considerable importance in commercial dealings, as can
be seen from the following example: A German
exporter delivers goods to Belgium and the Belgian
importer resells them. The purchaser sues the importer
for damages in the court for the place of his domicile
for example in Brussels. The Belgian importer has a
right of recourse against the German exporter and
consequently brings an action for breach of warranty
against that exporter in the court in Brussels, since it
- has jurisdiction over the original action. The jurisdiction
over the action on the warranty is allowed by the Con-
vention although the warrantor is domiciled in Ger-
many, since this is in the interests of the proper adminis-
tration of justice.
However, under Article 17, the court seised of t
original action will not have jurisdiction over the action
on the warranty where the warrantor and the
beneficiary of the warranty have agreed to confer
jurisdiction on another court provided that the
agreement covers actions on the warranty.
Moreover, the court seised of the original action will
not have jurisdiction over an action on the warranty if
the original proceedings were instituted solely with the
object of ousting the jurisdiction of the courts of the
State in which the warrantor is domiciled (6
The special position of German law is covered by
Article V of the Protocol.
Under this provision, the jurisdiction specified in Article
6 (2) in actions on a warranty or guarantee may not be
resorted to in the Federal Republic of Germany, but any
person domiciled in another Contracting State may be
summoned before the German courts on the basis of
Articles 72 to 74 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Judgments given against a guarantor or warrantor in
the other Contracting States will be recognized and
enforced in Germany.
Judgments given in Germany pursuant to Articles 72 to
74 will have the same effect in the other Contracting
States as in Germany.
Thus, for example, a guarantor or warrantor domiciled
in France can be sued in the German court having
jurisdiction over the original action. The German law
) See Article 181 of the Belgian, French and Luxembourg
Code of Civil Procedure, and Article 74 of the Netherlands
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judgment given in Germany affects only the parties to
the action, but it can be invoked against the guarantor
or warrantor. Where the beneficiary of the guarantee or
warranty proceeds agaist the guarantor or warrantor in
the competent French courts, he will be able to apply
for recognition of the German judgment, and it will no
longer be possible to re-examine that judgment as to the
merits.
It is clear that, following the principles which apply to
enforcement, a judgment given in an action on a
guarantee or warranty will have no effects in the State
in which enforcement is sought other than those which
it had in the country of origin.
This principle, which already applied under the
Conventions between Germany and Belgium (Article 3
(10)) and between Germany and the Netherlands
(Article 4 (1) (i)), is thus incorporated in the provision
governing relations between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the other Member States of the Com-
munity.
(b) Third party proceedings
While a third party warranty or guarantee necessarily
involves the intervention of an outsider, it seemed
preferable to make separate provision for guarantors or
warrantors and for other third parties. The simplest
definition of third party proceedings is to be found in
Articles 15 and 16 of the Belgian Judicial Code, which
provides that:
Third party proceedings are those in which a third
party is joined as a party to the action.
They are intended either to safeguard the interests
of the third party or of one of the parties to the
action, or to enable judgment to be entered against
a party, or to allow an order to be made for the
purpose of giving effect to a guarantee or warranty
(Article 15).
The third party s intervention is voluntary where he
appears in order to defend his interests.
It is not voluntary where the third party is sued in
the course of the proceedings by one or more of the
parties (Article 16).
(c) Counterclaims (Article 6 (3))
The bilateral. conventions on enforcement all recognize
jurisdiction over counterclaims: see the Convention
between Belgium and Germany (Article 3 (1) (10))
(counterclaims); the Convention between Italy and
Belgium (Article 2 (1) (10)) (dependent counterclaims);
the Convention between France and Belgiul1l (Article 4
(2)) (counterclaims); the Convention between Belgium
and the Netherlands (Article 6) (counterclaims, third
party proceedings and interlocutory proceedings); the
Convention between France and Italy (Article 18)
(claims for compensation, interlocutory or dependent
proceedings, counterclaims); the Convention between
Italy and the Netherlands (Article 2 (4)) dependent
proceedings, counterclaims); "the Convention between
Germany and Italy (Article 2 (5)) (counterclaims); the
Benelux Treaty (Article 6) (counterclaims, third party
proceedings and interlocutory proceedings); and the
Convention between Germany and the Netherlands
(Article 4 (1) (i)) (counterclaims and actions on a
warranty or guarantee).
It has been made clear that in order to establish this
jurisdiction the counterclaim must be related to the
original claim. Since the concept of related actions is not
recognized in all the legal systems, the provision in
question, following the draft Belgian Judicial Code
states that the counterclaim must arise from the
contract or from the facts on which the original claim
was based.
Sections 3 to 5
Insurance, instalment sales, exclusive jurisdiction
General remarks
In each . of the six Contracting States, the rules of
territorial jurisdiction are not as a rule part of public
policy and it is therefore permissible for the parties to
agree on a different jurisdiction.
There are, however, exceptions to this principle: certain
rules of jurisdiction are mandatory or form part of
public policy, either in order to further the efficient
administration of justice by reducing the number of
jurisdictions and concentrating certain forms of
litigation in a single forum, or else out of social
considerations for the protection of certain categories of
persons, such as insured persons or buyers of goods on
instalment credit terms.
In view of the Convention s structure and objectives, it
was necessary to deal with this matter under the
Convention. Failure to take account of the problem
raised by these rules of jurisdiction might not only have
caused recognition and enforcement to be refused in
certain cases on grounds of public policy, which would
be contrary to the principle of free movement of
judgments, but also result, indirectly, in  general
re-examination of the jurisdiction of the court of the
State of origin.Serveral solutions were open to the Committee.
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The first is found in many bilateral Conventions, and
enables the court of the State in which recognition or
enforcement is sought to refuse to recognize the
jurisdiction of the court of the State of origin where, in
the former State, there are ' rules attributing exclusive
jurisdiction to the courts of that State in the proceedings
which led to the judgment' (l).
This system would have been unsatisfactory not only
because it gives rise to the objections already set out
above, but because it would have introduced into the
Convention an element of insecurity incompatible with
its basic principles. It is no solution to the problem, and
only postpones the difficulties, deferring them until the
recognition and enforcement stage.
Another possible solution would have been a general
clause like that contained in the Convention between
Belgium and the Netherlands or the Bendux Treaty
(Article 5 (1)), which takes into consideration the
internal law of the Contracting States  (l).  Such a clause
could however, lead to difficulties of interpretation
since the court of the State of origin must, where its
jurisdiction is contested, apply the internal law of the
State which claims to have exclusive jurisdiction.
Moreover, while such a solution might be acceptable in
a Treaty between three States, it would be much more
difficult to incorporate it in a Convention between six
States where it is not always possible to determine in
advance the State or States in which recognition or
enforcement may be sought.
A third solution would have been to draw up a list 
the individual jurisdictions which would be exclusive
and which would thus be binding on all the Contracting
States. Such a list would answer the need of the parties
for information regarding the legal position, allow the
(1) Convention between Germany and Belgium, Article 3 (2);
Convention between Italy and the Netherlands (end of
Article 2); Convention between Italy and Belgium (end of
Article 2).
(2) Article 5 (1) of the Convention between Belgium and the
Netherlands reads as follows: 'Where a domicile conferring
jurisdiction has been chosen in one of the two countries for
the enforcement of an instrument, the courts for the place
of domicile chosen shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
litigation relating to that instrument, save for exceptions
and modifications enacted or to be enacted under the
national law of one of the two States or by international
agreement.'
court to give judgment on the basis of a definite
common rule, remove any element of uncertainty and
ensure a balance between the parties to contractual
arrangements.
The considerations underlying the various provisions of
the Convention are ~omplex. Sections 3 and 4, for
example, concerning insurance and instalment sales and
loans, are dictated by social considerations and are
aimed in particular at preventing abuses which could
result from the terms of contracts in standard form.
Section 5 (Article 16) contains a list of situations in
which the courts of a Contracting State are
acknowledged as having exclusive jurisdiction, since the
proper administration of justice requires that actions
should be brought before the courts of a single State.
The Convention deals with the two categories
differently. The first category has been placed in an
intermediate position between the general rules of
jurisdiction and the rules which are wholly exclusive.
The following system adopted:
1. For matters falling within Section 3 and 4 there is
no single jurisdiction. A choice, albeit a limited one
exists between the courts of different Contracting
States where the plantiff is a protected person, that
, a policy-holder, a buyer or a borrower. In
matters falling under exclusive jurisdictions
pursuant to Section 5, the parties have no choice
between the courts of serveral Contracting States.
2. The parties may, in certain circumstances, derogate
from the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 (Articles 12
, and 18). The provisions of Section 5 may not
however, be derogated from, either by an agreement
conferring jurisdiction (second paragraph of
Article 17) or by an implied submission to the
jurisdiction (Article 18).
3. The rules in Section 3 and 4 are applicable only
where the defendant is domiciled in a Contracting
State, whereas those in Section 5 apply regardless of
domicile.
However, contravention of the provisions of Sections 3
and 4, as well as of those of Section 5, constitutes a
ground for refusing recognition and enforcement
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Section 3
Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance
Rules of exclusive or special jurisdiction relating to
insurance exist in France (Article 3 of the Law of 
July 1930 concerning contracts of insurance), in
Belgium (Law of 20 May 1920, added as Article 43 bis
to the Law of 25 March 1876 on jurisdiction), in
Germany (~ 48 of the Gesetz iiber den
Versicherungsvertrag (Law on contracts of insurance)),
and in Italy (Article 1903 (2) of the Civil Code, Article
124 of the Consolidated Law on private insurance). In
Luxembourg, the Law of 16 May 1891 on contracts of
insurance does not include any provision on
jurisdiction. This is due to the small size of the Grand
Duchy, which comprises only two judicial
arrondissements. However, the Law of 16 May 1891
concerning the supervision of insurance matters governs
jurisdiction in regard to foreign insurance companies.
This Law requires an insurer resident abroad who is
transacting insurance business in the Grand Duchy to
appoint a general representative domiciled 
Luxembourg who will represent him there judicially and
extrajudicially. This representative must give an address
for service of process in the judicial arrondissement in
which he is not domiciled. Either the domicile of the
general representative or his address for service founds
jurisdiction in respect of actions arising from contracts
of insurance. In the Netherlands, there are no special
provisions concerning the jurisdiction of the courts 
insurance matters. As regards foreign life-assurance
companies, the Netherlands Law of 22 December 1922
recognizes rules analogous to those of the Luxembourg
Law of 16 May 1891. The rules are approximately the
same in Germany.
Section 3 was drawn up in cooperation with the
European Insurance Committee.
The provisions of this Section may be summarized as
follows: in matters relating to insurance, actions against
an insurer domiciled in a Contracting State may be
brought in the following courts, i.e. either:
(i) In the courts of the State where he is domiciled
(Article 8), or, subject to certain conditions, in the
courts for the place where he has a branch (Articles
7 and 8); or
(ii) (a) in the courts for the place where the
policy-holder is domiciled (Article 8);
(b) in the courts of the State where one of the
insurers is domiciled, if two or more insurers
are the defendants (Article 8);
(c) in the courts for the place where the agent who
acted as intermediary in the making of the
contract of insurance has his domicile, if there
is provision for such jurisdiction under the law
of the court seised of the matter (Article 8);
(d) 1. in respect of liability insurance, the insurer
may in addition be sued:
(1) in the courts for the place where the
harmful event occurred (Articles 9 and
10),
(2) as a third party, in the court seised of
the action brought by the injured party
against the insured if, under its own
law, that court has jurisdiction in the
third party proceedings (Article 10);
2. in respect of insurance of immovable
property, the insurer may in addition be
sued in the courts for the place where the
harmful event occurred. The same applies
if movable and immovable property are
covered by the same insurance policy and
both are adversely affected by the same
contingency (Article 9).
Where an insurer is the plaintiff, he may in general
bring an action only in the courts of the State in which
the defendant is domiciled, irrespective of whether the
latter is the policy-holder, the insured or a beneficiary.
Agreements conferring jurisdiction which depart from
these rules have no legal force if they were entered into
before the dispute arose (Article 12).
Article 
Article 7 specifies that jurisdiction in matters relating to
insurance is governed solely by Section 3 of Title II.
Specific exceptions are made by the references to
Articles 4 and 5 (5), which concern respectively
defendants domiciled outside the Community and
disputes arising out of the operations of a branch
agency or other establishment.
It follows from the first of these exceptions that
jurisdiction is determined by the law of the court seised
of the matter including the rules of exorbitant
jurisdiction, where the defendant, whether he is the
insurer or the policy-holder, is domiciled outside the
Community. However, as an exception to the general
rules of the Convention, an insurer domiciled outside
the Community who has a branch or an agency in aOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/31
Contracting State is, in disputes relating to the
operations of the branch or agency, deemed to be
domiciled in that State. This exception, which 
contained in the last paragraph of Article 8, was
adopted because foreign insurance companies can
establish branches or agencies in other States only by
putting up guarantees which in practice place them in
the same position as national companies. However, the
exception applies only to branches or agencies, i.
when the foreign company is represented by a person
able to conclude contracts with third parties on behalf
of the company.
The second exception again relates to branches or
agencies, and also to other establishments, which, as
appears from the reference back to Article 5 (5), depend
from a company whose seat is in a Contracting State.
The result is that such a company may be sued in the
courts for the place in which the branch, agency or
establishment is situated, in all disputes arising out of
their operations.
Article 
Article 8 lays down general rules of jurisdiction in
proceedings instituted against an insurer in matters
relating to insurance.
First, the courts of the State where the insurer is
domiciled have jurisdiction. This provision determines
only general jurisdiction, namely the jurisdiction of the
courts of the State where the insurer is domiciled. Each
State must then apply its internal law to determine
which court has jurisdiction. However, if the insurer is
sued outside the State in which he is domiciled, the
proceedings must be instituted in  specifically
determined court, in accordance with the principles
already adopted in Article 5.
Secondly, an action may be brought in a State other
than that in which the insurer is domiciled, in the courts
for the place where the policy-holder is domiciled.
Policy-holder' is to be taken to mean the other party to
the contract of insurance. Where the insured or the
beneficiary is not the same person as the policy-holder
their place of domicile is not taken into consideration.
As was noted in particular by the European Insurance
Committee, the insurer, as a supplier of services, enters
into a business relationship with the other contracting
party (the policy-holder). Because of their direct contact
it is right and proper that the insurer can be sued in the
courts for the place where the policy-holder 
domiciled. But it would be unreasonable to expect the
insurer to appear in the court of the insured or of a
beneficiary, since. he will not necessarily know their
exact domicile at lhe time when the cause of action
arIses.
The domicile of the policy-holder which is relevant here
is the domicile existing at the time when the proceedings
are instituted.
Thirdly, if two or more insurers are defendants in the
same action, they may be sued in the courts of the State
where anyone of them is domiciled. This provision is
identical to that in Article 6 (1), which does not apply
here since the Section relating to insurance applies
independently of the rest of the Convention.
Furthermore, an insurer may be sued in a State other
than that in which he is domiciled, in the courts for the
place where the agent who acted as intermediary in the
making of the contract of insurance is domiciled, but
subject to two conditions: first, that the domicile of the
agent who acted as intermediary is menti~ned in the
insurance policy or proposal, and, secondly, that the
law of the court seised of the matter recognizes this
jurisdiction. It is not recognized in Belgium or in France
although it is in Germany (1) and in Italy (Article 1903
of the Civil Code). The reference to the insurance
proposal takes account of the usual practice in
Germany. Insurance companies there in general use
data-processing systems, so that the place of the agency
often appears in the policy only in the form of a number
referring back to the insurance proposal. The insurance
proposal, within the meaning of the Convention, means
of course, the final proposal which forms the basis of
the contract.
The expression 'the agent, who acted as intermediary in
the making of the contract of insurance' includes both
an agent through whom the contract was directly
concluded between the company and the policy-holder
and also an agent who negotiated the contract to
conclusion on behalf of the company. The significance
) ~ 48 of the Gesetz iiber den Versicherungsvertrag:
1. If an insurance agent has acted as intermediary in the
making of the contract, or has concluded the contract, then
in actions against the insurer arising out of the insurance
contract the court for the place where, at the time when the
contract was negotiated through the agent or concluded
the agent had his agency or, in the absence of an agency,
has domicile, shall have jurisdiction.
2. The jurisdiction defined in paragraph 1 may not be
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of the last paragraph of ArticleS is made clear in the
commentary on Article 7.
Article 
Article 9 allows an insurer to be sued in a State other
than that in which he is domiciled in the courts for the
place where the harmful event occurred, but without
prejudice to the application of Article 12 (3). This
jurisdiction applies only in respect of liability insurance
and insurance of immovable property. It extends to
movable property in cases where a building and the
movable property it contains are covered by the same
insurance policy. This also applies if the movables are
covered by an endorsement to the policy covering the
immovable property.
Article 
Article 10 contains rules of special jurisdiction for
liability insurance cases. This provision is of particular
importance in relation to road accidents.
Under the first paragraph of Article 10, in an action
brought by the injured party against the insured, the
latter may join the insurer as a third party if the court
seised of the matter has jurisdiction in such a case under
its own law. This is not possible in the Federal Republic
of Germany (1).
The problem arose whether consolidation of the two
actions should be allowed even where the insurer and
the insured are both domiciled in the same State, which
it must be assumed for the purposes of this argument, is
different from the State of the court seised of the matter.
For example, where an accident is caused in France by a
German domiciled in Germany who is insured with - a
German company, should third party proceedings
which are recognized under French law, be possible
even though the litigation concerns a contract of
insurance between a German insured person and a
German insurer? As it is subject to German law, should
this contract not be litigated in a German court? The
contractual relationship between the insurer and the
policy-holder would then fall outside the scope of the
proceedings relating to personal liability.
While acknowledging the relevance of this question, the
Committee was of the opinion that it would be unwise
to introduce rules of jurisdiction which would depart
from national laws and which could also jeopardize the
) See Article V of the Protocol.
system in force following the introduction of the green
card (2).
The compromise solution adopted by the Committee is
to reduce the scope of the first paragraph of Article 10
by inserting, under Article 12 (3), a provision that, if the
policy-holder and the insurer are both domiciled in the
same Contracting State, when the contract is concluded
they may agree to confer jurisdiction on the courts of
that State. Such an agreement must not, however, be
contrary to the law of that State.
Under the second paragraph of Article 10 the insurer
may also, in respect of liability insurance, be sued
directly by the injured party (3) outside the State in
which he is domiciled in any court which, under Articles
7 to 9, has jurisdiction over actions brought by the
policy-holder against the insurer.
Where, however, under the first paragraph of Article 8
the court for the place where the policy-holder is
domiciled has jurisdiction, there is no provision giving
jurisdiction to the court for the place where the injured
party is domiciled. The phrase 'where such direct
actions are permitted' has been used specifically to
include the conflict of laws rules of the court seised of
the matter (4
Under the last paragraph of Article 10, the insurer may
join the policy-holder or the insured as parties to the
action brought against him by the injured party. In the
interests of the proper administration of justice, it must
be possible for the actions to be brought in the same
court in order to prevent different courts from giving
judgments which are irreconcilable. This procedure will
in addition protect the insurer against fraud (5
) Insurance against civil liability in respect of motor vehicles
is compulsory in all Community countries except Italy.
Belgium: Law of 1 July 1956.
France: Law of 27 February 1958, Decree of 7 January
1959.
Germany: Law of 7 November 1939.
Luxembourg: Law of 10 June 1932, Implementing
Regulations of 28 October 1932 and 24 December 1932.
Netherlands: Law of 30 May 1963, Decree of 23 June
1964.
(3) Direct actions are recognized under Belgian, French and
Luxembourg law. Under German and Netherlands law
they are recognized only with regard to compulsory
insurance against civil liability in respect of motor vehicles.
) The rules of conflict must be used to decide whether the
law to be applied is the law of the place where the harmful
event occurred, the law governing the contract of insurance
or the  lex fori.
) J. W AUTIER, L'assurance automobile obligatoire, Brussels
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Article 
Article 11 relates to actions brought by the insurer
against the policy-holder, the insured or a beneficiary.
The courts of the State in which the defendant is
domiciled when the proceedings are instituted have
exclusive jurisdiction.
Again, this is a provIsIOn dealing with international
jurisdiction; local jurisdiction within each State will be
determined by the internal law of that State.
Article 11 does not apply where the defendant is
domiciled outside a Contracting State, that is to say,
outside the Community. In such cases Article 4 applies.
The second paragraph corresponds to the provisions of
Article 6 (3).
Article 
Article 12 relates to agreements conferring jurisdiction.
Agreements concluded before a dispute arises will have
no legal force if they are contrary to the rules of
jurisdiction laid down in the Convention.
The purpose of this Article is to prevent the parties from
limiting the choice offered by this Convention to the
policy-holder, and to prevent the insurer from avoiding
the restrictions imposed under Article 11.
A number of exceptions are, however, permitted. After
a dispute has arisen, that is to say 'as soon as the parties
disagree on a specific point and legal proceedings are
imminent or contemplated' (1), the parties completely
regain their freedom.
Certain agreements conferring jurisdiction which were
concluded before the dispute arose are also permissible.
First, there are those made to the advantage of the
policy-holder, the insured or a beneficiary, which allow
them to bring proceedings in courts other than those
specified in the preceding Articles.
Certain other agreements conferring jurisdiction are
allowed under Article 12 (3), but only in the strictly
defined circumstances therein specified which have been
explained in the commentary on Article 10.
) BRAAS, Precis de procedure civile, Vol. I, No 795.
Section 4
Jurisdiction in matters relating to instalment sales and
loans
This Section relates to the sale of goods where the price
is payable in a series of instalments, and to the sale of
goods where the sale is contractually linked to a loan
(Abzahlungsgeschafte). The rules here adopted are
similar to those applicable in the national law of several
of the Member States and, like them, stem from a desire
to protect certain categories of persons. Article 13
provides that this Section applies independently of the
rest of the Convention and, like Article 7, without
prejudice to the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 (5).
Article  14 determines the rules of jurisdiction.
In actions against a seller or a lender, proceedings may
be instituted by the buyer or borrower either in the
courts of the State in which the defendant is domiciled
or in the courts of the State in which the buyer or
borrower is domiciled.
Actions by a seller or a lender may in general be
brought only in the courts for the place where the buyer
or borrower is domiciled when the proceedings are
instituted.
The third paragraph relating
corresponds to Article 6 (3).
counterclaims,
Article 15, which relates to agreements conferring
jurisdiction, contains under (3) a provision analogous to
that of Article 12 (3), but for different reasons. In
actions brought by a seller Of a lender, it is rather
difficult to determine jurisdiction where the buyer 
borrower establishes himself abroad after the contract
has been concluded. To protect these persons, they
should ideally be sued only in the courts of the State
where they have established their new domicile. For
reasons of equity the Committee has however provided
that where a seller and a buyer, or a lender and a
borrower, are both domiciled or at least habitually
resident in the same State when the contract is
concluded, they may confer on the courts of that State
jurisdiction over all disputes arising out of the contract
on condition that such agreements are not contrary to
the law of that State.
The criterion of habitual residence allows agreements
conferring jurisdiction to be concluded even where a
buyer or borrower remains domiciled in a ContractingNo C 59/34 Official Journal of the European Communities
State other than that in which he is resident. It follows
for example, that a seller or lender need not sue the
defendant abroad in the courts of the State in which the
defendant is domiciled, if when the proceedings are
instituted, the defendant is still resident in the State in
which the contract was concluded.
Section 5
Exclusive jurisdiction
Article 
Article 16 lists the circumstances in which the six States
recognize that the courts of one of them have exclusive
jurisdiction. The matters referred to in this Article will
normally be the subject of exclusive jurisdiction only if
they constitute the principal subject-matter of the
proceedings of which the court is to be seised.
The provisions of Article 16 on jurisdiction may not be
departed from either by an agreement purporting to
confer jurisdiction on the courts of another Contracting
State, or by an implied submission to the jurisdiction
(Articles 17 and 18). Any court of a State other than the
State whose courts have exclusive jurisdiction must
declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction
(Article 19). Failure to observe these rules constitutes a
ground for refusal of recognition or enforcement
(Articles 28 and 34).
These rules, which take as their criterion the
subject-matter of the action, are applicable regardless of
the domicile or nationality of the parties. In view of the
reasons for laying down rules of exclusive jurisdiction
it was necessary to provide for their general application
even in respect of defendants domiciled outside the
Community. Thus, for example, a Belgian court will
not, on the basis of Article 53 of the Law of 1876 or of
Article 637 of the draft Judicial Code, which in actions
against foreigners recognize the jurisdiction of the
courts of the plaintiff, have jurisdiction in proceedings
between a Belgian and a person domiciled, for example
in Argentina, if the proceedings concern immovable
property situated in Germany. Only the German courts
will have jurisdiction.
Immovable property
Under Article 16 (1), only the courts of the Contracting
State in which the immovable property is situated have
jurisdiction in proceedings concerning rights  in rem 
or tenancies of, immovable property.
The importance of matters relating to immovable
property had already been taken into consideration by
the authors of the Treaty of Rome since, under Article
54 (3) (c) of that Treaty, the Commission and the
Council must enable 'a national of one Member State to
acquire and use land and buildings situated in the
territory of another Member State , in so far as this does
not conflict with the principles laid down in Article 39
(2) relating to agricultural policy.
The problems which the Committee faced in this
connection did not in fact relate to the recognition and
enforcement of judgments, since these questions are
governed by the provisions of the conventions already
concluded between Member States, all of which apply
in civil and commercial matters, including immovable
property, but rather to the choice of rules of
jurisdiction.
The laws of all the Member States include in this respect
special rules of jurisdiction (1) which generally
speaking, have been incorporated in the bilateral
conventions, whether they are based on direct (2) or
indirect (3) jurisdiction.
However, the rules laid down in the Convention differ
from those in the bilateral agreements in that the
Convention lays down rules of exclusive jurisdiction.
The Convention follows in this respect the Treaty
between France and Germany settling the question of
the Saar, Article 49 of which provides that the courts '
the country in which the immovable property is situated
shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all disputes regarding
the possession or ownership of such property and in all
disputes regarding rights  in rem  in such property
As in that Treaty, the exclusive jurisdiction established
by Article 16 (1) applies only in international relations;
the internal rules of jurisdiction in force in each of the
States are thus not affected.
In other words, the Convention prohibits the courts of
one Contracting State from assuming jurisdiction in
) Belgium: Article 8 of the Law of 25 March 1876, amended
by the Arrete royal of 3 January 1935; Article 52 of the
Law of 1876; Federal Republic of Germany, Article 24 of
the Code of Civil Procedure; France, Article 59 (5) of the
Code of Civil Procedure; Italy, Articles 4 and 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; Luxembourg, Article 59 (3) and
(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure; Netherlands, Article
126 (8) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(l) Convention between Belgium and the Netherlands (Article
10).
(3) Conventions between Germany and Belgium (Article 10);
between France and Italy (Article 16); between Italy and
the Netherlands (Article 2 (6)); between Germany and Italy
(Article 2 (7)); between Belgium and Italy (Article 2 (8));
and between Germany and the Netherlands (Article 4
(1) (f)).Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/35
disputes relating to immovable property situated in
another Contracting State; it does not, in the State in
which the immov~ble property is situated, prevent
courts other than that for the place where the property
is situated from having jurisdiction in such disputes if
the jurisdiction of those other courts is recognized 
the law of that State.
number of considerations led the Committee to
provide a rule of exclusive jurisdiction in this matter. In
the Federal Republic of Germany and in Italy, the court
for the place where the immovable property is situated
has exclusive jurisdiction, this being considered a matter
of public policy. It follows that, in the absence of a rule
of exclusive jurisdiction, judgments given in other States
by courts whose jurisdiction might have been derived
from other provisions of the Convention (the court of
the defendant s domicile, or an agreed forum) could
have been neither recognized nor enforced in Germany
or Italy.
Such a system would have been contrary to the principle
of 'free movement of judgments
The Committee was all the more inclined to extend to
international relations the rules of jurisdiction in force
in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Italy, since it
considered that to do so was in the interests of the
proper administration of justice. This type of dispute
often entails checks, enquiries and expert examinations
which have to be made on the spot. Moreover, the
matter is often governed in part by customary practices
which are not generally known except in the courts of
the place, or possibly of the country, where the
immovable property is situated. Finally, the system
adopted also takes into account the need to make
entries in land registers located where the property is
situated.
The wording adopted covers not only all disputes
concerning rights  in rem  in immovable property, but
also those relating to tenancies of such property. This
will include tenancies of dwellings and of premises for
professional or commercial use, and agricultural
holdings. In providing for the courts of the State in
which the property is situated to have jurisdiction 
regards tenancies in immovable property, the
Committee intended to cover disputes between landlord
and tenant over the existence or interpretation of
tenancy agreements, compensation for damage caused
by the tenant, eviction, etc. The rule was not intended
by the Committee to apply to proceedings concerned
only with the recovery of rent, since such proceedings
can be considered to relate to a subject-matter which is
quite distinct from the rented property itself.
The adoption of this provision was dictated by the fact
that tenancies of immovable property are usually
governed by special legislation which, in view of its
complexity, should preferably be applied only by the
courts of the country in which it is in force. Moreover
several States provide for exclusive jurisdiction in such
proceedings, which is usually conferred on special
tribunals.
Companies and associations of natural or legal persons
Article 16 (2) provides that the courts of the State in
which a company or other legal person, or an
associatio~ of natural or legal persons, has its seat, have
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings which are 
substance concerned either with the validity of the
constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of the
company, legal person or association, or with the
decisions of its organs.
It is important, in the interests of legal certainty, to
avoid conflicting judgments being given as regards the
existence of a company or association or as regards the
validity of the decisions of its organs. For this reason, it
is obviously preferable that all proceedings should take
place in the courts of the State in which the company or
association has its seat. It is in that State that
information about the company or association will have
been notified and made public. Moreover, the rule
adopted will more often than not result in the
application of the traditional maxim  actor sequitur
forum rei' Such jurisdiction is recognized in particular
in German law and, as regards non-profit making
organizations, in Luxembourg law.
Public registers
Article 16 (3) lays down that the courts of the State in
which a public register is kept have exclusive
jurisdiction in proceedings relating to the validity or
effects of entries in that register.
This provision does not require a lengthy commentary.
It correspond to the provisions which appear in the
internal laws of most of the Contracting States; it covers
in particular entries in land registers, land charges
registers and commercial registers.No C 59/36 Official Journal of the European Communities
Patents
Article 16 (4) applies to proceedings concerned with the
registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs
or other similar rights, such as those which protect fruit
and vegetable varieties, and which are required to be
deposited or registered.
A draft convention has been drawn up by the EEC
countries relating to patent law. The draft includes rules
of jurisdiction for the Community patent, but it will not
apply to national patents, which thus fall within the
scope of the Judgments Convention.
Since the grant of a national patent is an exercise of
national sovereignty, Article 16 (4) of the Judgments
Convention provides for exclusive jurisdiction in
proceedings concerned with the validity of patents.
Other actions, including those for infringement of
patents, are governed by the general rules of the
Convention.
The expression 'the deposit or registration has been
applied for' takes into account internal laws which, like
German law, make the grant of a patent subject to the
results of an examination. Thus, for example, German
courts will have exclusive jurisdiction in the case of an
application to the competent authorities for a patent to
be granted where, during the examination of the
application, a dispute arises over the rights relating to
the grant of that patent.
The phrase 'is under the terms of an international
convention deemed to have taken place' refers to the
system introduced by the Madrid Agreement of 14 April
1891 concerning international registration of trade
marks, revised at Brussels on 14 December 1900, at
Washington on 2 June 1911, at The Hague on 6
November 1925 and at London on 2 June 1934, and
also to the Hague Arrangement of 6 November 1925
for the international registration of industrial designs
revised at London on 2 June 1934. Under this system
the deposit of a trade mark, design or model at the
International Office in Berne through the registry of the
country of origin has the same effect in the other
Contracting States as if that trade mark, design or
model had been directly registered there. Thus where a
trade mark is deposited at the International Office at
the request of the German authorities, the French courts
will have exclusive jurisdiction in disputes relating, for
example, to whether the mark should be deemed to
have been registered in France.
Enforcement of judgments
Article 16 (5) provides that the courts of the State in
which a judgment has been or is to be enforced have
exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerned with the
enforcement of that judgment.
What meaning is to be given to the expression
proceedings concerned with the enforcement of
judgments
It means those proceedings which can arise from
recourse to force, constraint or distraint on movable or
immovable property in order to ensure the effective
implementation of judgments and authentic
instruments' (1).
Problems arising out of such proceedings come within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts for the place of
enforcement.
Provisions of this kind appear in the internal law of
many Member States  (l).
Section 6
Prorogation of jurisdiction
This sec~ion includes Article 17, on jurisdiction by
consent, and Article 18, which concerns jurisdiction
implied from submission.
Article 
Jurisdiction deriving from agreements conferring
jurisdiction is already a feature of all the Conventions
concluded between Member States of the Community,
whether the rules of jurisdiction are direct or indirect:
see the Convention between France and Belgium
(Article 3), and between Belgium and the Netherlands
(Article 5); the Benelux Treaty (Article 5); the
) BRAAS, Precis de procedure civile, Vol. I, No 808.
e) See LEREBOURS-PIGEONNItRE, Droit international
prive, seventh edition, p. 9; LOUSSOUARN, No 411:
French courts have exclusive jurisdiction over measures for
enforcement which is to take place in France (preventive
measures, distress levied on a tenant s chattels, writs of
attachment and applications for enforcement of a foreign
judgment); over distraint levied on immovable or movable
property, and over proceedings concerned with the validity
of measures for enforcement.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/37
Convention between France and Italy (Article 12),
between Germany and Italy (Article 2 (2)), between
Italy and the Netherlands (Article 2 (2)), between Italy
and Belgium (Article 2 (1) (2)), between Germany and
Belgium (Article 3 (2)), and between Germany and the
Netherlands (Article 4 (1) (b)).
This jurisdiction is also the subject of international
conventions, namely the Hague Convention of 15 April
1958 on the jurisdiction of the contractual forum in
matters relating to the international sale of goods, and
the Hague Convention of 25 November 1965 on the
choice of court (1
It is unnecessary to stress the importance of this
jurisdiction, particularly in commercial relations.
However, although agreement was readily reached on
the basic principle of including such a jurisdiction in the
Convention the Committee spent much time in
drafting Article 17.
Like the draftsmen of the Convention between Germany
and Belgium, the report of which may usefully be
quoted, the Committee s first concern was 'not to
impede commercial practice, yet at the same time to
cancel out the effects of clauses in contracts which
might go unread. Such clauses will therefore be taken
into consideration only if they are the subject of an
agreement, and this implies the consent of all the
parties. Thus, clauses in printed forms for business
correspondence or in invoices will have no legal force if
they are not agreed to by the party against whom they
operate.
The Committee was further of the opinion that, in order
to ensure legal certainty, the formal requirements
applicable to agreements conferring jurisdiction should
be expressly prescribed, but that ' excessive formality
which is incompatible with commercial practice' (2)
should be avoided.
In this respect, the version adopted is similar to that of
the Convention between Germany and Belgium, which
was itself based on the rules of the Hague Convention
(1) By 1 September 1966 neither of these Conventions had
entered into force.
(2) Hague Conference on private international law, documents
of the eighth session. FRfDERICQ, Report on the work of
the Second Committee, p. 303.
of 15 April 1958, in that a clause conferring jurisdiction
is valid only if it is in writing, or if at least one of the
parties has confirmed in writing an oral agreement (3
Since there must be true agreement between the parties
to confer jurisdiction, the court cannot necessarily
deduce from a document in writing adduced by the
party seeking to rely on it that there was an oral
agreement. The special position of the Grandy Duchy of
Luxembourg in this matter necessitated an additional
restriction which is contained in the second paragraph
of Article I of the Protocol.
The question of how much weight is to be attached to
the written document was left open by the Committee.
In certain countries, a document in writing will be
required only as evidence of the existence of the
agreement; in others, however, it will go to the validity of the agreement. 
Like the Conventions between Belgium and the
Netherlands and between France and Belgium, and also
the Benelux Treaty and the Hague Convention, the first
paragraph of Article 17 provides that the court agreed
on by the parties shall have exclusive jurisdiction. This
solution is essential to avoid different courts from being
properly seised of the matter and giving conflicting or at
least differing judgments. In order to meet practical
realities, the first paragraph of Article 17 also covers
specifically cases of agreement that a particular court in
a Contracting State or the courts of a Contracting State
are to have jurisdiction, and is similar in this to the
1958 Hague Convention. As Professor Batiffol pointed
out in his report on that Convention, an agreement
conferring jurisdiction generally on the courts of a
Contracting State 'may have no legal effect if, in the
absence of any connecting factor between the
contractual situation and the State whose courts have
been agreed on as having jurisdiction, the law of that
State provides no way of determining which court can
or should be seised of the matter
' (4). But as Batiffol
remarks, this is a matter which the parties should
consider at the appropriate time.
The first paragraph of Article 17 applies only if at least
one of the parties is domiciled in a Contracting State. It
does not apply where two parties who are domiciled in
the same Contracting State have agreed that a court 
that State shall have jurisdiction, since the Convention
(3) Hague Conference on private international law, Final Act
of the tenth session. Convention on the choice of court
Article 4.
) Hague Conference on private international law, documents
of the eighth session, p. 305.No C 59/38 Official Journal of the European Communities
under the general principle laid down in the preamble
determines only the international jurisdiction of courts
(see Commentary, Chapter III, Section 1, International
legal relationships).
Article 17 applies where the agreement conferring
jurisdiction was made either between a person
domiciled in one Contracting State and a person
domiciled in another Contracting State, or between a
person domiciled in a Contracting State and a person
domiciled outside the Community, if the agreement
confers jurisdiction on the courts of a Contracting State;
it also applies where two persons domiciled in one
Contracting State agree that a particular court of
another Contracting State shall have jurisdiction.
The second paragraph of Article 17 provides that
agreements conferring jurisdiction shall have no legal
force if they are contrary to the provisions of Article 12
(insurance) or Article 15 (instalment sales), or if the
courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude have
exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16.
The intention behind the Convention is to obviate cases
of refusal of recognition and enforcement on the basis
of Articles 28 and 34, and so, as already stated, to
promote the free movement of judgments.
The third paragraph of Article 17 provides that if the
agreement conferring jurisdiction was concluded for the
benefit of only one of the contracting parties, that party
shall retain the right to bring proceedings in any other
court which has jurisdiction (1). Agreements conferring
jurisdiction cannot of course affect the substantive
jurisdiction of the courts.
Article 
Article 18 governs jurisdiction implied from submission.
If a defendant domiciled in a Contracting State is sued
in a court of another Contracting State which does not
have jurisdiction under the Convention, two situations
may arise: the defendant may either, as he is entitled to
, plead that the court has no jurisdiction under the
Convention, in which case the court must declare that it
does not have jurisdiction; or he may elect not to raise
this plea, and enter an appearance. In the latter case, the
court will have jurisdiction.
) See also the Conventions between France and Belgium
Article 3, between France and Italy, Article 2, and between
Belgium and the Netherlands, Article 5 and the Benelux
Treaty, Article 5.
Unlike the case of conventions based on indirect
jurisdiction, the defendant may, by virtue of the
Convention, rely on its provisions in the court seised of
the proceedings and plead lack of jurisdiction. It will be
necessary to refer to the rules of procedure in force in
the State of the court seised of the proceedings in order
to determine the point in time up to which the
defendant will be allowed to raise this plea, and to
determine the legal meaning of the term 'appearance
Moreover, by conferring jurisdiction on a court in
circumstances where the defendant does not contest that
court's jurisdiction , the Convention extends the scope of
Title II and avoids any uncertainty. The main
consequence of this rule is that if a defendant domiciled
in a Contracting State is, notwithstanding the provisions
of the second paragraph of Article 3, sued in another
Contracting State on the basis of a rule of exorbitant
jurisdiction, for example in France on the basis of
Article 14 of the Civil Code, the court will have
jurisdiction if this is not contested. The only cases in
which a court must declare that it has no jurisdiction
and where jurisdiction by submission will not be
allowed are those in which the courts of another State
have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16.
Section 7
Examination as to jurisdiction and admissibility
Article 
As has already been stated (page 8), a court must of its
own motion examine whether it has jurisdiction. Article
19 emphasizes that the court must of its own motion
declare that it has no jurisdiction if it is seised of a
matter in which the courts of another Contracting State
. have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 16.
This rule is essential since the exclusive jurisdictions are
conceived to be matters of public policy which cannot
be departed from by the free choice of the parties.
Moreover, it corresponds to Article 171 of the French
Code of Civil Procedure, by virtue of which territorial
jurisdiction is automatically examined where the parties
are not permitted to reach a settlement (2).
If this Article deserves particular attention, it is mainly
because, in order that the general rules of jurisdiction
) The same is true in the Federal Republic of Germany: see
ROSENBERG,  op. cit. paragraph 38 (I) (3).Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/39
are observed, it grants wide powers to the court seised
of the proceedings, since that court will of its own
motion have to examine whether it has jurisdiction.
The words 'principally concerned' have the effect that
the court is not obliged to declare of its own motion
that it has no jurisdiction if an issue which comes within
the exclusive jurisdiction of another court is raised only
as a preliminary or incidental matter.
Article 
Article 20 is one of the most important Articles in the
Convention: it applies where the defendant does not
enter an appearance; here the court must of its own
motion examine whether it has jurisdiction under the
Convention. If it finds no basis for jurisdiction, the
court must declare that it has no jurisdiction. It is
obvious that the court is under the same obligation even
where there is no basis for exclusive jurisdiction. Failure
on the part of the defendant to enter an appearance is
not equivalent to a submission to the jurisdiction. It is
not sufficient for the court to accept the submissions of
the plaintiff as regards jurisdiction; the court must itself
ensure that tp.e plaintiff proves that it has international
jurisdiction (1
The object of this provision is to ensure that in cases of
failure to enter an appearance the court giving judgment
does so only if it has jurisdiction, and so to safeguard
the defendant as fully as possible in the original
proceedings. The rule adopted is derived from Article
37 (2) of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, by virtue
of which the court must of its own motion examine
whether it has jurisdiction where the defendant is a
foreigner and does not enter an appearance.
The second paragraph of Article 20 is also designed to
safeguard the rights of the defendant, by recognizing the
international importance of the service of judicial
documents. The service of judicial documents abroad
although governed differently in each of the Member
States, can broadly be separated into two main systems.
The German system is based on the cooperation of the
public authorities of the place of residence of the
addressee which have jurisdiction to deliver to him a
copy of the instrument. A German court cannot in
general give judgment in default of appearance unless it
receives conclusive evidence that the instrument has
) BOLOW op. cit.
been delivered to the addressee (2 e).  The system
contrasts with those in force in Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands (4), all of which are
characterized by the 'desire to localize in the territory of
the State of the forum all the formalities connected with
the judicial document whose addressee resides
abroad'  (5).
Under the laws of these countries, service is properly
effected, and causes time to begin to run, without there
being any need to establish that the document
instituting the proceedings has actually been served on
its addressee. It is not impossible in these circumstances
that, in some cases, a defendant may have judgment
entered against him in default of appearance without
having any knowledge of the action.
The Hague Convention of 1 March 1954 on civil
procedure, to which the six Member States are party,
does not solve the difficulties which arise under such
legislation.
The Committee also tried to solve the problems arising
when service is effected late, bearing in mind that the
aim of the Convention is to promote, so far as possible
the free movement of judgments.
The search for a solution was obviously helped by the
drafting at the tenth session of the Hague Conference
on private international law of the Convention on the
service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents
in civil or commercial matters, which was opened for
signature on 15 November 1965. This is the reason why
the solution adopted in the second paragraph of Article
20 is only transitional.
This provision summarizes Article 15 of the Hague
Convention, which is in fact derived from Article 20 of
this present Convention since the work of the
Committee served as a basis for discussion at the
meetings of the Special Commission which was
established by the Hague Conference and which drew
up the preliminary draft which was submitted for
discussion at the tenth session.
e) RIGAUX, La signification des actes judiciaires a I'etranger.
Revue critique de droit international prive, p. 448  et seq.
(3) See German Code of Civil Procedure, Article 335 (1) (2)
and Article 202.
(~) Belgium: Code of Civil Procedure, Article 69bis, and
Judgment of the Cour de cassation of 4 March 1954.
Revue des huissiers de Belgique, May-June 1954, p. 15.
France: Code of Civil Procedure, Article 69 (10), as
interpreted by the French Cour de cassation. See Revue
critique de droit international prive, No 1, January-March
1961 , p. 174  et seq.
Italy: Code of Civil Procedure, Articles 142 and 143.
Luxembourg: Arrete-Ioi of 1 April 1814.
Netherlands: Code of Civil Procedure, Article 4 (8).
) RIGAUX, id., p. 454.No C 59/40 Official Journal of the European Communities
Under the second paragraph of Article 20, where a
defendant domiciled in one Contracting State is sued in
the courts of another State and does not enter an
appearance, the court must stay the proceedings so long
as it is not shown that the defendant has been able to
receive the document instituting the proceedings in
sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence
or that all necessary steps have been taken to this end.
This provIsIOn is based on the old Article 8 of the
Netherlands Law of 12 June 1909, Stb No 141 (1).
The second paragraph of Article 20 requires first that
notification of the proceedings has been given to the
party who has not entered an appearance, that is either
to him in person or at his domicile, and secondly that it
has been delivered in sufficient time to enable the
defendant to arrange for his defence. It does not require
that the defendant should actually have been notified in
sufficient time. The defendant must be responsible for
any delay caused by his own negligence or by that of his
relations or servants. The critical time is thus the time at
which service was properly effected, and not the time at
which the defendant received actual knowledge of the
institution of proceedings.
The question of 'sufficient time' is obviously a question
of fact for the discretion of the court seised of the
matter.
The court may give judgment in default against a
defendant if it is shown that 'all necessary steps have
been taken' for him  actually to have received in
sufficient time the document instituting the proceedings.
This means that a court will be able to give judgment in
default against a defendant even if no affidavit can be
produced to confirm service on the defendant of the
document instituting the proceedings, provided it is
shown that all the necessary approaches have been
made to the competent authorities of the State in which
the defendant is domiciled in order to reach him in
sufficient time. Where necessary, it must also be shown
that 'all the investigations required by good conscience
(1) This Article reads as follows: 'Where the defendant does
not enter an appearance, the court may not give judgment
in default if the plaintiff does not show that the defendant
received the writ of summons. The plaintiff may ask for a
new date to be fixed for the hearing.'
and good faith have been undertaken to discover the
defendant' (2).
As already stated, the second paragraph of Article 20 is
only a transitional provision. Under the third paragraph
of that Article, where the State of the forum and the
State in which the document had to be transmitted have
both ratified the new Hague Convention, the court
seised of the matter will no longer apply the second
paragraph of Article 20 but will be exclusively bound
by Article 15 of the Hague Convention. Thus any
possibility of conflict between Article 15 of the Hague
Convention and the second paragraph of Article 20 of
the EEC Judgments Convention is resolved in favour of
the Hague Convention.
The Committee also considered it important to ensure
certainty and speed in the transmission of judicial
documents. In order to achieve this, it considered as a
possible solution the transmission of such documents by
registered post. However, it did not adopt this system
for, although it meets the requirement of speed, it does
not offer all the necessary safeguards from the point of
view of certainty. In the end the Committee adopted the
system which is set out in Article IV of the Protocol.
This Article simply adds a new method of transmission
to those already provided for by the Hague Convention
of 1 March 1954 on civil procedure, or by the
agreements concluded between the Contracting States in
application of that Convention. It corresponds
moreover, to the facility provided for by Article 10 (b)
of the new Hague Convention.
Under the system adopted in the Protocol, documents
can be transmitted by public officers in one Contracting
State directly to their colleagues in another Contracting
State, who will deliver them to the addressee in person
or to his domicile.
According to the assurances which were given to the
Committee by  representative of the 'Union
internationale des huissiers de justice et d' officiers
judiciaires , it will be easy for a public officer in one
country to correspond with the appropriate public
officer in another country. In case of difficulty it would
moreover be possible for the officer in the State in
which judgment was given to invoke the assistance of
the national associations of public officers, or on the
central office of the 'Union' which has its headquarters
in Paris.
(2) Cour d'appel de POITIERS, 9. 7. 1959 (Gazette du Palais,
1959.11.183); d. GAVALDA, Revue critique de droit
international prive, 1960, No 1, p. 174.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/41
In the opinion of the Committee these arrangements
meet the requirements of speed and certainty. Direct
communication between public officers allows a
considerable gain in time by avoiding any recourse to
intermediary bodies such as Ministries for Foreign
Affairs, Ministries of Justice or prosecutors' offices.
Certainty is further guaranteed since if, for example, the
address is incomplete or inaccurate, the officer in the
State in which service is to be effected may well be able
to undertake investigations in order to find the
addressee.
As for the linguistic difficulties which could arise in the
context of a grouping of the six countries, these could
be overcome by attaching to the instrument a summary
in the language of the addressee.
Like Article 10 (b) of the Hague Convention, Article IV
of the Protocol allows a Contracting State to object to
this method of transmission.
Section 8
Lis pendens  related actions
Article 
As there may be several concurrent international
jurisdictions, and the courts of different States may
properly be seised of a matter (see in particular Articles
2 and 5), it appeared to be necessary to regulate the
question of  /is pendens.  By virtue of Article 21 , the
courts of a Contracting State must decline jurisdiction
if necessary of their own motion, where proceedings
involving the same cause of action and between the
same parties are already pending in a court of another
State. In cases of  lis pendens  the court is therefore
obliged to decline jurisdiction, either on the application
of one of the parties, or of its own motion, since this
will facilitate the proper administration of justice within
the Community. A court will not always have to
examine of. its own motion whether the same
proceedings are pending in the courts of another
country, but only when the circumstances are such as to
lead the court to belive that this may be the case.
Instead of declining jurisdiction, the court which 
subsequently seised of a matter may, however, stay its
proceedings if the jurisdiction of the court first seised is
contested. This rule was introduced so that the parties
would not have to institute new proceedings if, for
example, the court first seised of the matter were to
decline jurisdiction. The risk of unnecessary disclaimers
of jurisdiction is thereby avoided.
Jurisdiction is declined in favour of the court first seised
of the matter. The Committee decided that there was no
need to specify in the text the point in time from which
the proceedings should be considered to be pending,
and left this question to be settled by the internal law of
each Contracting State.
Article 
The solution offered by this Article to t~e problem of
related actions differs in several respects from that
adopted to regulate the question of  /is pendens,
although it also serves to avoid the risk of conflicting
judgments and thus to facilitate the proper
administration of justice in the Community.
Where actions are related, the first duty of the court is
to stay its proceedings. The proceedings must, however
be pending at the same level of adjudication, for
otherwise the object of the proceedings would be
different and one of the parties might be deprived of a
step in the heirarchy of the courts.
Furthermore, to avoid disclaimers of jurisdiction, the
court may decline jurisdiction only if it appears that the
court first seised has jurisdiction over both actions, that
is to say, in addition, only if that court has not
jurisdiction over the second action. The court may
decline jurisdiction only on the application of one of the
parties, and only if the law of the court first seised
permits the consolidation of related actions which are
pending in different courts. This last condition takes
into account the specific problems of German and
Italian law. In German law, consolidation is in general
permitted only if both actions are pending in the same
court. In Italian law, the constitution does not permit a
court to decide whether it will hear an action itself or
refer it to another court. It will, however, always be
possible for a German or Italian court which is
subsequently seised of a matter to stay its proceedings.No C 59/42 Official Journal of the European Communities
Finally, since the expression 'related actions' does not
have the same meaning in all the Member States, the
third paragraph of Article 22 provides a definition. This
is based on the new ~lgian Judicial Code (Article 30).
The Convention does not regulate the procedure for the
consolidation of related actions. This is a question
which is left to the internal laws of the individual States.
Article 
This Article deals with a situation which will occur only
very rarely, namely where an action comes within the
exclusive jurisdiction of several courts. To avoid
conflicts of jurisdiction, any court other than the court
first seised of the action is required under Article 21 or
Article 22 to decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.
Section 9
Provisional and protective measures
Article 
Article 24 provides that application may be made to the
courts of a Contracting State for such provisional
measures, including protective measures, as may 
available under the internal law of that State
irrespective of which court has jurisdiction as to the
substance of the case. A corresponding provision will be
found in nearly all the enforcement conventions (1).
In each State, application may therefore be made to the
competent courts for provisional or protective measures
to be imposed or suspended, or for rulings on the
validity of such measures, without regard to the rules of
jurisdiction laid down in the Convention.
As regards the measures which may be taken, reference
should be made to the internal law of the country
concerned.
CHAPTER V
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
As a result of the safeguards granted to the defendant in
the original proceedings, Title III of the Convention is
very liberal on the question of recognition and
enforcement. As already stated, it seeks to facilitate as
far as possible the free movement of judgments, and
should be interpreted in this spirit. This liberal
approach is evidenced in Title III first by a reduction in
the number of grounds which can operate to prevent the
recognition and enforcement of judgments and
secondly, by the simplification of the enforcement
procedure which will be common to the six countries.
It will be recalled that Article 1, which governs the
whole of the Convention, provides that the Convention
shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the
nature of the court or tribunal. It follows that
judgments given in a Contracting State in civil 
commercial matters by criminal courts or 
administrative tribunals must be recognized and
enforced in the other Contracting States. Under Article
, the Convention applies to any judgment, whatever
the judgment may be called. It also applies to writs of
execution (Vollstreckungsbefehl, Article 699 of the
German Code of Civil Procedure) (2) and to the
determination of costs (Kostenfestsetzungsbeschlug des
Urkundsbeamten, Article 104 of the German Code of
Civil Procedure) which, in the Federal Republic, are
decisions of the registrar acting as an officer of the
court. In decisions based on Article 104 of the German
Code of Civil Procedure, the CQsts are determined in
accordance with a schedule laid down by law and on
the basis of the judgment of the court deciding on the
substance of the matter (3). In the event of a dispute as
to the registrar s decision, a fully constituted court
decides the issue.
(1) Benelux Treaty and Convention between Belgium and the
Netherlands (Article 8); Convention between Germany and
Belgium (Article 15 (2)); between France and Belgium
(Article 9); between Italy and Belgium (Article 14);
between Italy and the Netherlands (Article 10); between
France and Italy (Article 32); and between Germany and
the Netherlands (Article 18 (2)).
(2) The Vollstreckungsbefehl is issued hy the court registrar.
(3) See also Article 18 (2) of the Hague Convention of 
March 1954 on Civil Procedure.Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/43
It follows from Article 1 that Title III cannot be invoked
for the recognition and enforcement of judgments given
on matters excluded from the scope of the Convention
(status and legal capacity of persons, rules governing
rights in property arising out of  matrimonial
relationship, wills and succession, bankruptcy and other
similar proceedings, social security, and arbitration
including arbitral awards).
On the other hand, Title III applies to any judgment
given by a court or tribunal of a Contracting State in
those civil and commercial matters which fall within the
scope of the Convention, whether or not the parties are
domiciled within the Community and whatever their
nationality.
B. COMMENTARY ON THE SECTIONS
Section 1
Recognition
Article 
Recognition must have the result of conferring 
judgments the authority and effectiveness accorded to
them in the State in which they were given.
The words  res judicata which appear in a number of
conventions have expressly been omitted since
judgments given in interlocutory proceedings and 
parte  may be recognized, and these do not always have
the force of  res judicata.  Under the rules laid down in
Article 26:
1. judgments are to be recognized automatically;
2. in the event of a dispute, if recognition is itself the
principal issue, the procedure for enforcement
provided for in the Convention may be applied;
3. if the outcome of proceedings depends on the
determination of an incidental question of
recognition the court entertaining those
proceedings has jurisdiction on the question of
recognition.
The first of these rules lays down the principle that
judgments are to be recognized; recognition is to be
accorded without the need for recourse to any prior
special procedure. It is thus automatic, and does not
require a judicial decision in the State in which
recognition is sought to enable the party in whose
favour judgment has been given to invoke that
judgment against any party concerned, for example an'
administrative authority, in the same way as a judgment
given in that State. This provision means that certain
legal provisions which in some countries, such as Italy,
make the recognition of a foreign judgment subject to a
special procedure (dichiarazione di efficacia) will be
abolished. The Italian delegation stated that it was able
to concur in this solution since the scope of the
Convention was limited to matters relating to property
rights.
Furthermore, this system is the opposite of that adopted
in numerous conventions, according to which foreign
judgments are recognized only if they fulfil a certain
number of conditions. Under Article 26 there is '
presumption in favour of recognition, which can be
rebutted only if one of the grounds for refusal listed in
Article 27 is present.
The second rule concerns the case where the recognition
of a judgment is itself the point at issue, there being no
other proceedings involved and no question of
enforcement. For example, a negotiable instrument is
declared invalid in Italy by reason of fraud. The
negotiable instrument is presented to a bank in Belgium.
Reliance is placed on the Italian judgment. The bank is
faced with two contradictory instruments. The Italian
judgment would normally have to be recognized, but it
may be that one of the grounds for refusal set out in
Article 27 applies. In the event of a dispute it is hardly
the task of the bank to decide on the grounds for
refusal, and in particular on the scope of Belgian
international public policy . The second rule of Article
26 offers a solution in cases of this kind. It allows the
party seeking recognition to make use of the simplified
procedure provided by the Convention for enforcement
of the judgment. There is thus unification at the stage of
recognition not only of the legal or administrative
procedures which govern this matter in a number of
States, but also in those countries which, like Belgium
do not allow actions for a declaration that a judgment is
not to be recognized. Only the party seeking recognition
may make use of this simplified procedure, which was
evolved solely to promote the enforcement of
judgments, and hence their recognition. It would
moreover be difficult to apply the procedure laid down
if the party opposing recognition could also avail
himself of it; the latter will have to submit his claims in
accordance with the ordinary rules of the internal law
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The third rule concerns the case where recognition of a
judgment is raised as an incidental question in the
course of other proceedings. To simplify matters, the
Committee provided that the court entertaining the
principal proceedings shall also have jurisdiction on the
question of recognition.
It will immediately be noticed that two conditions
which are frequently inserted in enforcement treaties are
not referred to in the Convention: it is not necessary
that the foreign judgment should have become  res
judicata  (1), and the jurisdiction of the court which gave
the original judgment does not have to be verified by
the court of the State in which the recognition is sought
unless the matter in question falls within the scope of
Sections 3, 4 or 5 of Title II.
Article 
Public policy
Recognition may be refused if it is contrary to public
policy in the State in which the recognition is sought. In
the opinion of the Committee this clause ought to
operate only in exceptional cases. As has already been
shown in the commentary on Article 4, public policy is
not to be invoked as a ground for refusing to recognize
a judgment given by a court of a Contracting State
which has based its jurisdiction over a defendant
domiciled outside the Community on a provision of its
internal law, such as the provisions listed in the second
paragraph of Article 3 (Article 14 of the French Civil
Code, etc.).
Furthermore, it follows from the last paragraph of
Article 27 that public policy is not to be used as a
means of justifying refusal of recognition on the
grounds that the foreign court applied a law other than
that laid down by the rules of private international law
of the court in which the recognition is sought.
The wording of the public policy provision is similar to
that adopted in the most recent conventions (2), in that
(1) The condition of  res judicata  is required by the
Conventions between Germany and Italy, France and Italy,
and Italy and the Netherlands. It is not required in the
Conventions between Belgium and the Netherlands
Belgium and Italy, Germany and Belgium and Germany
and the Netherlands, in the Benelux Treaty, or in the
application of the Convention between France and
Belgium, in spite of the wording of this last Convention
(Article 11 (2)).
(l) Conventions between Germany and Belgium, Italy and
Belgium; Hague Convention on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and commercial
matters.
it is made clear that there are grounds for refusal, not of
the foreign judgment itself, but if recognition of it is
contrary to public policy in the State in which the
recognition is sought. It is no part of the duty of the
court seised of the matter to give an opinion as to
whether the foreign judgment is, or is not, compatible
with the public policy of its country. Indeed, this might
be taken as criticism of the judgment. Its duty is rather
to verify whether recognition of the judgment would be
contrary to public policy.
Safeguarding the rights of the defendant
Where judgment is given in default of appearance,
recognition must be refused if the defendant was not
duly served with the document which instituted the
proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to arrange
for his defence. Where judgment is given abroad in
default of appearance, the Convention affords the
defendant double protection.
First, the document must have been duly served. In this
connection reference must be made to the internal law
of the State in which the judgment was given, and to the
international conventions on the service abroad of
judicial instruments. Thus, for example, a German court
in which recognition of a Belgian judgment given in
default of appearance against a person who is 
Germany is sought could, on the basis of the Agreement
between Belgium and Germany of 25 April 1959, which
was entered into to simplify application of the Hague
Convention of 1 March 1954 on civil procedure, refuse
recognition if the document instituting the proceedings
was sent from Belgium to Germany by registered post
since the Federal Republic of Germany does not permit
this method of transmitting documents. 
Secondly, even where service has been duly effected,
recognition can be refused if the court in which
recognition is sought considers that the document was
not served in sufficient time to enable the defendant to
arrange for his defence.
Looking at the second paragraph of Article 20, which
lays down that the court of the State in which judgment
is given must stay the proceedings if the document
instituting the proceedings was not served on the
defendant in sufficient time, it might be assumed that
Article 27 (2) would apply only in exceptional cases. It
must not be forgotten, however, that the secondOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/45
paragraph of Article 20 requires the court of the State in
which judgment is given to stay proceedings only where
the defendant is domiciled in another Contracting State.
Incompatibility with a judgment already given in
the State in which recognition is sought
There can be no doubt that the rule of law in a State
would be disturbed if it were possible to take advantage
of two conflicting judgments (1).
The case where a foreign judgment is irreconcilable with
a judgment given by a national court is, in the existing
conventions, either treated as a matter of public
policy (2), as in the Convention between France and
Belgium, the Benelux Treaty and the Convention
between Belgium, and Germany, or is regulated by a
special provision.
In the OpInIOn of the Committee, to treat this as a
matter of public policy would involve the danger that
the concept of public policy would be interpreted too
widely. Furthermore, the Italian courts have consistently
held that foreign judgments whose recognition is sought
in Italy and which conflict with an Italian judgment do
not fall within the scope of public policy. This is why
the enforcement conventions concluded by Italy always
contain two provisions, one referring to public policy,
which serves the purpose of providing a safeguard in
exceptional cases, and the other whereby the judgment
must not conflict with an Italian judgment already
given, or be prejudicial to proceedings pending in an
Italian court (3).
There are also several other conventions which contain
clause providing for refusal of recognition of a
judgment which conflicts with another judgment
already given by the courts of the State in which
recognition is sought.
(1) NIBOYET, Traite de droit international prive fran'rais
Paris 1949, Vol. VI, No 2028.
(2) BA TIFFOL, Traite elementaire de droit international prive
Paris 1959, No 761: ' ... any judgment which 
irreconcilable with a French judgment previously given is
contrary to public policy. This rule holds good even if the
judgment is not final' (Civ. 23 March 1936, Sirey
1936.1.175, R.1937-198); Riezler op. cit.  pp. 521 and
547.
(3) Conventions between Germany and Italy, Article 4;
between France and Italy, Article 1 (5); between Belgium
and Italy, Article 1 (4); and between the Netherlands and
Italy, Article 1 (3).
In certain conventions, the judgment given in the State
in which recognition is sought has to have become  res
judicata  ), in others it is sufficient for the judgment to
be final and conclusive at that stage of procedure (5
and finally there are some which do not regulate the
point (6
The Committee preferred a form of wording which does
not decide whether the judgment should have become
res judicata  or should merely be final and conclusive
and left this question to the discretion of the court in
which recognition is sought.
The Committee also considered that, for refusal of
recognition, it would be sufficient if the judgment
whose recognition was sought were irreconcilable with
a judgment given between the same parties in the State
in which recognition was sought. It is therefore not
necessary for the same cause of action to be involved.
Thus, for example, a French court in which recognition
of a Belgian judgment awarding damages for failure to
perform a contract is sought will be able to refuse
recognition if a French court has already given
judgment in a dispute between the same parties
declaring that the contract was invalid.
The form of words used also covers the situation
referred to in Article 5 (3) (c) of the Hague Convention
on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, under which recognition may be refused if
the proceedings which gave rise to the judgment whose
recognition is sought have already resulted in a
judgment which was given in a third State and which
would be entitled to recognition and enforcement under
the law of the State in which recognition is sought.
It is to be anticipated that the application of the
provisions of Title II regarding  lis pendens  and related
actions will greatly reduce the number of irreconcilable
judgments.
) Hague Convention on the jurisdiction of the contractual
forum in matters relating to the international sales of
goods, Article 5 (3).
) Conventions between France and the United Kingdom
Article 3 (1) (a); between the United Kingdom and
Belgium, Article 3 (1) (a); between France and Germany on
the Saar, Article 30 (I) (d); between Austria and Belgium
on maintenance, Article 2 (2) (b); between Austria and
Belgium (general), Article 2 (2) (b).
) Hague Convention of 15 April 1958 concerning the
recognition and enforcement of decisions relating to
maintenance obligations towards children, Article 2 (4),
and the Conventions concluded by Italy. Hague
Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in civil and commercial matters (Article 5).No C 59/46
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
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Recognition is not to be refused on the sole ground that
the court which gave the original judgment applied a
law other than that which would have been applicable
under the rules of private international law of the State
in which recognition is sought. However the
Convention makes an exception for preliminary
questions regarding the status or legal capacity of
natural persons, rules governing rights in property
arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and
succession, unless the same result would have been
reached by the application of the rules of private
international law of the State in which recognition is
sought.
The Convention between Belgium and Germany
contains a rule which is similar, but confined to cases
where the judgment concerns a national of the State in
which it is sought to give effect to that judgment. It is
pointed out in the report of the negotiators of that
Convention that this exception is justified by the fact
that States reserve to themselves the right to regulate the
status of their nationals. The wording used is similar to
that of Article 7 of the Hague Convention on the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in
civil and commercial matters.
Article 
The very strict rules of jurisdiction laid down in Title II
and the safeguards granted in Article 20 to defendants
who do not enter an appearance, make it possible to
dispense with any review, by the court in which
recognition or enforcement is sought, of the jurisdiction
of the court in which the original judgment was given.
The absence of any review of the substance of the case
implies complete confidence in the court of the State in
which judgment was given; it is similarly to be assumed
, that that court correctly applied the rules of jurisdiction
of the Convention. The absence of any review as 
whether the court in which the judgment was given had
jurisdiction avoids the possibility that an alleged failure
to comply with those rules might again be raised as an
issue at the enforcement stage. The only exceptions
concern, first, the matters for which Title II lays down
special rules of jurisdiction (insurance, instalment sales
and loans) or exclusive rules, and which, as has been
shown, are in the six countries either of a binding
character or matters of public policy, and, secondly, the
case provided for in Article 59; reference should be
made to the commentary on that Article.
The second paragraph contains a provIsIOn which is
already included in a number of conventions
(Convention between Germany and Belgium; Hague
Convention Article 9) and avoids recourse to
time-wasting duplication in the exceptional cases where
re-examination of the jurisdiction of the court of origin
is permitted.
The last paragraph of Article 28 specifies that the rules
of jurisdiction are not matters of public policy within
the meaning of Article 27; in other words, public policy
is not to be used as a means of justifying a review of the
jurisdiction of the court of origin (1). This again reflects
the Committee s desire to limit so far as possible the
concept of public policy.
REVIEW AS TO SUBSTANCE
Article 
It is obviously an essential provlSlon of enforcement
conventions that foreign judgments must not 
reviewed.
The court of a State in which recognition of a foreign
judgment is sought is not to examine the correctness of
that judgment; 'it may not substitute its own discretion
for that of the foreign court (2) nor refuse recognition' if
it considers that a point of fact or of law has been
wrongly decided (3
STA  OF PROCEEDINGS
Article 
Article 30 postulates the following situation: a party
may, in the course of litigation, wish to plead a
judgment which has been given in another Contracting
State but has not yet become  res judicata.  In order to
remedy the inconvenience which would result if such
judgment were reversed, Article 30 allows the court to
stay the proceedings upon the principal issue of which it
(1) For a similar provision, see Article 13 (2) of the Benelux
Treaty.
(l) P. GRAULICH, Principes de droit international prive.
Conflits de lois. Conflits de juridictions. No 254.
e) BA TIFFOL, Traite elementaire de droit international prive
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is seised, until the foreign judgment whose recognition
is sought has become  res judicata  in the State in which it
was gIven.
This power does not prevent the court from examining,
before staying the proceedings, whether the foreign
judgment fulfils the conditions for recognition laid
down in Article 27.
Section 2
Enforcement
(a) Preliminary remarks
As has already been shown the Committee
endeavoured to give the Convention a progressive and
pragmatic character by means of rules of jurisdiction
which break new ground as compared with the
enforcement conventions concluded hitherto.
This means, of course, that at the enforcement stage
solutions must be found which follow from the rules of
jurisdiction.
The progress achieved by Title II of the Convention
would be rendered nugatory if a party seeking
enforcement in a Contracting State of a judgment given
in his favour were impeded by procedural obstacles.
The aim of Title II of the Convention is to strengthen
the role of the court of the State in which the judgment
was given. It must not be forgotten that that court
must declare that it does not have jurisdiction 'if there
are rules of exclusive jurisdiction which give jurisdiction
to the courts of another State (Article 19); the court
must also declare that it does not have jurisdiction, in
cases where the defendant does not enter an
appearance, if its jurisdiction is not derived from the
Convention (first paragraph of Article 20).
Moreover, the court must stay the proceedings in the
absence of proof that the defendant has been able to
arrange for his defence (second paragraph of Article
20).
This role, as set out in Title II, is thus of prIme
importance.
If follows that the intervention of the court in which
enforcement is sought is more limited than is usual
under enforcement conventions. That court has in
practice only two points to examine: public policy and
whether the defendant has had the opportunity of
defending himself. The other reasons for refusal 
conflicting judgments, preliminary questions, review of
jurisdiction in relation to certain specific topics - can
in fact, be regarded as akin to public policy. Since
moreover, the Convention is confined to matters
relating to property rights, public policy will only very
seldom have any part to perfom.
This limitation on the powers of the court in which
enforcement is sought led to a simplification of the
enforcement procedure. Furthermore, as "the position of
the defendant in the original proceedings is well
protected it is proper that the applicant for
enforcement be enabled to proceed rapidly with all the
necessary formalities in the State in which enforcement
is sought, that he be free to act without prior warning
and that enforcement be obtained without unnecessary
complications.
The Committee discussed the enforcement procedure at
length before adopting it. There were several
possibilities open to it: reference back to national laws
but subject to certain rules of the Convention, ordinary
contentious procedure, summary contentious procedure
or  ex parte  application.
Each of these solutions had its advantages and
disadvantages. The Committee finally adopted a system
for the whole Community based on  ex parte
application. This rapid and simple procedure will apply
in all six States.
This uniform solution has the advantage of creating a
proper balance as between the various provisions of the
Convention: uniform rules of jurisdiction in the six
countries and identical procedures for enforcement.
(b) Conditions for enforcement
As has been shown, the Convention is based on the
principle that a foreign judgment is presumed to be in
order. It must, in principle, be possible to enforce it in
the State in which enforcement is sought. Enforcement
can be refused only if there is a ground for refusing
recognition (1). The foreign judgment must, however, be
enforceable in the State in which it was given in order to
be enforceable in the State in which enforcement is
sought.
(1) On the disadvantages resulting from a difference between
the conditions for recognition and for enforcement, see
RIGAUX op. cit. p. 207, No 39.No C 59/48 Official Journal of the European Communities
If a judgment from which an appeal still lies or against
which an appeal has been lodged in the State in which it
was given cannot be provisionally enforced in that
State, it cannot be enforced in the State in which
enforcement is sought. It is an essential requirement of
the instrument whose enforcement is sought that it
should be enforceable in the State in which it originates.
As Niboyet points out, there is no reason for granting to
a foreign judgment rights which it does not have in the
country in which it was given (1).
Under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be
reviewed as to its substance (Article 34).
(c) Enforcement procedure
Before examInIng the Articles of the section on
enforcement it seems appropriate to give on outline of
the procedure which will be applicable in the six States.
1. The application, accompanied by the documents
required under Articles 46 and 47, must be
submitted to the authority specified in Article 32.
The procedure for making the application 
governed by the law of the State in which
enforcement is sought.
The applicant must give an address for service of
process or appoint a representative  ad litem  in the
jurisdiction of the court applied to.
2. The court applied to must give its decision without
delay, and is not able to summon the other party. At
this stage no contentious proceedings are allowed.
The application may be refused only for one of the
reasons specified in Articles 27 and 28.
3. If enforcement is authorized:
(a) the party against whom enforcement is sought
may appeal against the decision within one
month of service of the decision (Article 36);
(b) the appeal must be lodged, in accordance with
the rules governing procedure in contentious
matters, with the court specified in Article 37;
) NIBOYET, Droit international prive franc;:ais. Vol VI
No 1974.
(c) if an appeal has been lodged against the foreign
judgment in the State in which it was given, or if
the time for such an appeal has not yet expired
the court seised of the appeal against the
decision authorizing enforcement may stay the
proceedings or make enforcement conditional on
the provision of security (Article 38);
(d) the judgment given on the appeal against the
decision authorizing enforcement may not 
contested by an ordinary appeal. It may be
contested only by an appeal in cassation (l)
(Article 37);
(e) during the time specified for an appeal against
the decision authorizing enforcement the
applicant may take only protective measures; the
decision authorizing enforcement carries with
it the power to proceed to such measures
(Article 39).
4. If enforcement is refused:
(a) the applicant may appeal to the court specified
in Article 40;
(b) the procedure before that court is contentious,
the other party being summoned to appear
(Article 40);
(c) the judgment given on this appeal may be
contested only by an appeal in cassation (7)
(Article 41).
Article 
Under this Article 'a judgment given in a Contracting
State and enforceable in that State shall be enforced in
another Contracting State when, on the application of
any interested party, the order for its enforcement has
been issued there
As can be seen, this provision is almost identical with
that contained in the European Convention providing a
uniform law on arbitration (3). The Committee did, in
fact, take the view that judgments given in one
) In the Federal Republic of Germany by 
Rechtsbeschwerde
. .
(3) European Convention providing a uniform law on
arbitration, Strasbourg, 20 January 1966. Article 29 of
Annex I: 'An arbitral award may be enforced only when it
can no longer be contested before arbitrators and when an
enforcement formula has been apposed to it by the
competent authority on the application of the interested
party.'Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/49
Contracting State should be enforceable in any other
Contracting State as easily as arbitral awards.
The legal systems of the Member States are already
familiar with authorization of enforcement by means of
an enforcement order. This is so, for example, in the
case of judgments and decisions given by the European
Community institutions (Article 92 of the ECSC Treaty,
Article 192 of the EEC Treaty, Article 164 of the
Euratom Treaty). It is also true of judgments and
decisions falling within the scope of the Mannheim
Convention (1
The Convention of 30 August 1962 between Germany
and the Netherlands also provides that judgments given
in one of the two States are to be enforced in the other
if enforcement is authorized by means of 
enforcement order.
A rule similar to that in Article 31 , that is to sayan 
parte  procedure, was contained in the Franco-German
Treaty on the Saar of 27 October 1956. Business circles
in the Saar have said that the rule has proved entirely
satisfactory.
About 80% of enforcement proceedings have been
successfully completed by means of the first  ex parte
written phase of the procedure. In the majority of cases
judgment debtors have refrained from contesting the
proceedings by means of an appeal. This is easily
explained by the fact that cases of refusal of
enforcement are exceptional, and the risk of having to
bear the costs of the proceedings restrains the judgment
debtor, unless he feels certain of winning his case.
Article 31 does not purport to determine whether it is
the judgment given in the State of origin, or the decision
authorizing the issue of the enforcement order, which is
enforceable in the State in which enforcement is sought.
The expression 'on the application of any interested
party' implies that any person who is entitled to the
benefit of the judgment in the State in which it was
given has the right to apply for an order for its
enforcement.
Article 
Article 32 specifies the authority in each of the
Contracting States to which the application must be
submitted and which will have jurisdiction. It was
(1) Revised Convention for the Navigation of the Rhine signed
at Mannheim on 17 October 1868.
considered to be in the interests of the parties that each
relevant authority be indicated in the Convention itself.
The court to which local jurisdiction is given is that for
the place of domicile of the party against whom
enforcement is sought, or, if that party is not domiciled
in the State in which enforcement is sought, the court
for the place of enforcement, that is, where the
judgment debtor has assets. The jurisdiction of the court
for the place of enforcement is thus of minor
importance.
The provision requiring applications to be submitted to
the court for the place where the judgment debtor is
domiciled was included for the following reason. It is
quite possible that in the State in whi~h enforcement is
sought the judgment debtor may possess property
situated in the jurisdiction of different courts. If
jurisdiction had been given only to the court for the
place of enforcement, a choice between several courts
would have been open to the applicant. Thus . an
applicant who was unsuccessful in one court could,
instead of availing himself of the methods of appeal
provided for in the Convention, have applied to another
court which would not necessarily have come to the
same decision as the first court, and this without the
knowledge of the other party, since the procedure is 
parte.
Article 
Under Article 33, the procedure and formalities for
making the application are to be governed by the law of
the State in which enforcement is sought.
Reference must therefore be made to the national laws
for the particulars which the application must contain
the number of copies which must be submitted to the
court, the authority to which the application must be
submitted, also, where necessary, the language in which
it must be drawn up, and whether a lawyer should be
instructed to appear.
The provisions to which reference must be made are the
following:
Belgium:
The matter will be governed by the Judicial Code (see
Articles 1025 and 1027);
Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands and Italy:
The question will be governed by the law implementing
the Convention;
France:
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Luxembourg:
A lawyer must be instructed in accordance with the
general law under which no one can officially,address
the court except through an  avoue.  Article 856 or
Article 512 of the Code of Civil Procedure is generally
invoked in support of this proposition.
The application must be accompanied by the documents
required to be produced under Articles 46 and 47.
In the view of the Committee, if the applicant does not
produce the required documents, enforcement should
not be refused, but the court may stay the proceedings
and allow the applicant time to produce the documents.
If the documents produced are not sufficient and the
court cannot obtain sufficient information, it may
refuse to entertain the application.
Finally, the applicant must, in accordance with the law
of the State in which enforcement is sought, either give
an address for service of process or appoint a
representative  ad litem  within the area of jurisdiction of
the court applied to. This provision is important in two
respects: first for communicating to the applicant the
decision given on the application (Article 35), and
secondly in case the party against whom enforcement is
sought wishes to appeal, since such an appeal must be
lodged 'in accordance with the rules governing
procedure in contentious matters' (Article 37).
The respondent must therefore summon the applicant to
appear; the furnishing of an address for service or the
appointment of a representative enables the summons to
be served rapidly, in accordance with the law of the
country in which enforcement is sought, without risk of
error  and without all the hazards connected with the
service of legal documents abroad. It will in fact usually
happen that the applicant is domiciled outside the State
in which enforcement is sought.
The appointment of a representative  ad litem  has been
provided for because the furnishing of an address for
service is unknown in German law.
The two methods will, of course, produce the same
result.
Article 
Article 34 provides that the court applied to shall give
its decision without delay; 'the party against whom
enforcement is sought shall not at this stage of the
proceedings be entitled to make any submissions on the
application.
The Committee considered but rejected the idea of
imposing on the court to which application is made a
fixed period for giving its decision. Such a time limit is
unknown in judicial practice, and there would in any
case be no way of enforcing it.
The Convention does not allow the court to which
application is made to ask the respondent to make
submissions, even in exceptional cases. Such a
possibility would have meant that the proceedings were
not fully  ex parte.  Certain courts might be inclined to
hear the respondent, which would in fact result in the
ex parte  procedure systematically becoming  inter partes.
Moreover, there would be a reduction in the element of
surprise which is nec~ssary in an enforcement procedure
if the respondent is not to have the opportunity 
withdrawing his assets from any measure of
enforcement.
The rights of the respondent are safeguarded, since he
can institute contentious proceedings by appealing
against the decision authorizing enforcement.
As has beed shown above, the application may be
refused only for one of the reasons specified in Articles
27 and 28, and the foreign judgment may not 
reviewed as to its substance. Consequently, fresh claims
which have not been submitted to the foreign court are
inadmissible; the court seised of the application may
authorize or refuse enforcement, but it cannot alter the
foreign judgment.
The court may, however, refuse the application if it
does not satisfy the requirements of Articles 32 and 33.
Article 
Article 35 provides that the appropriate officer of the
court shall without delay bring the decision given on the
application to the notice of the applicant in accordance
with the procedure laid down by the law of the State in
which enforcement is sought. It is important that the
applicant be informed of the decision taken. This
demonstrates the value of an address for service or of
the appointment of a representative  ad "litem
particularly where the applicant is domiciled abroad.
The manner in which the decision is communicated to
the applicant will be a matter for the national law of the
State in which enforcement is sought, irrespective of
whether enforcement is authorized or refused.Article 
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If enforcement is authorized, the decision must be
notified to the party against whom enforcement has
been granted. That party may appeal against the
decision from the time it is served on him. As regards
the period within which an appeal may be lodged and
the moment from which it begins to run, Article 36
makes a distinction between the following situations:
(a) if the party is domiciled in the State in which the
decision was given, the period is one month; the
moment from which time begins to run 
determined by the law of that State, from which
there is no reason to derogate;
(b) if the party is domiciled in another Contracting
State, the period is two months, and runs from the
date when the decision was served, either on him in
person or at his residence (1).
In France and the Netherlands, the day of delivery
to the prosecutor office is not counted for
purposes of computation of time. In Belgium, the
day of delivery to the postal authorities is not
counted (Article 40 of the Judicial Code), nor is the
day on which an instrument is dispatched by a
Belgian Consul to a foreign authority  (l).
The purpose of this rule, which derogates from
some national laws, is to protect the respondent and
to prevent his being deprived of a remedy because
he had not been informed of the decision in
sufficient time to contest it.
No extension of time may be granted on account of
distance, as the time allowed is sufficient to enable
the party concerned to contest the decision, if he is
so minded;
(c) if the party is domiciled outside the Community, the
period within which an appeal may be lodged runs
from the date when the decision is served or is
deemed to have been served according to the law of
the State in which the decision was given. In this
case the period of one month may be extended on
account of distance in accordance with the law of
that State.
Computation of time is governed by the internal law
of the State in which the decision was given.
(1) Service on a party at his residence means delivering the
instrument to a person who is present and empowered by
law to receive a copy of the instrument or, if there is no
such person, to a competent authority.
(l) Belgian Court of Cassation, 4 March 1954; Revue des
huissiers de Belgique, May to June 1954, p. 15.
Article 37 specifies for each country the court with
which an appeal can be lodged.
In that court the proceedings are contentious.
Accordingly it is incumbent upon the person against
whom enforcement has been authorized to summon the
other party to appear.
'the court seised of the appeal will have to examine
whether it was properly lodged and will have to decide
upon the merits of the appeal, taking account of the
additional information supplied by the appellant. It will
therefore be open to the appellant to establish, in the
case of a judgment originally given in default of
appearance, that the rights of the defendant were
disregarded, or that a judgment has already been given
in a dispute between the same parties in the State in
which enforcement is sought which is irreconcilable
with the foreign judgment. The appellant may also
plead Article 38 if he has lodged an appeal against the
judgment whose enforcement is sought in the State in
which it was given.
It is no part of the duty of the court with which the
appeal against the decision authorizing enforcement is
lodged to review the foreign judgment as to its
substance. This would be contrary to the spirit of the
Convention. The appellant could, however, effectively
adduce grounds which arose after the foreign judgment
was given. For example, he may establish that he has
since discharged the debt. As Batiffol points out
such grounds are admissible In enforcement
proceedings e) (4
The second paragraph of Article 37 provides that the
judgment given on the appeal may be contested only by
an appeal in cassation and not by any other form of
appeal or review.
This rule was requisite for the following reasons. First,
the grounds for refusing enforcement are very limited
and involve public policy . in the State in which
enforcement is sought. No useful purpose is served by
further argument on this concept. Next, the situation is
different from that in which purely national proceedings
are involved. The proceedings on the merits of the case
itself have already taken place in the State in which the
judgment was given, and the Convention in no way
) BA TIFFOL op. cit., p. 863, note 57.
) For the Federal Republic of Germany, see Article 767 of the Code of Civil Procedure; see also
BAUMBACH-LAUTERBACH ZivilprozeBordnung,
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interferes with the rights of appeal. It is true that the
Convention applies to judgments which are enforceable
only provisionally, but in this case the court with which
the appeal is lodged may, as provided in Article 38, stay
the proceedings. An excessive number of avenues of
appeal might be used by the losing party purely as
delaying tactics, and this would constitute an obstacle
to the free movement of judgments which is the object
of the Convention.
Since appeals in cassation are unknown in the Federal
Republic of Germany, it has been provided, in order to
establish a certain parity amongst the Contracting
States that an appeal on  point of law
(Rechtsbeschwerde) shall lie against a judgment of the
Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht).
Article 
Article 38 covers cases where an ordinary appeal has
been lodged against the judgment in the State in which
that judgment was given, and also cases where the
period within which such an appeal may be lodged has
not yet expired. The court with which the appeal
against enforcement under the first paragraph of Article
37 is lodged may either stay the proceedings, authorize
enforcement, make enforcement conditional on the
provision of such security as it thinks fit, or specify the
time within which the defendant must lodge his appeal.
This provIsIOn originates in the Convention between
Germany and Belgium (Article 10), and its 'object is to
protect the judgment debtor against any loss which
could result from the enforcement of a judgment which
has not yet become  res judicata  and may 
amended' (1).
Article 38 deals only with judgments which
notwithstanding that they may be appealed against, are
enforceable in the State in which they were given.
Only the court seised of the appeal has the power to
stay the proceedings, and such a stay can be granted
only on the application of the party against whom
enforcement is sought. This is because that party does
not appear at the first stage of the proceedings and
cannot be required to do so.
(1) Convention between Germany and Belgium. See Report of
the negotiators.
Article 
Article 39 contains two very important rules. First it
provides that during the time specified for the lodging
of an appeal the applicant for enforcement may take no
enforcement measures other than protective measures
namely those available under the law of the State in
which enforcement is sought. Similarly, if an appeal has
actually been lodged, this rule applies until the appeal
has been determined. Secondly it provides that the
decision authorizing enforcement carries with it the
power to proceed to any such protective measures.
Article 39 also allows the judgment creditor in certain
States, for example in the Federal Republic of Germany,
to initiate the first phase of the enforcement of the
foreign instrument. The object of this provision is to
ensure at the enforcement stage a balance between the
rights and interests of the parties concerned, in order to
avoid either of them suffering any loss as a result of the
operation of the rules of procedure.
On the one hand, an applicant who, in consequence of a
foreign judgment, is in possession of an enforceable
instrument, must be able to take quickly all measures
necessary to prevent the judgment debtor from
removing the assets on which execution is to be levied.
This is made possible by the  ex parte  procedure and by
the provision in Article 39 that the decision authorizing
enforcement carries with it the power to proceed 
such protective measures. The power arises
automatically. Even in those States whose law requires
proof that the case calls for prompt action or that there
is any risk in delay the applicant will not have to
establish that either of those elements is present; power
to proceed to protective measures is not a matter for the
discretion of the court.
On the other hand, the fact that the enforcement
procedure is  ex parte  makes it essential that no
irreversible measures of execution can be taken against
the defendant. The latter may be in a position to
establish that there are grounds for refusal of
enforcement; he may, for example, be able to show that
the question of public policy was not examined in
sufficient detail. To safeguard his rights it accordingly
appeared to be necessary to delay enforcement, which is
usually carried out by sequestration of the movable and
immovable property of the defendant, until the end of
the time specified for appeal (see Article 36) or, if an
appeal is actually lodged, until it has been determined.
In other words, this is a counterbalance to the  ex parte
procedure; the effect of the decision authorizing
enforcement given pursuant to Article 31 is limited in
that during the time specified for an appeal, or if an
appeal has been lodged, no enforcement measures can
be taken on the basis of that decision against the assets
of the judgment debtor.Articles  40  and 
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These Articles relate to the case where an application
for enforcement is refused.
Article 40 provides that the applicant may appeal to the
appeal court which has jurisdiction in the State in which
enforcement is sought.
The Committee did not think it necessary that the
Convention should fix the period within which appeals
would have to be lodged. If the applicant has had his
application refused, it is for him to give notice of appeal
within such time as he considers suitable. He will have
regard, no doubt, to the length of time it will take him
to assemble all the relevant documents.
Upon appeal the proceedings are contentious, since the
party against whom enforcement is sought is summoned
to appear. The  inter partes  procedure is necessary in
order to avoid numerous appeals. If the procedure on
appeal had remained  ex parte it would have been
essential to provide for additional proceedings to enable
the defendant to make his submissions if the appellate
court were to reverse the decision at first instance and
authorize enforcement. The Committee wished to avoid
a plethora of appeals. Moreover, the dismissal of the
application reverses the presumption of validity of the
foreign judgment.
The summoning of the party against whom enforcement
is sought is to be effected in manner prescribed by the
national laws.
The appellate court can give judgment only if the
judgment debtor has in fact been given an opportunity
to make his submissions. The object of this provision is
to protect the rights of the defendant and to mitigate the
disadvantages which result from certain systems of
serving instruments abroad. These disadvantages are all
the more serious in that a party against whom
enforcement is sought and who is not notified in time to
arrange for his defence no longer has any judicial
remedy against the judgment given on the appeal other
than by way of an appeal in cassation, and then only to
the extent that this is allowed by the law of the State in
which enforcement is sought (Article 41).
Because of the safeguards contained in Article 40
Article 41 provides that the judgment given on the
appeal may not be contested by an ordinary appeal, but
only by an appeal in cassation. The reason why a
special form of appeal (Rechtsbeschwerde) is provided
for in the Federal Republic of Germany has already
been explained (Article 37).
The procedure for the forms of appeal provided for in
Articles 40 and 41 is to be determined by the national
laws which may, where necessary, prescribe time limits.
Article 
Article 42 covers two different situations.
The first paragraph of Article 42 empowers the court of
the State in which enforcement is sought to authorize
enforcement in respect of certain matters dealt with in a
judgment and to refuse it in respect of others (1). As
explained in the report annexed to the Benelux Treaty,
which contains a similar provision
, '
this discretion
exists in all cases where a judgment deals with separate
and independent heads of claim, and the decision on
some of these is contrary to the public policy of the
country in which enforcement is sought, while the
decision on others is not.
The second paragraph of Article 42 allows an applicant
to request the partial enforcement of a judgment, and 
hypothesi  allows the court addressed to grant such a
request. As mentioned in the report on the Benelux
Treaty, 'it is possible that the applicant for enforcement
himself wants only partial enforcement, e. g. where the
judgment whose enforcement is sought orders the
payment of a sum of money, part of which has been
paid since the judgment was given.' (2).
As is made clear in the Conventions between Germany
and Belgium, and between Belgium and Italy, which
contain similar provisions, the applicant may exercise
this option whether the judgment covers one or several
heads of claim.
Article 
Article 43 relates to judgments which order a periodic
payment by way of  penalty. Some enforcement
conventions contain a clause on this subject (see
Benelux Treaty, Article 14; Convention between
Germany and the Netherlands, Article 7).
(1) See Benelux Treaty (Articles 14 (4)); the Conventions
between France and Italy (Article 3); between Italy and the
Netherlands (Article 3); between Germany and Belgium
(Article 11); between Belgium and Italy (Article 10) and
between Germany and the Netherlands (Article 12).
(2) See also the Conventions between Germany and Belgium
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It follows from the wording adopted that judgments
given in a Contracting State which order the payment of
a sum of money for each day of delay, with the
intention of getting the judgment debtor to fulfil his
obligations, will be enforced in another Contracting
State only if the amount of the payment has been finally
determined by the courts of the State in which judgment
was gIven.
Article 
Article 44 deals with legal aid.
A number of enforcement conventions deal with this
matter (1).
The provisions adopted by the Committee supplements
the Hague Convention of 1 March 1954 on civil
procedure, which has been ratified by the six States, so
that a party who has been granted legal aid in the State in which judgment was given also qualifies
automatically for legal aid in the State in which
enforcement is sought, but only as regards the issuing of
the order for enforcement. Thus the automatic
extension of legal aid achieved by the Convention does
not apply in relation to enforcement measures or to
proceedings arising from the exercise of rights of
appeal.
The reasoning underlying Article 44 is as follows.
First, as maintenance obligations fall within the scope of
the Convention consideration was given to the
humanitarian issues which were the basis for a similar
provision in the 1958 Hague Convention.
Above all it must not be forgotten that if a needy
applicant were obliged, before making his application
for enforcement, to institute in the State in which
enforcement is sought proceedings for recognition of the
decision granting him legal aid in the State in which the
judgment was given, he would be in a less favourable
position than other applicants. He would in particular
not have the advantage of the rapidity of the procedure
and the element of surprise which Title III is designed to
afford to any party seeking the enforcement of a foreign
judgment.
It is moreover because of this consideration that the
automatic extension of legal aid has been limited to the
) Hague Convention of 15 April 1958 concerning the
recognition and enforcement of decisions relating to
maintenance obligations towards children (Article 9);
Conventions between Italy and the Netherlands (Article 6)
and between Germany and the Netherlands (Article 15).
procedure for issuing the order for enforcement, and
has not been extended to the proceedings on appeal.
Once these proceedings have been set in motion, the
applicant for enforcement, or, in case of appeal, the
respondent, may, in accordance with the 1954 Hague
Convention, take the necessary steps, in the State in
which enforcement is sought, to obtain legal 'aid, in the
same way as nationals of that State.
Under Article 47 (2) an applicant must, on making his
application, produce documents showing that he is 
receipt of legal aid in the State in which judgment was
gIven.
Article 
This Article deals with security for costs. A similar rule
is included in the Hague Convention of 1 March 1954
but as regards the obligation to provide security it
exempts only nationals of the Contracting States who
are also domiciled in one of those States (Article 17).
Under Article 45, any party, irrespective of nationality
or domicile, who seeks enforcement in one Contracting
State of a judgment given in another Contracting State
may do so without providing security. The two
conditions  nationality and domicile  prescribed by
the 1954 Convention do not apply.
The Committee considered that the provision of security
in relation to proceedings for the issuing of an order for
enforcement was unnecessary.
As regards the proceedings which take place in the State
in which judgment was given, the Committee did not
consider it necessary to depart from the rules of the
1954 Convention.
Section 3
Common provisions
This Section deals with the documents which must be
produced when application is made for the recognition
or enforcement of a judgment.
Article 46 applies to both recognition and enforcement.
Article 47 applies only to applications for enforcement.
It should be noted that at the recognition stage there is
no reason to require production of the documents
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Article 47 (1) provides for the production of documents
which establish that the judgment is enforceable in the
State in which it was given. The requirement that the
judgment be, in law, enforceable in that State applies
only in relation to its enforcement (not to its
recognition) abroad. (Article 31).
Article 47 (2), which relates to documents showing that
the applicant is receiving legal aid in the State in which
judgment was given is also relevant only 
enforcement proceedings. The documents are in fact
intended to enable a party receiving legal aid in the
State in which judgment was given to qualify for it
automatically in the proceedings relating to the issue of
the order for enforcement (Article 44). However
recognition requires no special procedure (Article 26). If
recognition were itself the principal issue in an action
Article 44 and, consequently, Article 47 (2) would
apply, since Article 26 refers to Sections 2 and 3 
Title III.
Under Article 46 (1), a copy of the judgment which
satisfies the conditions necessary to establish its
authenticity must be produced, whether it is recognition
or enforcement which is sought.
This provision is found in all enforcement treaties and
does not require any special comment. The authenticity
of a judgment will be established in accordance with the
maxim  locus regit actum;  it is therefore the law of the
place where the judgment was given which prescribes
the conditions which the copy of the judgment must
satisfy in order to be valid (1).
Under Article 46 (2), if the judgment was given in
default, a document which establishes that the party in
default was served with the document instituting the
proceedings must also be produced.
The court in which recognition or enforcement is sought
must, if the foreign judgment was given in default, be in
a position to verify that the defendant s right to defend
himself was safeguarded.
Article 47 provides that the following documents must
be produced:
(1) WESER: Traite franco-belge du 8 juillet 1899. f:tude
critique No 247.
(a) documents which establish that the judgment is
enforceable according to the law of the State in
which it was given. This does not mean that a
separate document certifying that the judgment has
become enforceable in that State is necessarily
required. Thus in France
, '
provisional
enforceability' would be  deduced from an express
reference to it in judgments given pursuant to Article
135a of the Code of Civil Procedure. Decisions
given in summary proceedings will be provisionally
enforceable (Article 809 of the Code of Civil
Procedure); and so will decisions in  ex parte
proceedings (Article 54 of the Decree of 30 March
1808). But whether other judgments are enforceable
can be determined only when the date on which they
were given has been considered in relation to the
date on which they were served and the time
allowed for lodging an appeal (2).
Documents which establish that the judgment has
been served will also have to be produced, since
some judgments may be enforceable and
consequently fall within the scope of the
Convention even if they have not been served on the
other party. However, before enforcement can be
applied for, that party must at least have been
informed of the judgment given against him and
also have had the opportunity to satisfy the
judgment voluntarily;
(b) where appropriate, a document showing, in
accordance with the law of the State in which the
judgment was given, that the applicant is in receipt
of legal aid in that State.
Article 
In order to avoid unnecessary formalities, this Article
authorizes the court to allow time for the applicant to
produce the documentary evidence proving service of
the document instituting the proceedings, required
under Article 46 (2), and the documentary evidence
showing that the applicant was in receipt of legal aid in
the State in which judgment was given (Article 47 (2)).
(2)  Belgium:  Judicial Code: see Article 1029 for decisions in 
parte  proceedings, Article 1039 for decisions in summary
proceedings, and Articles 1398 and 1496 for judgments.
Federal Republic of Germany:  Vollstreckungsklausel' 
Under Article 725 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
order for enforcement is worded as follows:
This copy of the judgment shall be given to . . . (name of
the party) for the purpose of enforcement.' This order must
be added at the end of the copy of the judgment and must
be signed by the appropriate officer of the court and sealed
with the seal of the court.
Luxembourg:  see Articles 135, 136 and 137 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, Article 164 for judgments in default,
Article 439 for Commercial Courts (tribunaux de
commerce) and Article 5 of the Law of 23 March 1893 
summary jurisdiction.
Netherlands:  see Articles 339, 350, 430 and 433 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, also Articles 82 and 85 of that
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The court may dispense with the production of these
documents by the applicant (the Committee had in
mind the case where the documents had been destroyed)
if it considers that it has sufficient information before it
from other evidence.
The second paragraph relates to the translation of the
documents to be produced. Again with the object of
simplifying the procedure, it is here provided that the
translation may be certified by a person qualified' to 
so in anyone of the Contracting States.
CHAPTER VI
Article 
This Article provides that legalization or other like
formality is not necessary as regards the documents to
be produced and, in particular, that the certificate
provided for in the Hague Convention of 5 October
1961 abolishing the requirement of legalization for
foreign public documents is not required. The same
applies to the document whereby an applicant appoints
a representative, perhaps a lawyer, to act for him in
proceedings for the issue of an order for enforcement.
AUTHENTIC INSTRUMENTS AND COURT SEITLEMENTS
Article 
In drawing up rules for the enforcement of authentic
instruments, the Committee has broken no new ground.
Similar provisions are, in fact, contained in the
Conventions already concluded by the six States (1),
with the sole exception of the Convention between
Germany and Italy.
Since Article 1 governs the whole Convention, Article
50 applies only to authentic instruments which have
been drawn up or registered in matters falling within
the scope of the Convention.
In order that an authentic instrument which has been
drawn up or registered in one Contracting State may be
the subject of an order for enforcement issued in
another Contracting State, three conditions must be
satisfied:
(a) the instrument must be enforceable in the State in
which it was drawn up or registered;
(b) it must satisfy the conditions necessary to establish
its authenticity in that State;
(1) Conventions between France and Belgium (Article 16);
between Belgium and the Netherlands (Article 16); Benelux
Treaty (Article 18); Conventions between Germany and
Belgium (Article 14); between Italy and Belgium (Article
13); between Germany and the Netherlands (Article 16);
between Italy and the Netherlands (Article 8); and between
France and Italy (Article 6).
(c) its enforcement must not be contrary to public
policy in the State in which enforcement is sought.
The provisions of Section 3 of Title III are applicable as
appropriate. It follows in particular that no legalization
or similar formality is required.
Article 
A provision covering court settlements was considered
necessary on account of the German and Netherlands
legal systems (2), under German and Netherlands law
settlements approved by a court in the course of
proceedings are enforceable without further formality
(Article 794 (1) of the German Code of Civil Procedure
and Article 19 of the Netherlands Code of Civil
Procedure).
The Convention, like the Convention between Germany
and Belgium, makes court settlements subject to the
same rules as authentic instruments, since both are
contractual in nature. Enforcement can therefore be
refused only if it is contrary to public policy in the State
in which it is sought.
(2) See the Conventions between Germany and Belgium
(Article 14 (1)); between Germany and the Netherlands
(Article 16); between Germany and Italy (Article 9); and
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CHAPTER VII
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 
As regards the determination of domicile (Article 52),
reference should be made to Chapter IV (A) (3) which
deals with the matter.
Article 
Article 53 provides that, for the purposes of this
Convention, the seat of a company or other legal person
or association of natural or legal persons shall be
treated as its domicile.
The Convention does not define what is meant by the
seat of a legal person or of a company or association of
natural or legal persons any more than it defines
domicile.
In determining the location of the seat, the court will
apply its rules of private international law. The
Committee did not think it possible to particularize the
concept of seat in any other way, and considered that it
could not be achieved by making a reference to Article
, in view of the different approaches which the
various Member States of the Community adopt in this
matter. Moreover, the Committee did not wish 
encroach upon the work on company law which is now
being carried out within the Community.
It did not excape the attention of the Committee that
the application of Article 16 . (2) of the Convention
could raise certain difficulties. This would be the case
for example, where a court in one State ordered the
dissolution of a company whose seat was in that State
and application was then made for recognition of that
order in another State under whose law the location of
the company s seat was determined by its statutes, if
when so determined, it was in that other State. In the
opinion of the Committee, the court of the State in
which recognition were sought would be entitled, under
the first paragraph of Article 28, to refuse recognition
on the ground that the courts of that State had exclusive
jurisdiction.
Article 53 does not deal with the preliminary question
of the recognition of companies or other legal persons
or associations of natural or legal persons; this must be
resolved either by national law or by the Hague
Convention of 1 June 1956 on the red~gnition of the
legal personality of companies, firms, associations and
foundations (l), pending the entry into force of the
Convention which is at present being prepared within
the EEC on the basis of Article 220 of the Treaty of
Rome.
Article 53 refers to companies or other legal persons
and to associations of natural or legal persons; to speak
only of legal persons would have been insufficient, since
this expression would not have covered certain types of
company, such as the 'offene Handelsgesellschaft' under
German law, which are not legal persons. Similarly, it
would not have been sufficient to speak only of
companies, since certain bodies, such as associations
and foundations, would then not have been covered by
this Convention.
e)  Ratified on 20 April 1966 by Belgium, France and the
Netherlands.
CHAPTER VIII
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Article 
As a general rule, enforcement treaties have no
retroactive effect (1), in order 'not to alter a state of
) Conventions between France and Belgium (Article 19);
between Belgium and the Netherlands (Article 27);
between Germany and Belgium (Article 17); between
Germany and Italy (Article 18); between Germany and the
Netherlands (Article 20); between Italy and Belgium
(Article 17); and between Italy and the Netherlands
(Article 16).
affairs which has been reached on the basis of legal
relations other than those created between the two
States as ' a result of the introduction of the
Convention' (2).
So far as the author is aware only the Benelux Treaty
applies to judgments given before its entry into force.
(z) See Report of the negotiators of the Convention between
Germany and Belgium.No C 59/58 Official Journal of the European Communities
A solution as radical as that of the Benelux Treaty did
not seem acceptable. In the first place, the conditions
which a judgment must fulfil in order to be recognized
and enforced are much stricter under the Benelux
Treaty (Article 13) than under the EEC Convention.
Secondly, the ease with which recognition and
enforcement can be granted under the EEC Convention
is balanced by the provisions of Title II which safeguard
the interests of the defendant. In particular, those
provisions have made it possible, at the stage of
recognition or enforcement, to dispense with any review
of the jurisdiction of the court of origin (Article 28).
But, of course, a defendant in the State in which
judgment was originally given will be able to rely on
these protective provisions only when the Convention
has entered into force. Only then will he be able to
invoke the Convention to plead lack of jurisdiction.
Although Article 54 was not modelled on the Benelux
Treaty, its effect is not very different.
The rules adopted are as follows:
1. The Convention applies to proceedings which are
instituted  and in which, therefore, judgment is
given  after the entry into force of the
Convention.
2. The Convention does not apply if the proceedings
were instituted and judgment given before the entry
into force of the Convention.
3. The Convention does apply, but subject to certain
reservations, to judgments given after its entry into
force in proceedings instituted before its entry into
force.
In this case, the court of the State addressed may review
the jurisdiction of the court of origin, since the
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defendant originally had no opportunity to contest that
jurisdiction in that court on the basis of the Convention.
Enforcement will be authorized if the jurisdiction of the
court of origin:
(i) either was based on a rule which accords with one
of the rules of jurisdiction in the Convention; for
example, if the defendant was domiciled in the
State in which the judgment was given;
(ii) or was based on a multilateral or bilateral
convention in force between the State of origin and
the State addressed. Thus if, for example, an action
relating to a contract were brought in a German
court, the judgment given could be recognized and
enforced in Belgium if the obligation had been 
was to be performed in the Federal Republic since
the jurisdiction of the German court would 
founded on Article 3 (1) (5) of the Convention
between Germany and Belgium.
If the jurisdiction of the court of origin is founded on
one of those bases, the judgment must be recognized
and enforced, provided of course that there is no
ground for refusal under Article 27 or 28,. Recognition
will be accorded without any special procedure being
required (Article 26); enforcement will be authorized in
accordance with the rules of Section 2 of Title III, that is
to say, on  ex parte  application.
It follows from Article 54, which provides that the
Convention applies only to legal proceedings instituted
after its entry into force, that the Convention will have
no effect on proceedings in progress at the time of its
entry into force. If, for example, before the entry into
force of the Convention, proceedings were instituted in
France in accordance with Article 14 of the Civil Code
against a person domiciled in another Contracting State
that person could not plead the Convention for the
purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the French
court.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
Title VII deals with the relationship between the
Convention and other international instruments
governing jurisdiction, recognition and the enforcement
of judgments. It covers the following matters:Official Journal of the European Communities No C 59/59
1. the relationship between the Convention and the
bilateral agreements already in force between
certain Member States of the Community (Article
55 and 56) (1):
2. the relationship between the Convention and those
international agreements which, in relation to
particlar matters, govern  or will govern 
jurisdiction and the recognition or enforcement of
judgments (Article 57);
3. the relationship between the Convention and the
Convention of 15 June 1869 between France and
Switzerland which is the only enforcement
convention concluded between a Member State of
the EEC and a non-member State to contain rules of
direct jurisdiction (Article 58);
4. the relationship between the Convention and any
other instruments, whether bilateral or multilateral
which may in the future govern the recognition and
enforcement of judgments (Article 59).
It was not thought necessary to regulate the relationship
between the Convention and the bilateral conventions
already concluded between Member States of the EEC
and non-member States since, with the exception of the
Convention between France and Switzerland, such
conventions all contain rules of indirect jurisdiction.
There is, therefore, no conflict between those
conventions and the rules of jurisdiction laid down in
Title II of the Convention. Recognition and enforcement
would seem to raise no problem, since judgments given
in those non-member States must be recognized in
accordance' with the provisions of the bilateral
conventions.
Articles  55  and 
Article 55 contains a list of the Conventions which will
be superseded on the entry into force of the EEC
Convention. This will, however, be subject to:
1. the provisions of the second paragraph of Article
, as explained in the commentary on that Article;
2. the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 56
the consequence of which is that these conventions
will continue to have effect in relation to matters to
which the EEC Convention does not apply (status
legal capacity etc.
) Mention has been made of the Benelux Treaty although, as
it has not been ratified by Luxembourg, it has not yet
entered into force; this is to avoid any conflict between the
Convention and that Treaty should it enter into force.
3. the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 56
concerning the recognition and enforcement of
judgments given before the EEC Convention enters
into force. Thus a judgment given in France before
the EEC Convention enters into force and to which
by virtue of Article 54 this Convention would
therefore not apply, could be recognized and
enforced in Italy after the entry into force of the
EEC Convention under the terms of the Convention
of 3 June 1930 between France and Italy. Without
such a rule, judgments given before the Convention
enters into force could be recognized and enforced
only in accordance with the general law, and this
would in several Contracting States involve the
possibility of a review of the substance of the
judgment, which would unquestionably be 
retrograde step.
Article 
The Member States of the Community, or some of
them, are already parties to numerous international
agreements which, in relation to particular matters
govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of
judgments. Those agreements include the following:
1. The revised Convention for the navigation of the
Rhine signed at Mannheim on 17 October
1868 (2);
2. The International Convention for the unification
of certain rules relating to international carriage by
air, and Additional Protocol, signt!d at Warsaw on
12 October 1929 (3
3. The International Convention on certain rules
concerning civil jurisdiction in matters of collision
signed at Brussels on 10 May 1952 (4
4. The International Convention relating to the arrest
of sea-going ships, signed at Brussels on 10 May
1952 (5
5. The Convention on damage caused by foreign
aircraft to third parties on the surface, signed at
Rome on 7 October 1952 (6
(2) These Conventions have been ratified by the following
Member States of the European Economic Community (list
drawn up on 15 September 1966): Belgium, the Federal
Republic of Germany, France and the Netherlands.
e) Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
) Belgium and France.
) Belgium and France.
) Belgium and Luxembo~rg.No C 59/60 Official Journal of the European Communities
6. The International Convention concerning the
carriage of goods by rail (CIM), and Annexes,
signed at Berne on 25 October 1952  (l);
7. The International Convention concerning the
carriage of passengers and luggage by rail (CIV)
and Annexes, signed at Berne on 25 October
1952 (2);
8. The Agreement on German external debts, signed
at London on 27 February 1953 (2);
9. The Convention on civil procedure concluded at
The Hague on 1 March 1954 (3
10. The Convention on the contract for the
International carriage of goods by road (CMR)
and Protocol of Signature, signed at Geneva on
19 May 1956 (3
11. The Convention concerning the recognition and
enforcement of decisions relating to maintenance
obligations in respect of children, concluded at The
Hague on 15 April 1958 (4
12. The Convention on the jurisdiction
contractual forum in matters relating
international sale of goods, concluded
Hague on 15 April 1958 (5
of the
to the
at The
13. The Convention on third party liability in the field
of nuclear energy, signed at Paris on 29 July
1960 (6a), and the Additional Protocol, signed at
Paris on 28 January 1964 (6b), the Supplementary
Convention to the Paris Convention of 29 July
1960, and Annex, signed at Brussels on 31 January
1963 (6 C), and Additional Protocol to the
Supplementary Convention signed at Paris on 28
January 1964 (6d).
14. The Convention on the liability of operators of
nuclear ships, and Additional Protocol, signed at
Brussels on 25 May 1962 (7);
15. The Convention of 27 October 1956 between the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Federal
Republic of Germany and the French Republic on
the canalization of the Moselle (8
) Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
(l) Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
(3) The six States.
) Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy
and the Netherlands. ) Italy. 
(Ii" (a) and (b) France and Belgium; (c) and (d) France.
) Not ratified,
(8) Ratified by the three States concerned.
The structure of these agreements varies considerably.
Some of them govern only jurisdiction, like the Warsaw
Convention of 12 October 1929 for the unification 
certain rules relating to international carriage by air, or
are based on indirect jurisdiction, like the Hague
Convention of 15 April 1958 concerning the
recognition and enforcement of decisions relating to
maintenance obligations in respect of children, or
contain rules of direct or even exclusive jurisdiction
such as the International Convention of 25 October
1952 concerning the carriage of goods by rail (CIM),
which lays down in Article 43 (5) that actions arising
from the contract of carriage may be brought only in
the courts of the State to which the defendant railway
belongs.
The approach adopted by the Committee means that
agreements relating to particular matters prevail over
the Convention. It follows that, where those agreements
lay down rules of direct or exclusive jurisdiction, the
court of the State of origin will have to apply those rules
to the exclusion of any others; where they contain
provisions concerning the conditions governing the
recognition and enforcement of judgments given in
matters to which the agreements apply, only those
conditions need be satisfied, so that the enforcement
procedure set up by the EEC Convention will not apply
to those judgments.
The Committee adopted this approach in view of the
fact that the Member States of the Community, when
they entered into these agreements, had for the most
part contracted obligations towards non-Member States
which should not be modified without the consent of
those States.
Moreover, the following points must be borne in mind:
1. The rules of jurisdiction laid down in these
agreements have been dictated by particular
considerations relating to the matters of which they
treat, e. g. the flag or port of registration of a vessel
in the maritime conventions; the criterion of
domicile is not often used to establish jurisdiction in
such agreements.
2. The EEC Convention lays down that judgments are
in principle to be recognized, whereas agreements
relating to particular matters usually subject the
recognition and enforcement of judgments to a
certain number of conditions. These conditions may
well differ from the grounds for refusal set out in
Articles 27 and 28; moreover they usually include aOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/61
requirement, which the Convention has dropped
that the court of origin had jurisdiction.
3. The simplified enforcement procedure laid down by
the Convention is the counterpart of Title II, the
provisions of which will not necessarily have to be
observed where the court of the State of origin has
to apply another convention. Consequently, where
agreements relating to particular matters refer for
the enforcement procedure back to the ordinary law
of the State in which enforcement is sought, it is
that law which must be applied. There is, however
nothing to prevent a national legislature from
substituting the Convention procedure for its
ordinary civil procedure for the enforcement of
judgments given in application of agreements
governing particular matters.
Article 
This Article deals only with certain problems . of
jurisdiction raised by the Convention of 15 June 1869
between France and Switzerland.
Under Article 1 of that Convention, a Swiss national
domiciled in France may sue in the French courts a
French national domiciled in a third State.
This option, granted by that Convention to Swiss
nationals domiciled in France, might, in the absence of
Article 58, conflict with the EEC Convention, according
to which a defendant domiciled in a Contracting State
may be sued in the courts of another Contracting State
only in certain defined situations, and in any case not
on the basis of rules of exorbitant jurisdiction such as
those of Article 14 of the French Civil Code.
Under Article 58, a Swiss national domiciled in France
can exercise the option which the Convention between
France and Switzerland grants him to sue in France a
Frenchman domiciled in another Contracting State
without there being any conflict with the EEC
Convention, since the jurisdiction of the French Court
will be recognized under the terms of Article 58. As a
result of this provision, the rights secured by Swiss
nationals domiciled in France are safeguarded, and
France can continue to honour the obligations which it
has entered into with respect to Switzerland. This is, of
course, only an option which is granted to Swiss
nationals, and there is nothing to prevent them from
making use of the other provisions of the EEC
Convention.
Article 
It will be recalled that under Article 3 of the
Convention, what are known as the rules of 'exorbitant
jurisdiction are no longer to be applied in cases where
the defendant is domiciled in the Community, but that
under Article 4 they are still fully applicable where the
defendant is domiciled outside the Community, and
that, in such cases, judgments given by a court whose
jurisdiction derives from those rules are to 
recognized and enforced in the other Contracting States.
It must first be stressed that Article 59 does not reduce
the effect of Article 4 of the Convention, for the latter
Article does not prevent a State, in an agreement with a
third State, from renouncing its rules of exorbitant
jurisdiction either in whole or only in certain cases, for
example, if the defendant is a national of that third
State or if he is domiciled in that State. Each State party
to the EEC Convention remains quite free to conclude
agreements of this type with third States, just as it is free
to amend the provisions of its legislation which contain
rules of exorbitant jurisdiction; Article 4 of the
Convention imposes no common rule, but merely refers
back to the internal law of each State.
The only objective of Article 59 is to lessen the effects
within the Community, of judgments given on the basis
of rules of exorbitant jurisdiction. Under the combined
effect of Articles 59 and 28, recognition or enforcement
of a judgment given in a State party to the Convention
can be refused in any other Contracting State:
1. where the jurisdiction of the court of origin could
only be based on one of the rules of exorbitant
jurisdiction specified in the second paragraph of
Article 3. It would therefore be no ground for
refusal that the court of origin founded its
jurisdiction on one of those rules, if it could equally
well have founded its jurisdiction on other
provisions of its law. For example, a judgment given
in France on the basis of Article 14 of the Civil
Code could be recognized and enforced if the
litigation related to a contract which was to be
performed in France;No C 59/62 Official Journal of the European Communities
2. where a convention on the recognition and
enforcement of judgments exists between the State
addressed and a third State, under the terms of
which judgments given in any other State on the
basis of a rule of exorbitant jurisdiction will be
neither recognized nor enforced where the
defendant was domiciled or habitually resident in
the third State. Belgium would thus not be obliged
to recognize or enforce a judgment given in France
against a person domiciled or habitually resident in
Norway where the jurisdiction of the French courts
over that person could be based only on Article 14
of the Civil Code since a convention between
Belgium and Norway exists under which those two
countries undertook not to recognize or enforce
such judgments. Article 59 includes a reference not
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only to the defendant's domicile but also to his
habitual residence, since in many non-member
States this criterion is in practice equivalent to the
concept of domicile as this is understood in the
Member States of the Community (see also Article
10 (1)) of the Hague Convention on the recognition
, and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and
commercial matters).
As regards the recognition and enforcement of
judgments. Article 59 thus opens the way towards
regulating the relations between the Member States of
the EEC and other States, in particular the increasing
number which are members of the Hague Conference.
This seemed to justify a slight encroachment on the
principle of free movement of judgments.
FINAL PROVISIONS
Articles  60  to  62  and  64  to 
These Articles give rise to no particular comment.
Article 
Article 63 deals with the accession of new' Member
States to the European Economic Community.
It is desirable, in the opinion of the Committee, that, in
order to be able to fulfil the obligations laid down in
Article 220 of the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, such States should accede to the
Convention. The legal systems of such States might
however, prevent the acceptance of the Convention as it
stands, and negotiations might be necessary. If such
were the case, any agreement concluded between the Six
and a new Member State should not depart from the
basic principles of the Convention. That is why Article
63 provides that the Convention must be taken as a
basis for the negotiations, which should be concerned
only with such adjustments as are essential for the new
Member State to be able to accede to the Convention.
The negotiations with that State would not necessarily
have to precede its admission to the Community.
Since the adjustments would be the subject of a special
agreement between the Six and the new Member State,
it follows from the second paragraph of Article 63 that
these negotiations could not be used as an opportunity
for the Six to reopen debate on the Convention.
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PROTOCOL
Article I
Article I of the Protocol takes account of the special
position of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. It
provides that any person domiciled in Luxembourg who
is sued in a court of another Contracting State pursuant
to Article 5 (1) (which provides, in matters relating to a
contract, that the courts for the place of performance ofOfficial Journal of the European Communities No C 59/63
the obligation shall have jurisdiction), may refuse the
jurisdiction of those courts. A similar reservation is
included in the Benelux Treaty (Protocol, Article I), and
it is justified by the particular nature of the economic
relations between Belgium and Luxembourg, in
consequence of which the greater part of the contractual
obligations between persons resident in the two
countries are performed or are to be performed 
Belgium. It follows from Article 5 (1) that a plaintiff
domiciled in Belgium could in most cases bring an
action in the Belgian courts.
Another characteristic of Luxembourg economic
relations is that a large number of the contracts
concluded by persons resident in Luxembourg are
international contracts. In view of this, it was clearly
necessary that agreements conferring jurisdiction which
could be invoked against persons domiciled in
Luxembourg should be subject to stricter conditions
than those of Article 17. The text adopted is based on
that of the Benelux Treaty (Article 5 (3)).
Article 
Article II of the Protocol also has its OrIgIn in the
Benelux Treaty. The latter applies  inter alia 
judgments given in civil matters by criminal courts, and
thus puts an end to a controversy between Belgium and
the Netherlands on the interpretation of the 1925
Convention between Belgium and the Netherlands. As
the report annexed to the Treaty explains (1), the
reluctance of the Netherlands authorities to enforce
judgments given by foreign criminal courts in civil
claims is due to the fact that a Netherlander charged
with a punishable offence committed in  foreign
country may be obliged to appear in person before the
foreign criminal court in order to defend himself even in
relation to the civil claim, although the Netherlands
does not extradite its nationals. This objection is less
pertinent than would appear at first sight under certain
systems of law, and in particular in France, Belgium and
Luxembourg, the judgment in a criminal case has the
force of  res judicata  in any subsequent civil action.
In view of this, the subsequent civil action brought
against a Netherlander convicted of a criminal offence
will inevitably go against him. It is therefore essential
that he should be able to conduct his defence' during the
criminal stage of the proceedings.
(1) Benelux Treaty: see the commentary on Article 13 and
Article II of the Protocol.
For this reason the Convention, like the Benelux Treaty,
provides (see the Protocol) that a person domiciled in a
Contracting State may arrange for his defence in the
criminal courts of any other Contracting State.
Under Article II of the Protocol, that person will enjoy
this right even if he does not appear in person and even
if the code of criminal procedure of the State in question
does not allow him to be represented. However, if the
court seised of the matter should specifically order
appearance in person, the judgment given without the
person concerned having had the opportunity to
arrange for his defence, because he did not appear in
person, need not be recognized or enforced in the other
Contracting States.
This right is, however, accorded by Article II of the
Protocol only to persons who are prosecuted for an
offence which was not intentionally committed; this
includes road accidents.
Article  III
This Article is also based on the Benelux Treaty (Article
III of the Protocol).
It abolishes the levying, in the State in which
enforcement is sought, of any charge, duty or fee which
is calculated by reference to the value of the matter in
issue, and seeks to remedy the distortion resulting from
the fact that enforcement gives rise to the levying of
fixed fees in certain countries and proportional fees in
others.
This Article is not concerned with lawyers' fees.
In the opinion of the Committee, while it was desirable
to abolish proportional fees on enforcement, there was
no reason to suppress the fixed charges, duties and fees
which are payable, even under the internal laws of the
Contracting States, whenever certain procedural acts are
performed, and which in some respects can be regarded
as fees charged for services rendered to the parties.
Article IV
(See the commentary on Article 20 (2) page 66  et seq.)No C 59/64 Official Journal of the European Communities
Article VI
provisions of the laws mentioned in the Convention 
as might happen in the case of the provisions specified
in the second paragraph of Article 3  or affect the
courts listed in Section 2 of Title III. Information on
these matters must be passed to the Secretary General of
the Council of the European Communities to enable
him, in accordance with Article 64 (e), to flotify the
other Contracting States.
Article V
(See the commentary on Article 6 (2), page 27  et seq.
This Article relates to the case where legislative
amendments to national laws affect either the
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